FACTS:

The case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines to reverse the Sandiganbayan's decision granting Joseph Estrada's demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565. An Information for plunder was filed against Estrada, along with other accused, on April 4, 2001. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was also filed against Estrada. The cases were consolidated for joint trial. The People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations. The Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence and denied the motions to reconsider. Estrada filed a demurrer to evidence, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove his use of the name "Jose Velarde" and that the use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The case involves the petition of Joseph Estrada seeking to reverse the resolution of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to the opening of Trust Account C-163. It found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime of illegal use of alias. The Sandiganbayan concluded that Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings after a certain date is not relevant to the case. The Sandiganbayan also rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel regarding publicity. It further concluded that the use of the alias in a numbered trust account did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity.

Former President Joseph Estrada was charged with plunder and other crimes. One of the charges against him was the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in opening a numbered trust account. The use of the alias was considered a violation of CA No. 142. It was argued that the use of the alias was protected by the secrecy provisions of RA No. 1405 and was not covered by CA No. 142 until the passage into law of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the charge of using an alias against Estrada, reasoning that it was protected by the secrecy provisions of RA No. 1405 until the passage of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. The prosecution filed a petition questioning the dismissal and raised several issues, including whether the use of the alias was public and whether the harmonization and application of the relevant laws were proper. The prosecution also disputed the limitation of the amended information to the use of the alias on a specific date and the departure from the court's earlier finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals to the case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the use of an alias by a person violates CA No. 142, as amended.

2. Whether the Ursua ruling should be applied in determining criminal liability under CA No. 142.

3. Whether there should be a distinction in applying CA No. 142 to the President of the Philippines.

4. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in applying Ursua despite a previous final ruling on its non-applicability.

5. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in limiting the coverage of the indictment.

6. Whether the allegations of the date of the commission of the offense in the information are sufficient.

7. Whether the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" in the information is a surplusage and has no meaning separately from the phrase "on or about".

8. Whether the allegation of multiple transactions on several separate days in the Information violates the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

9. What act or acts constituting a violation of the offense charged were actually alleged in the Information.

10. Whether the use of an alias within a single day can be deemed "habitual" and therefore punishable under the offense charged.

11. Whether the presence of two individuals who are not bank officers during the signing of bank documents amounts to a "public" use of an alias that violates the law.

12. Whether the use of aliases in banking transactions is allowed under CA No. 142.

13. Whether R.A. No. 1405, governing bank deposits, is an exception to the coverage of CA No. 142.

14. Whether trust transactions fall within the coverage of R.A. No. 1405.

15. Whether the Sandiganbayan's ruling on the privileged nature of the transaction or communication was erroneous.

16. Whether the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers only bank employees and officers, and not the accused.

17. Whether the Sandiganbayan ruling supposedly encouraging the commission of wrongdoing and concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms is valid.

18. Whether the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is considered publicity applies to violations of CA No. 142.

19. Whether the use of an alias must be made openly or in an open manner or place for it to be considered public under CA No. 142.

20. Whether there was sufficient intention of publicity in the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by the accused.

21. • Whether or not there was a public use of alias when Jose Velarde signed the documents relating to the opening of the trust account
22. • Whether or not the enactment of R.A. No.9160 can be applied in the indictment against Estrada without violating the prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws
23. • Whether or not R.A. No. 1405 can be applied to Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde"

RULING:

1. The use of an alias by a person violates CA No. 142, as amended, if there is a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth. The use of the alias must be habitual and public in nature.

2. The Ursua ruling should be followed in determining criminal liability under CA No. 142. The Ursua ruling provides the definition of an alias and the historical background and rationale behind the enactment of the law. The court is guided by the Ursua ruling, and adherence to it is necessary in the application of and determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.

3. There should be no distinction in applying CA No. 142 to the President of the Philippines. The law does not make any distinction that would justify a differential treatment. The President is allowed to use his screen name even when holding office. Any distinction based on the President's position would unduly prejudice him, and CA No. 142 should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.

