FACTS:

The case involves the rape of Mary Rose Bondoc, an 11-year-old girl, by her uncle, Eloy Miclat Jr. Mary Rose lived with her maternal grandmother in Marikina City and was shuttled between relatives as her mother lived in Pampanga. On July 7, 1997, while playing outside her house, appellant Eloy Miclat called Mary Rose and she hesitated due to fear of being sexually molested again. Appellant shouted at her, causing Mary Rose to approach him. Appellant closed the doors and windows of the house and told Mary Rose to lie down. He removed her panty and prevented her from putting it on again. Appellant then masturbated in front of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Mary Rose did not shout for help due to fear of being hurt, only stopping appellant when she mentioned her grandmother's possible arrival. Mary Rose later reported the rape to her grandmother, who did not believe her. After this incident, appellant "invited" Mary Rose again, prompting her to run away and reveal the incident to a schoolmate. The schoolmate's aunt called Bantay Bata, and Mary Rose was taken by social workers to the police station and then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for a medical examination.

The examination revealed findings consistent with sexual abuse. The Bantay Bata rescue team then accompanied Mary Rose to appellant's house, where he was voluntarily taken by the police for questioning.

The case involves the appellant, Miclat, who was charged with the rape of his stepdaughter, Mary Rose. Mary Rose was turned over to the CID of Marikina City after the police apprehended Miclat. During the inquest, social worker Evelyn Valencia heard Miclat pleading for forgiveness from Mary Rose. The next day, Mary Rose was turned over to the DSWD Crisis Center in Marillac Hills, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Cindy Mativo, a social worker at the crisis center, assessed Mary Rose's physical condition and noted her complaints of vaginal itchiness. Mary Rose disclosed that she had been sexually abused by Miclat since she was living in Pampanga. She had also lived with various relatives before residing with her maternal grandmother, Vivencia Pascual, where Miclat eventually joined them.

Miclat denied the rape charges and presented alibi and denial as defense. He claimed that Mary Rose fabricated the charges because she wanted to be independent and had a history of making up stories. He also presented evidence to support his alibi that he was at work during the time of the alleged rape. Testimonies from his employer and foreman were presented to support his alibi.

The three foremen testified that they saw the appellant multiple times on the day the crime occurred - at 8:00 am when he was told to make a sample traffic sign, at 10:00 am during break time, at noon, at 1:00 pm, at 3:00 pm when he had his snack, and at 6:00 pm when he was about to log out. It was also established that it would take approximately three hours to travel from Marikina to Shaw Boulevard.

The appellant's stepfather and mother testified that they did not see him at their house in Marikina City on the alleged date of the crime and that it was impossible for him to commit the rape in their small house.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death. The appellant appealed and raised several errors, including the claim that he only attempted rape and that the extreme penalty of death was not applicable to him as his relationship with the complainant was not alleged in the information. The appellant also pointed out inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the white substance.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the accused should be convicted of statutory rape or attempted rape.

2. Whether the accused should be penalized with the extreme penalty of death.

3. Whether or not there was penetration of the victim's vagina.

4. Whether or not the victim's testimony is credible.

5. Whether or not rape can be committed even in small and crowded spaces.

6. Whether or not the defense of alibi is valid in this case.

7. Whether or not the appellant's denial and alibi defense can overcome the positive identification of the victim.

8. Whether the trial court erred in not awarding moral damages to the rape victim.

9. Whether the award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages is proper in this case.

RULING:

1. The accused is guilty of consummated statutory rape. The court held that the briefest of contact of the male and female sex organs under circumstances of force, intimidation, or unconsciousness, even without the rupture of the hymen, constitutes consummated rape. In this case, there was proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ, as testified to by the victim. Thus, the accused is guilty of statutory rape.

2. The accused is not eligible for the extreme penalty of death. Although the accused was convicted of statutory rape, the information did not allege the relationship between the accused and the complainant, which would make the crime punishable by death. Therefore, the accused should only be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua.

3. Yes, there was penetration of the victim's vagina. The testimony of the victim, supported by medical evidence, establishes that the appellant inserted his penis into the victim's vagina right after a white substance came out from his sex organ. The court held that even slight penetration or the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge.

4. The victim's testimony is credible. The court found that her testimony is entitled to greater weight, considering that the accusing words were directed against a close relative. The court also considered the victim's emotional breakdowns and the case study made by a DSWD social worker as additional factors that support her credibility. The court rejected the appellant's allegations that the victim was motivated by revenge or that she is a liar.

5. The Court ruled that rape can be committed regardless of the possibility of being observed, even in small and crowded spaces. The Court cited a previous case where it was held that the concomitant anxiety and the act of rape itself can take only a short time to consummate, thus it can be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone.

6. The Court held that the defense of alibi is not valid in this case. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that not only was he somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at that time. In this case, it was found that it is highly probable and still possible for the appellant to have committed the crime and the short distance and travel time from the scene of the crime to his workplace did not make it physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

7. The Court held that the defense of denial and alibi, even if supported by witnesses, cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim. The victim had no untoward motive to falsely testify against the appellant, thus her positive identification is given more weight.

8. The trial court erred in not awarding moral damages to the rape victim. The victim is entitled to recover moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury as being inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape, especially where the victim is an innocent child.

9. The award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages is proper in this case. The decision of the trial court ordering the appellant to pay the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages is affirmed.

PRINCIPLES:

• The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under certain circumstances, including when the woman is under twelve years of age.

• Only carnal knowledge needs to be proved to establish rape when the victim is under twelve years old.

• The testimony of the victim may be the sole basis for conviction if it is credible.

• The trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and will be sustained by the appellate court unless there are significant errors in the trial court's judgment.

• Carnal knowledge does not necessarily require total penetration or rupture of the hymen. The mere touching of the labia of the pudendum with the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape.

• A victim's testimony is given greater weight when the accusing words are directed against a close relative.

• The emotional condition of the victim can bolster the veracity of the sexual abuse she experienced.

• Hearsay evidence has no probative value unless it falls within an exception under the Rules of Court.

• Virginity is not an element of rape. It is irrelevant whether the victim was a virgin at the time of the rape.

• Rape can be committed even in small and crowded spaces.

• The defense of alibi must prove not only that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

• The defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by the victim, especially when the victim has no motive to falsely testify.

• Moral damages can be awarded to a rape victim without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape.

• Civil indemnity and exemplary damages can be awarded in rape cases to compensate the victim for the injury suffered and to deter others from committing the same crime.