PEOPLE v. NESTOR G. SORIANO

FACTS:

Nestor G. Soriano was charged and convicted of destructive arson for setting fire to several houses in Davao City. The incident began with an argument between Nestor and Honey Rosario Cimagala, his live-in partner, regarding their son. After Honey refused Nestor's sexual advances, he became angry and physically assaulted her. He even threatened to burn down the house. Consequently, Nestor set fire to a plastic partition in Honey's room and burned her clothes in a cabinet. As the fire spread, Honey managed to escape and alerted her neighbors about Nestor's actions. Nestor then followed Honey, choked her, but eventually released her. As a result of the fire, Honey's house, along with five neighboring houses, were completely destroyed. Nestor was found guilty by the trial court and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, along with an obligation to compensate the complainants.

Honey Rosario Cimagala positively identified Nestor G. Soriano as the individual responsible for setting fire to Fe Cimagala's house. The trial court convicted Soriano based on Honey Rosario Cimagala's testimony. While Soriano denied the crime, his denial was insufficient to contradict the account provided by a credible witness. The court agreed with the trial court's assessment that the required proof beyond reasonable doubt was established. Soriano's conviction was based on Art. 320, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1, which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death for destructive arson. However, the court believed that the applicable law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson since the properties burned by Soriano were explicitly described as houses.

In this case, the Court addressed the issue of whether the structures in question should be classified as houses or buildings/edifices. The City Treasurer of Manila sought to collect building and real estate taxes on these structures. However, the owners argued that the structures were houses, not buildings/edifices, and therefore should not be subject to such taxes. Upon examination, it was determined that the structures were wooden houses. The Court then considered the relevant provisions of the law to determine whether the structures should indeed be classified as houses or buildings/edifices for taxation purposes.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the applicable provision of law should be Art. 320, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code or Sec. 3, par. 2 of PD 1613.

  2. Whether the act committed by the accused constitutes Destructive Arson or Simple Arson.

  3. Whether the special aggravating circumstance of "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" can be appreciated in the present case.

  4. Whether the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for arson is proper in this case.

  5. Whether the elements discussed by Mr. Justice Carson in his separate concurring opinion in Butardo are present.

  6. Whether the penalty of the appellant should be modified to simple arson.

  7. Whether the award of actual damages and moral damages is supported by evidence.

  8. Whether the award of temperate damages and exemplary damages is justified.

RULING:

  1. The applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2 of PD 1613 instead of Art. 320, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

  2. The act committed by the accused constitutes Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2 of PD 1613, as the properties burned are specifically described as houses.

  3. The special aggravating circumstance of "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case.

  4. The Court is not adequately convinced that imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper in this case. The accused's actions were a result of a lovers' tiff and there was no reckless disregard for human lives. His purpose was to convince his lover to move back with him, not to exterminate human lives. Furthermore, there was no reckless disregard for the rights of neighboring property owners. The accused's diminished emotional state mitigates his criminal liability.

  5. The elements discussed by Mr. Justice Carson in his separate concurring opinion in Butardo are not present in this case. The accused did not act with a cold, calculating, wicked, and perverse intention to burn the house and there was no reckless disregard for human lives or the rights of neighboring property owners.

  6. The penalty of the appellant is modified to simple arson under Section 3, paragraph 2, of PD 1613.

  7. The records did not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages and moral damages. However, the court awarded temperate damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to each complaining witness or their heirs.

  8. Exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are awarded to each complaining witness or their heirs as a way to reshape behavior and preserve the public good.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Proof beyond reasonable doubt means moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

  • Penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and literally in favor of the accused in case of ambiguity in their construction.

  • Destructive Arson is characterized as a heinous crime with greater degree of perversity and viciousness compared to Simple Arson under PD 1613.

  • Acts falling under Simple Arson may be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present, but none were established in the present case.

  • Passion and obfuscation, which leads to a reduction in the accused's mental and rational faculties, is a mitigating circumstance.

  • The penalties for arson in the Philippines were intended to address the extreme danger to human lives and property resulting from malicious burning of buildings.

  • The severity of the penalties for arson are graduated according to the degree of danger to life and property resulting from the commission of the crime.

  • The potential damage and risk to human lives are key factors in determining the gravity of the crime of arson.

  • The intention of the author of the crime, as well as the presence of reckless disregard for human lives and property, are relevant in determining the severity of the penalty for arson.

  • The presence of mitigating circumstances, such as diminished emotional state, may lessen the degree of criminality and mitigate the punishment to be imposed.

  • Proof is required to determine the reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded to victims of conflagration.

  • Actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged.

  • Moral damages must have an evidentiary basis to be awarded.

  • The court may award temperate or moderate damages when the exact amount of damages cannot be proved with certainty.

  • Exemplary or corrective damages may be awarded to correct future conduct and preserve the public good.

  • Lessons can be learned from one's mistakes and misfortunes.