FACTS:

Mario Valeroso, the petitioner, was appointed as the caretaker of a lot owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). He placed a sign on the lot indicating that it was private property. However, Julita Castillo, believing that the lot belonged to her grandparents, constructed a nipa hut on the lot. Valeroso, along with other individuals, demolished Castillo's hut. As a result, Castillo filed a complaint for malicious mischief against Valeroso and his cohorts. The MTC found Valeroso guilty of malicious mischief, while the other defendants were acquitted due to insufficient evidence. Valeroso appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the MTC's decision but modified it by imposing civil liability on Valeroso. Valeroso further appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC's decision. Unsatisfied, Valeroso filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA erred in finding Valeroso guilty of malicious mischief.

RULING:

1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA that Valeroso is guilty of malicious mischief. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief, as provided under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, were present in this case. Valeroso admitted to deliberately demolishing Castillo's hut, the act did not constitute arson or any other crime involving destruction, and the act was committed merely for the sake of causing damage. Valeroso's claim that he acted to safeguard the interest of his employer, the PNB, was not sufficient to justify his actions. The Court held that Valeroso was not acting in the fulfillment of his duty and did not have lawful authority to demolish Castillo's property. Therefore, his appeal was dismissed, and the CA's decision was affirmed.

PRINCIPLES:

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) deliberate causing of damage to the property of another; (2) the act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; and (3) the act is committed merely for the sake of damaging the property. The justifying circumstance that exempts a person from criminal liability for acting in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office requires that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.