FACTS:
The case involves an appeal challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which absolved Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel from any liability for the death of a minor pedestrian. The incident occurred when Mayor Miguel, who was riding in an Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme while crossing the National Highway. Marvin sustained severe head injuries and later succumbed to them.
The parents of Marvin filed a complaint for damages against several defendants, seeking their solidary liability for their loss. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the parents, holding Mayor Miguel jointly liable with the other defendants. Unsatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel appealed to the CA, arguing that he was not Lozano's employer and should not be held liable for the accident.
The CA granted Mayor Miguel's appeal, holding that he cannot be held liable as he was not Lozano's employer. However, the parents of Marvin filed a petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA's decision, alleging that the CA erred in absolving Mayor Miguel from liability.
ISSUES:
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Whether the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability applies in this case.
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Whether Mayor Miguel can be held liable for the negligent acts of Lozano.
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Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between Mayor Miguel and Lozano.
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The issue in this case is whether Mayor Miguel, as a passenger in the vehicle involved in the accident, can be held liable for the death of Marvin Jayme.
RULING:
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The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability does not apply in this case.
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Mayor Miguel cannot be held liable for the negligent acts of Lozano.
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An employer-employee relationship does not exist between Mayor Miguel and Lozano.
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The Supreme Court ruled that Mayor Miguel cannot be held liable for Marvin Jayme's death. There existed no causal relationship between Mayor Miguel and the driver of the vehicle or the vehicle itself that would make him accountable. Mayor Miguel was merely a passenger at the time of the accident and not the employer or registered owner of the vehicle. Liability attaches to the negligent driver, his direct employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle. The municipality, as the true and lawful employer of the driver, cannot be sued because it is engaged in governmental functions and is immune from suit.
PRINCIPLES:
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To make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the injurious or tortuous act must be committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
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The burden of proving an employment relationship is on the plaintiff, and the defendant is under no obligation to prove the negative averment.
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The existence of an employment relationship is determined using the four-fold test: (1) the employer's power of selection, (2) payment of wages or other remuneration, (3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the work, and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
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Even if an employee is loaned by the employer to another person or entity, an employer-employee relationship still exists if control over the employee subsists.
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Mere giving of directions to a driver does not establish control over the vehicle or make one the employer of the driver.
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Negligence may not be imputed against a fellow employee, and the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.
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Liability for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of a vehicle rests with the negligent driver, the driver's employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle.
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A public official is not vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of subordinates unless they cooperate in the act complained of or direct or encourage it.
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Failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing warnings or serving as a lookout, does not make the passenger liable for the driver's negligent acts.
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Municipal corporations are generally not liable for torts committed in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.