4. The Sandiganbayan did not err in applying Ursua. The previous ruling on its non-applicability is not considered final because it was a mere interlocutory order. The Sandiganbayan has the authority to modify or rescind interlocutory orders upon sufficient grounds shown before final judgment.

5. The Sandiganbayan did not err in limiting the coverage of the indictment. The phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" and does not create separate transactions. The allegation of time is not as essential in satisfying the constitutional requirement of informing the accused of the accusation against him.

6. The allegations of the date of the commission of the offense in the information are sufficient. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice. It is not necessary to state the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime.

7. The phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" in the information is not a surplusage. The information alleges that the accused represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities on February 4, 2000, or before or after that date. The use of the "OR" between the phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase implies that all the transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after that date.

8. Yes, the allegation of multiple transactions on several separate days in the Information violates the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

9. The act alleged in the Information is a single act of signing bank documents using an alias.

10. The use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual."

11. The presence of two individuals who are not bank officers during the signing of bank documents does not amount to a "public" use of an alias that violates the law.

12. The use of aliases in banking transactions is not allowed under CA No. 142.

13. R.A. No. 1405, governing bank deposits, is not an exception to the coverage of CA No. 142.

14. Trust transactions do not fall within the coverage of R.A. No. 1405.

15. The Sandiganbayan's ruling on the privileged nature of the transaction or communication was erroneous.

16. The prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers both bank employees and officers as well as the accused.

17. The Sandiganbayan ruling encouraging the commission of wrongdoing and concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms is not valid.

18. The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is considered publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142.

19. For the use of an alias to be considered public under CA No. 142, it must be made openly, in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known.

20. Based on the circumstances of the case, the accused did not manifest the intent to publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde."

21. • The Supreme Court found that there was no public use of the alias "Jose Velarde" when Estrada signed the documents. The transactions were considered private and the use of the alias was within the context of these private transactions. Therefore, the provisions of R.A. No.1405 on bank secrecy do not apply.
22. • The Court also ruled that the enactment of R.A. No.9160 cannot be applied to Estrada's indictment without violating the prohibition on ex post facto laws. The law was passed after the commission of the alleged crimes and cannot retroactively be applied to Estrada.
23. • Finally, the Court emphasized that the guilt of any accused, including Estrada, must be based on evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the People failed to discharge this burden, and thus, there was no reversible error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

PRINCIPLES:

• A violation of CA No. 142, as amended, occurs when a person uses an alias publicly and habitually, indicating an intention to be known by that name in addition to his real name.

• The Ursua ruling provides the definition of an alias and the historical background and rationale behind the enactment of CA No. 142.

• CA No. 142 should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.

• An interlocutory order is provisional in nature and can be modified or rescinded before final judgment.

• The principle of res judicata does not apply to interlocutory orders.

• The Sandiganbayan has the authority to arrive at a different conclusion on the application of a case law based on differing views.

• The coverage of an indictment is determined based on the allegations and their relationship, and the allegation of time is not as essential in satisfying the constitutional requirement of informing the accused.

• The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is a constitutional right.

• A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the approximate date of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense was committed.

• The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense.

• The information must embody the essential elements of the crime charged and set forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused to enable him to properly prepare for and undertake his defense.

• Accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation.

• Right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.

• Definition of "habitual."

• Prohibition on the use of aliases in banking transactions under CA No. 142.

• Inapplicability of R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to CA No. 142.

• Distinction between traditional deposits and trust accounts.

• Confidentiality of bank transactions under R.A. No. 1405.

• Interpretation of R.A. No. 1405 and CA No. 142.

• Prohibition against using the law as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes.

• The required publicity in the use of an alias under CA No. 142 is more than mere communication to a third person; it must be made openly or in an open manner or place.

• Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.

• The term "deposits" in R.A. No. 1405 applies broadly and includes investments made by banks on behalf of depositors.

• Transactions considered private or where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use an alias publicly.

• Prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.

• The enactment of a new law cannot be applied retroactively to the detriment of an accused.