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CRESENCIA ACHEVARA v. ELVIRA RAMOS

FACTS:

In this case, the respondents, Elvira Ramos and her two minor children, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners, Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo Achevara, and Benigno Valdez. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that occurred on April 22, 1995, on the national highway in Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. The respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez, who was driving a passenger jeep owned by the petitioners, recklessly attempted to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and collide with the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Arnulfo Ramos suffered injuries that ultimately led to his death. The respondents sought to recover damages, including medical and funeral expenses.

During the trial, witnesses testified on the circumstances of the accident. PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who was present at the scene, stated that he saw the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos running in a zigzag manner and colliding with the passenger jeep. He assisted the injured driver and reported the incident to the police. Investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who arrived afterwards, documented the damages to both vehicles.

On the other hand, petitioner Benigno Valdez testified that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner before the collision. He claimed that he tried to avoid the collision but was unable to do so and ended up losing consciousness. After regaining consciousness, he surrendered himself to the police and provided information about the incident.

Petitioner Alfredo Achevara, who owned the passenger jeep, testified that he had hired Benigno Valdez as the driver since 1992 but only during the daytime. He emphasized that he had exercised due diligence in selecting, training, and supervising Valdez. Achevara stated that they required Valdez to present his professional driver's license and conducted a background investigation on his personal history and driving experience. Additionally, as part of his apprenticeship, Valdez was instructed to drive from Metro Manila to Tagaytay City and back within a day. Prior to the accident, Achevara claimed to have noticed a policeman following him, but there was a tricycle blocking their visibility. He denied driving at a fast speed and insisted that his speedometer indicated a speed of only 20.

These facts provide an overview of the circumstances leading to the complaint for damages filed by the respondents against the petitioners, as well as the testimonies presented by witnesses and the parties involved in the case.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.

  2. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies to the case

  3. Whether the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Arnulfo Ramos

  4. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case.

RULING:

  1. Yes, the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The doctrine states that where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

  2. The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to the case. The Court held that the doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered."

  3. The negligence of Arnulfo Ramos was the proximate cause of the accident. The Court found that Ramos knowingly drove a defective vehicle and failed to have it repaired. His negligence in driving the defective vehicle was the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.

  4. The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply in this case. Although it can be said that the plaintiff had the last chance to avoid the collision when the defendant's vehicle encroached on his lane, there was no longer an opportunity for the plaintiff to avoid the collision. The records indicate that the plaintiff maneuvered his vehicle towards the shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the defendant's vehicle continued to move towards his lane and ultimately bumped the plaintiff's vehicle. The doctrine of last clear chance applies when the defendant had the last fair chance to avoid the harm but failed to do so. In this case, the plaintiff no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision due to the defendant's continuous movement towards his lane.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Doctrine of last clear chance: When both parties are guilty of negligence, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. (Picart v. Smith)

  • The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply when the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by applying all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

  • Negligence is the failure to act or act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable person would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.

  • A person is guilty of inexcusable negligence when he fails to take precautionary measures that a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the circumstances and such negligence proximately causes injury to another.

  • Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence to the extent that it amounts to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.

  • The doctrine of last clear chance applies when the plaintiff was negligent but the defendant had the last fair chance to avoid the harm and failed to do so. However, the doctrine does not apply when the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

  • When the plaintiff's own negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. However, if the plaintiff's negligence is only contributory and the immediate and proximate cause of the injury is the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages.