FACTS:
The victim, Vidal Avila Jr., suffered a gunshot wound on July 8, 1995. Dr. Audie Relliquete, the physician who examined Avila at the Surigao Provincial Hospital, noted that he was pale and cyanotic due to blood loss. The bullet entered Avila's body on the right side of his abdomen and exited on the left side of his navel. The wound was circular and contused, indicating a bullet wound. The trajectory of the wound was horizontally leveled from entry to exit. Dr. Relliquete provided medical treatment to Avila and scheduled him for surgery.
Witnesses at the scene of the incident reported hearing a lone gunshot. After the gunshot, Avila, Jr., who fell down from his motorcycle, approached the witnesses. Felipe Llorado and a friend called a tricycle and brought Avila, Jr. to the city police station to report the incident and seek assistance. Two policemen were dispatched to investigate.
The police officers found Avila, Jr. wounded and brought him to the hospital. When asked about the shooter, Avila, Jr. weakly stated that a policeman shot him. PO3 Deguino, who was informed of the shooting, went to Casa Blanca, where witnesses identified the accused-appellant, who was already drunk, as the assailant. Deguino then spoke to Kit Aguilar, who confirmed that the accused-appellant was at Casa Blanca with his girlfriend Maritess.
When Deguino arrived at the hospital, he found Avila, Jr. being interviewed by another policeman. Deguino was allowed to ask Avila, Jr. questions, and Avila, Jr. confirmed that the shooter was a policeman and identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator. Senior Inspector Leva received a report identifying the accused-appellant as the prime suspect. When Leva and Deguino arrived at the accused-appellant's house, he surrendered to them.
To gather forensic evidence, a paraffin test was conducted on the accused-appellant, showing the presence of gunpowder residue on his right hand. The accused-appellant's assigned revolver was also examined and found to have nitrate and gunpowder residue, indicating recent firing. These facts were established through testimonies from witnesses, police officers, and forensic experts.
ISSUES:
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Whether the dying declaration of the victim is admissible as evidence.
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Whether the prosecution established that the victim was conscious of his imminent death at the time he made the dying declaration.
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Whether the dying declaration made by the victim satisfies the requisites for admissibility.
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Whether the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement made by Maritess addressing the accused-appellant as the shooter.
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Whether the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
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Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimonies regarding the statement made by the accused's girlfriend that he fired a warning shot.
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Whether the defense of alibi can prevail over the direct and circumstantial evidence against the accused.
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Whether the killing of the victim was qualified by treachery.
RULING:
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The dying declaration of the victim is admissible as evidence. The fact that it was not reduced into writing does not render it inadmissible. The rules of evidence do not require the dying declaration to be in writing for it to be admissible. As long as the declarant is conscious of his impending death and the declaration relates to the cause and circumstances of his death, it is admissible.
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The prosecution failed to establish that the victim was conscious of his imminent death at the time he made the dying declaration. The mere fact that the victim suffered a gunshot wound does not automatically establish consciousness of imminent death. The prosecution should have presented additional evidence to prove this element.
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The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration made by the victim satisfies the requisites for admissibility. Although the victim did not explicitly state that he was on the brink of death, the circumstances surrounding the declaration show that it was made under the consciousness of impending death. The victim died shortly after making the declaration, which gives rise to the inference that he knew he was dying at the time he made the statement. Therefore, the dying declaration is admissible as evidence.
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The Court did not consider the hearsay statement made by Maritess as it was not presented in court. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the hearsay statement.
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The circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that circumstantial evidence is enough to support a conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances is sufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
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The trial court did not err in admitting the testimonies regarding the statement made by the accused's girlfriend. The testimonies were offered not to establish the truth of the statement, but only to show that the accused's girlfriend uttered the statement.
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The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the direct and circumstantial evidence against the accused. The Court noted that it was not physically impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime, and the timing and distance between the locations involved made it possible for the accused to commit the crime.
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The killing of the victim was qualified by treachery. The Court agreed with the trial court's finding that the attack was unexpected and sudden, and the victim had no chance to defend himself. The location and characteristics of the gunshot wound further supported the finding of treachery.
PRINCIPLES:
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Dying declarations are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant was conscious of his impending death and the declaration relates to the cause and circumstances of his death.
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The failure to reduce a dying declaration into writing does not render it inadmissible as long as it meets the requirements for admissibility.
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The prosecution has the burden of proving that the declarant was conscious of his imminent death at the time he made the dying declaration.
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Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to respect and shall not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked or misinterpreted that would materially affect the disposition of the case.
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For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, the following elements must concur: (1) it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.
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A dying declaration made in the form of answers to questions put by the person to whom the declaration is made is admissible in court and may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it was made.
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Even if the declarant did not explicitly state that he was dying, a dying declaration may still be admissible if there are circumstances from which it may be inferred with certainty that the declarant was under the consciousness of impending death.
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Circumstantial evidence can support a conviction if there are multiple circumstances, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances is sufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
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Testimonies regarding hearsay statements can be admitted for the purpose of showing that the statements were made, even if not for the truth of the statements.
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Alibi defense cannot prevail over direct and circumstantial evidence if it is not physically impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime.
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Treachery is present in a killing when the attack is unexpected and sudden, giving the victim no chance to defend themselves.