KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA

FACTS:

The case involves petitioner Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national, who was charged with violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The charge stemmed from a "buy-bust operation" conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents in Minucher's house, where they allegedly seized a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug. Private respondent Arthur Scalzo, who accompanied the narcotic agents, would later become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On January 8, 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting Minucher and another accused. Minucher then filed a civil case for damages against Scalzo, claiming that the charges of drug trafficking were trumped-up. In the civil case, Minucher provided details about his background and his encounters with Scalzo, including their discussions on politics, business, and the purchase of items like caviar and carpets. Minucher alleged that Scalzo, who claimed to be a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States, orchestrated his arrest and violated his privacy by invading his bedroom without a warrant.

The plaintiff, Khosrow Minucher, alleged that on June 19, 1987, a certain Mr. Alonzo, whom he met through an acquaintance, came to his residence and asked him to inspect some carpets at a warehouse. When they arrived, Alonzo introduced him to the defendant, Arthur Scalzo, who claimed to be a buyer of carpets and gems. Both Alonzo and Scalzo insisted on bringing the carpets to Minucher's house for inspection, after which Scalzo paid $24,000.00 for the carpets. Minucher alleged that Scalzo also saw the $8,000.00 he placed in his safe, as well as a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00.

On June 24, 1987, Minucher was arrested by NARCOM agents together with a certain Torabian, accusing them of being heroin traffickers. Minucher argued that he was subjected to physical violence during his arrest and was never given the opportunity to use the telephone or consult a lawyer. He further claimed that his arrest was well publicized in newspapers all over the world and that he and Torabian were detained for three days without food and water at Camp Crame.

The trial court granted a motion for extension of time to file an answer filed by Scalzo's counsel, who argued that they needed advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice in order to prepare a defense. Scalzo then filed a motion to quash the summons, stating that he was not a resident of the Philippines and that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. The court denied the motion, holding that Scalzo's motion for extension of time to file an answer was a voluntary appearance that could be construed as a waiver of formal notice.

Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was denied, and further elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. However, the petition was denied for failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88. Meanwhile, the trial court declared Scalzo in default for failing to file a responsive pleading and set the case for the reception of evidence.

Scalzo later filed a motion to set aside the order of default and admit his answer, denying the material allegations of the complaint and claiming that he was acting in his official capacity as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. He also filed a counterclaim for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation. Almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of diplomatic immunity, attaching a Diplomatic Note from the United States Embassy and a Certification from the Vice Consul.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, prompting Scalzo to file a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme Court. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, which sustained Scalzo's diplomatic immunity and ordered the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

The petitioner, Minucher G. P. Sicangco, filed a complaint for damages against Arthur J. Scalzo, a United States diplomatic agent, for the alleged tortious acts committed by Scalzo in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties. The trial court ruled in favor of Sicangco and held Scalzo liable for damages. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and declared that Scalzo was entitled to diplomatic immunity as provided by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Sicangco then filed a petition for review questioning the applicability of the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and whether Scalzo was indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the previous decision in a related case did not resolve the issue of diplomatic immunity with finality. Scalzo argued that he was entitled to immunity based on his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines. He submitted various documents to support his claim, including a diplomatic note and a certification from a Vice Consul.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal in an entirely different manner than previously decided by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 97765.

  2. Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULING:

  1. On the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment: The Supreme Court held that the ruling in G.R. No. 97765 had not resolved the issue of diplomatic immunity with finality. Thus, the Court of Appeals was not precluded from addressing the matter in its decision.

  2. On diplomatic immunity: The Supreme Court ruled that Arthur Scalzo, being an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency with functions sanctioned by the Philippine government, is entitled to state immunity from suit. Consequently, the defense of state immunity applies as Scalzo acted within his official duties.

PRINCIPLES:

  1. Doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment: Requires finality of the prior judgment, valid jurisdiction, judgment on the merits, and identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

  2. Diplomatic immunity: Diplomats are immune from the jurisdiction of the receiving state if they perform duties of a diplomatic nature.

  3. State Immunity from Suit: A state and its agents acting in official capacities are immune from suits in foreign jurisdictions unless there is express consent.

  4. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Grants various immunities but emphasizes restrictive application to "diplomatic agents" who perform diplomatic functions.