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PANFILO O. DOMINGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking to nullify the resolution of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the information against him for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, and Joaquin T. Venus with the Tanodbayan. Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped Marcos from the complaint and ordered a subpoena to be issued to Domingo, the President of PNB at the time. However, the subpoena was returned unserved as Domingo was no longer connected with the bank.

In 1988, the Ombudsman issued an administrative order authorizing the continuation of the preliminary investigation of cases pending since April 27, 1988.

In 1992, Special Prosecution Officer III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos found probable cause to implicate Domingo in the case. Domingo submitted a counter-affidavit. Diaz-Baldos recommended the prosecution of Domingo and Cuenca, and the case was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Domingo filed a petition for reinvestigation, which was treated as a motion for reconsideration and denied by the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

Domingo then filed a motion to quash the information against him, which the Sandiganbayan denied.

Not satisfied, Domingo filed the present petition alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash.

During the arraignment, Domingo refused to enter a plea, and a plea of not guilty was entered for him.

The issue of prescription was raised by Domingo, claiming that his criminal liability had already been extinguished by prescription.

ISSUES:

  1. When does the prescriptive period for violations of a special law commence?

  2. When does the prescriptive period for violations of a special law get interrupted?

  3. Do the facts charged in the information constitute an offense under the law?

  4. Whether or not the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

  5. Whether or not the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information violated the accused's right to speedy trial.

  6. Whether or not a writ of injunction or prohibition may be issued to restrain a criminal prosecution.

RULING:

  1. The prescriptive period for violations of a special law commences on the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the violation is not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

  2. The prescriptive period for violations of a special law is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

  3. The facts charged in the information do constitute an offense under the law. The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, are present in the allegations of the information.

  4. The facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

  5. The right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated. The delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information was adequately explained by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The delay was intended to afford the accused the opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit and refute the charges made against him. Therefore, the delay was more beneficial than prejudicial to the accused.

  6. A writ of injunction or prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution, unless there are specified cases such as to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, or to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. Such exceptions do not apply in this case.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The prescriptive period for violations of a special law commences on the day of the commission of the violation, or from the discovery thereof if the violation was not known at the time.

  • The prescriptive period for violations of a special law is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

  • Whether the facts charged in the information constitute an offense is determined by whether the allegations in the information establish the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law.

  • The facts alleged in the information must constitute a violation of the specific provision of law charged in order for a motion to quash to fail.

  • The right to a speedy trial is a flexible concept that considers the length of delay, the reasons for the delay, the assertion or failure to assert the right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.

  • Delays in the preliminary investigation and filing of the information may be justified if they are intended to afford the accused the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and refute the charges made against him.

  • Writs of injunction or prohibition will not be issued to restrain a criminal prosecution, unless there are exceptional circumstances wherein the use of the strong arm of the law is oppressive and vindictive, or when constitutional rights need protection.