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ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC v. CA

FACTS:

Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) after his motion to quash the information charging him with falsification of public documents was denied by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The information accused the petitioner of falsifying various documents and using them in a Petition for Reconstitution of Records filed by another accused. Initially, the information was quashed by Branch 80 of the RTC. However, more than two years later, two new informations for falsification of public documents were filed against the petitioner and others. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the new informations based on the ground of double jeopardy. The RTC denied the motion, ruling that the new information involved a different document from the one in the earlier quashed information. The CA upheld the RTC's ruling, stating that the petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy. The petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, disputing the CA's decision. The Office of the Solicitor General claimed that the petitioner had waived his right against double jeopardy by filing the motion to quash. On the other hand, the private respondent argued that the dismissal or quashal of an information is not a bar to another prosecution, except in certain specified grounds.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the prosecution of the petitioner under the subsequent information would constitute double jeopardy, considering that the first information against him was quashed.

  2. Whether the subsequent filing of the two informations constitutes a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

  3. Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of the accused.

RULING:

  1. The court held that not all the elements of double jeopardy exist in the case. In order for double jeopardy to apply, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Here, the first information against the petitioner was quashed at his own instance, and the dismissal was done with his express consent. Since one of the requisites for double jeopardy, i.e. that the dismissal be without the accused's express consent, is not present, the subsequent prosecution under the new information does not constitute double jeopardy.

  2. The court ruled in the negative. The circumstances present in the cases of Tatad and Angchangco, which justified the "radical relief" granted by the court, are not present in the present case. The court emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In this case, there was a delay in the refiling of the proper informations, but the prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain the circumstances that may have caused such delay. Furthermore, the petitioner never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case and it was only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that raised the issue on petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case.

  3. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of the accused.

PRINCIPLES:

  • A valid indictment is required for double jeopardy to attach.

  • Legal jeopardy attaches upon a valid indictment before a competent court after arraignment and a valid plea has been entered.

  • In the case of a duplicitous information, the defect may be waived by the accused and they can be convicted of as many offenses as those charged and proven during trial.

  • The dismissal of a case at the accused's own instance, such as through a motion to quash, with the accused's express consent does not constitute double jeopardy.

  • The right to a speedy disposition of a case may be waived if not properly raised in the lower courts.

  • The right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

  • The length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are factors to be considered in determining whether the right to a speedy disposition of cases has been violated.

  • The filing of informations after a delay does not automatically constitute a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of cases. The circumstances peculiar to each case must be taken into account.

  • The trial court should only suspend the arraignment of an accused if there is a pending petition for review before the Secretary of Justice or the Office of the President, and it is shown that the resolution of the petition is likely to affect the determination of the case.

  • The trial court has the discretion to suspend the arraignment of an accused, but such discretion should be exercised judiciously and only when there are compelling or justifiable reasons for the suspension.