FACTS:

The case involves the indictment of Valentin Baring, Jr. for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl, Jennifer Donayre. Jennifer accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her grandmother's common law husband, of raping her on several occasions. The incidents occurred when Jennifer was about six years old and left alone in the house. Jennifer informed her grandmother about the sexual abuse, and her mother, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation. Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service, which revealed signs of sexual abuse. Valentin Baring, Jr. denied the allegations and claimed that Jennifer was not living with them at the time of the alleged rapes. The trial court convicted Valentin Baring, Jr., based on Jennifer's clear and trustworthy testimony. Accused-appellant filed a petition to dismiss the case, citing the lack of supporting facts in the trial court's decision and the absence of cross-examination of the physician who conducted the medical examination. Accused-appellant asserted that he was being framed and another person, Venancio Mendoza, was responsible for the crime. Accused-appellant assigned errors related to the trial court's decision, denial of DNA testing, and alleged framing.

This case involves an accused-appellant who was convicted of the crime of rape. The accused claims that the trial court erred in convicting him because the prosecution failed to present the examining physician, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a witness against him. However, it was revealed in the transcript of stenographic notes that the accused's counsel waived the presentation of the medico-legal officer, and therefore the accused was not deprived of his constitutional right. The trial court admitted the doctor's report based on the counsel's admission of its due execution and authenticity. The court also dispensed with the testimony of the doctor, stating that a medical examination is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. The court emphasized that the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused. The accused further questions the credibility of the victim due to the one-year delay in filing the rape case, which allegedly raises doubts about the real identity of the culprit. The court, however, explains that the delay in reporting does not diminish the complainant's credibility, especially considering that the victim was only six years old when she was sexually abused, lived separately from her mother, and was under her grandmother's care. The accused also asserts that he was framed and that another person raped the victim, relying on the testimony of the victim's mother.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the delay in reporting the incident of rape creates doubt over the credibility of the complainant.

2. Whether the accused's defense of being "framed-up" by another person is credible.

3. Whether the failure to specify the exact dates when the other alleged rapes were committed justifies the dismissal of the case.

4. Whether the trial court denied the accused's right to subject the blood found on the victim's panty for DNA testing.

5. Whether the method of physical examination performed on the seven-year-old victim was appropriate and in line with the "child sensitive" approach in dealing with child sexual abuse cases.

6. Whether the physical findings alone are conclusive of child sexual abuse.

7. Whether corroboration is required for the testimony of a child witness.

8. Whether or not the imposition of the death penalty is proper in this case.

RULING:

1. Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create doubt over the credibility of the complainant.

2. The categorical testimony of the victim prevails over the accused's defense of being framed-up.

3. Failure to specify the exact dates when the alleged rapes were committed does not make the information defective, as the precise time and date of the commission of rape are not essential elements of the crime.

4. The accused's counsel voluntarily withdrew his proposition for DNA testing and the alleged denial of accused's right to avail of the DNA tests is a futile attempt to confuse the issues.

5. The method of physical examination performed on the seven-year-old victim, specifically the insertion of the examiner's finger inside the hymenal opening, was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate. The court adopted a more "child sensitive" approach in dealing with child sexual abuse cases and emphasized that a prepubertal girl without active bleeding only requires an external examination with good lighting and magnification.

6. The physical findings alone are not conclusive of child sexual abuse. Even if a child has normal genital examination, their clear and convincing description of the abuse has a high rate of probability.

7. Corroboration is not required for the testimony of a child witness. If the child's testimony is credible by itself, it shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment.

8. The Court held that the imposition of the death penalty is improper in this case. The victim in this case is seven years old, which rules out the application of the specific provision in the Revised Penal Code that imposes the death penalty for rape committed against a child below seven years old. Furthermore, the accused-appellant is not the common-law husband of the victim's mother, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty under another provision if the victim was under 18 years old. Therefore, the accused-appellant can only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

PRINCIPLES:

• Testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible, and the testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit.

• Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create doubt over the credibility of the complainant.

• The complaint of being framed-up is not sufficient to overturn the categorical testimony of the victim.

• The precise time and date of the commission of rape are not essential elements of the crime.

• The presentation of bloodstained evidence is not essential in the prosecution of rape cases, as the victim's credible testimony alone is sufficient for conviction.

• The forensic examination of sexually assaulted children must be conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young victim's feelings of vulnerability and embarrassment.

• Physical findings alone are not conclusive of child sexual abuse, and a child's clear and convincing description of abuse has a high rate of probability.

• Corroboration is not required for the testimony of a child witness, and their testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient.

• The imposition of the death penalty is governed by specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code.

• The specific provisions on the imposition of the death penalty should be strictly construed, and if the elements do not apply, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

• The common-law spouse of the victim's parent is included among the persons who can be given the death penalty for rape committed against a victim under 18 years old.