FACTS:

The petitioners in this case were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) and were members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP). On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which included a provision on compulsory retirement age of fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. Petitioners claimed that this provision was discriminatory and demanded equal treatment. They filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City to challenge the validity of the provision. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of the provision. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case and ordered the dismissal of the petition. The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the RTC had jurisdiction over their action challenging the constitutionality of the provision.

of the court in this case is being disputed. The petitioners argue that the labor tribunals have no jurisdiction over the case as it involves a constitutional issue regarding the validity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which they claim is discriminatory and unconstitutional. They argue that the RTC has jurisdiction over their petition for declaratory relief. On the other hand, the respondent argues that the labor tribunals have jurisdiction as the case involves a labor dispute regarding the terms and conditions of the petitioners' employment, specifically their retirement age. The respondent argues that the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. The petitioners' primary relief in their petition is the annulment of the provision in the CBA that allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The issue raised is whether this provision is unlawful and unconstitutional. The petitioners argue that they have a constitutional right to fundamental equality with men and statutory right to equal work and employment opportunities. They also argue that the provision is in violation of the Labor Code and the Act Strengthening Prohibition on Discrimination Against Women. The petitioners claim that the provision is patently unconstitutional and unlawful and should be declared invalid. They pray for the Court to declare the provision null and void to the extent that it discriminates against them and to grant them the right to work until they are sixty years old, like their male counterparts.

ISSUES:

1. The primary issue raised in this case is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional.

2. Whether the proper remedy for nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement is through an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract or a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

3. Whether the dispute between the union and the company regarding the compulsory retirement provision in the CBA can be referred to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.

4. Whether FASAP, as the representative of female flight attendants, adequately pursued negotiations and settlement with PAL regarding the compulsory retirement provision in the CBA.

5. Whether the trial court is being asked to interpret the CBA provision or determine its intrinsic validity.

6. Whether the principle of party autonomy in contracts is absolute.

7. Whether the retirement provisions in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the petitioner and respondent are exempt from judicial review.

8. Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction to hear the petition for declaratory relief.

RULING:

1. The jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality or legality of the assailed CBA provision lies with the regular courts of justice. The grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do not have the power to decide constitutional issues. The regular courts possess the power of judicial review and are equipped to apply and interpret the Constitution and other laws.

2. The proper remedy for nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, not a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.

3. The dispute between the union and the company regarding the compulsory retirement provision in the CBA cannot be referred to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration because both parties have agreed upon the provision and the dispute involves individual members questioning its validity.

4. FASAP, as the representative of female flight attendants, did not adequately pursue negotiations and settlement with PAL regarding the compulsory retirement provision in the CBA.

5. The trial court is not being asked to interpret the CBA provision but to determine its intrinsic validity.

6. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not absolute and can be limited by the law.

7. The retirement provisions in the CBA between the petitioner and respondent are not exempt from judicial review. While a CBA is a labor contract impressed with public interest, if the retirement provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or public policy, they may be voided.

8. The RTC had jurisdiction to hear the petition for declaratory relief. The issue of whether the provision in the CBA is discriminatory or not is a question of fact that requires a full-blown trial with the presentation and reception of evidence. Therefore, the case should be remanded to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition.

PRINCIPLES:

• The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from the employer-employee relationship that can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

• Actions where the employer-employee relationship is incidental and the cause of action arises from a different source of obligation fall within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

• Regular courts have the competence and expertise to resolve disputes that require the application of general civil law, including issues of constitutionality and legality.

• The grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do not have jurisdiction over constitutional issues and cannot settle disputes involving the validity or voidness of contracts.

• The power to adjudicate and settle disputes involving constitutional issues is a function of the judiciary, as it requires the exercise of judicial power.

• The judiciary's power to decide ordinary cases based on general laws should not be deprived by the increasing authority given to administrative bodies.

• The regular courts possess judicial review power and are capable of interpreting and applying the Constitution and other laws.

• The proper remedy for nullification of a contract is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract.

• Disputes involving the union and the company can be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators, but disputes between the union/company and individual employees may require settlement before an impartial body.

• The representative of employees must actively participate in negotiations and settlement on behalf of the employees.

• The court is not required to interpret a clear and unambiguous contract provision, but may determine its intrinsic validity.

• The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not absolute and may be limited by the law.

• Provisions of applicable law, especially those relating to matters affected by public policy, are deemed written into the contract.

• Parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law, especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest.

• Labor contracts are not ordinary contracts but are imbued with public interest and subject to the police power of the state.

• Pure questions of fact may not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.