FACTS:

Eden del Castillo was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Witnesses testified that a search warrant was issued for del Castillo's grandmother's house where she was visiting. During the search, various drugs and drug paraphernalia were found, and del Castillo was arrested. The seized items were confirmed to be shabu by a chemist from the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. Del Castillo claimed that she was forced to sign the inventory and was not given a copy. She also declared that the search warrant was served on her.

On July 31, 2000, the PNP implemented a search warrant against del Castillo and seized plastic packs of shabu. The confiscated drugs were submitted for analysis, which confirmed their content. The trial court found del Castillo guilty and sentenced her to Reclusion Perpetua. Del Castillo appealed, arguing that she did not own the house that was searched, the seized articles were not turned over to the issuing court, and her constitutional rights were violated during the raid. The OSG agreed with her arguments and filed a motion for acquittal.

The prosecution failed to prove that del Castillo owned or shared ownership of the house where the shabu was found. Witnesses testified that the house belonged to del Castillo's grandmother. Evidence, such as a tax declaration in her grandmother's name, supported this claim. Del Castillo's grandmother also testified that she lived in the house, along with del Castillo and her grandson. The prosecution witnesses only testified that del Castillo frequented the house and it was known that she lived there since childhood. There was no evidence to establish that del Castillo had control or dominion over the place where the shabu was found.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the appellant's control and dominion over the place where the shabu was found.

2. Whether the prosecution was able to prove appellant's possession of the shabu at the time of her arrest.

3. Whether the search conducted on the subject house complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

4. Whether the search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

5. Whether the raiding party violated the hierarchy of witnesses required by the law in conducting the search.

6. Whether the police officers have the authority to retain possession of confiscated property without approval from the court.

7. Whether the inventory receipt is admissible as evidence when the accused signed it without the assistance of counsel.

8. Whether the signing of receipts by the appellant, acknowledging the confiscated items, violated her constitutional right to remain silent.

9. Whether the absence of a written waiver of the right to counsel and the presence of counsel at the time the appellant signed the receipts violated her right under the Constitution.

10. Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

1. The evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish, by competent evidence, that the appellant is the owner or shared the ownership of the house where the shabu was found. There was no competent evidence that appellant had control and dominion over the place. The appellant's claim that she was only a visitor in the house that belongs to her grandmother was not rebutted by convincing evidence.

2. The prosecution also failed to prove appellant's possession of the shabu at the time of her arrest. The raiding team did not find any drugs on appellant's body, nor was there anything unusual or suspicious noted in her person.

3. The manner in which the search was conducted on the subject house did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The search must be done in the presence of the lawful occupants or their family members. However, in this case, the appellant and the other occupants of the house were asked to stay in the sala while the search was ongoing. They were not allowed to actually witness the search of the premises, which violated the law.

4. Yes, the search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The provision states that no search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family, or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Violation of this rule is punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.

5. Yes, the raiding party violated the hierarchy of witnesses required by the law in conducting the search. The police officers should have ensured that the search was witnessed by the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. The police officers were not allowed to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.

6. The police officers do not have the authority to retain possession of confiscated property without approval from the court. Approval by the court that issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the police officers. Without such approval, the police officers have no authority to retain possession of the property and deliver it to another agency.

7. The inventory receipt is not admissible as evidence when the accused signed it without the assistance of counsel. It is a violation of the accused's custodial rights to use an inventory receipt as evidence without informing the accused of their right not to sign the receipt and to the assistance of counsel. The accused must be fully informed of their rights before signing any document, as failing to do so renders the document inadmissible as evidence.

8. The signing of receipts by the appellant, acknowledging the confiscated items, violated her constitutional right to remain silent. The Court held that such practice is unusual and violates the constitutional right to remain silent. The receipts were considered extra-judicial confessions obtained without informing the appellant of her right, and therefore inadmissible as evidence.

9. The absence of a written waiver of the right to counsel and the presence of counsel at the time the appellant signed the receipts violated her right under the Constitution. The Court emphasized that any waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. A written waiver in the presence of counsel is required. Without such written waiver and presence of counsel, the appellant's signature on the inventory receipt was a violation of her constitutional right.

10. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that in all criminal cases, the appellant has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Since the evidence presented showed insufficient factual nexus of the appellant's participation in the offense charged, she was acquitted and ordered to be released from confinement.

PRINCIPLES:

• It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued. However, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under the person's control or possession.

• The prosecution must prove the accused's possession of the illegal drugs at the time of arrest.

• A search must be conducted in the presence of the lawful occupants or their family members, and two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, in order to comply with the law.

• The requirement of the presence of witnesses during a search is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant.

• Violation of the rules on search and seizure is punishable under the law.

• The hierarchy of witnesses prescribed by the Rules of Court must be followed in conducting searches.

• The seizure of evidence must be conducted in a manner that excludes all hypotheses consistent with the innocence of the accused.

• The seized property must be delivered to the court that issued the warrant, accompanied by a true inventory duly verified under oath. Failure to do so violates the rules on search and seizure.

• The mere tolerance by the trial court of unlawful practices by law enforcement does not make it right. Such practices violate the mandatory requirements of the law and can lead to speculations of tampering with evidence.

• Approval by the court is necessary for the retention of confiscated property by police officers.

• The accused must be fully informed of their rights, including the right not to sign any document and the right to the assistance of counsel, before signing any document that may be used as evidence against them.

• The practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for confiscated items without informing them of their right to remain silent violates their constitutional rights.

• Any waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. It must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.

• The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.