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PEDRO G. SISTOZA v. ANIANO DESIERTO IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:

The case involves a routine procurement of tomato paste for the New Bilibid Prison. The Pre-Qualification, Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the Bureau of Corrections initiated a public bidding for the supply of tomato paste and other food items. Several bidders submitted their bids, including Elias General Merchandising, RBJJ, PMS Trading Enterprises, and Filcrafts Industries, Inc. The bid specification for tomato paste was 48/170 tins-grams to one case.

Elias General Merchandising offered a bid of P1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one case, while RBJJ and PMS Trading Enterprises offered higher prices of P1,380.10 and P1,380.05 per case, respectively, for the same quantity. Filcrafts Industries, Inc. also submitted a bid of P539.00 for the quantity of 48/198 tins-grams to one case. PBAC approved the change in quantity specification for Elias General Merchandising's bid and rejected Filcrafts Industries, Inc.'s bid for offering a non-registered brand of tomato paste.

Elias General Merchandising won the bid for the one-month supply of tomato paste in favor of the Bureau of Corrections. The purchase order was prepared for the supply of tomato paste at a price of P1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one case. The Management Division of the Bureau of Corrections confirmed the regularity of the procedures, while the Accounting Division authorized the funding of the purchase order. Petitioner Sistoza received the purchase order, read it briefly, and signed it.

PBAC issued a resolution confirming Elias General Merchandising’s winning bid. Petitioner Sistoza endorsed the winning bid to the Department of Justice, but it was initially disapproved. Elias General Merchandising expressed willingness to meet the price of the lowest bidder but the counter-offer was rejected. The purchase order was endorsed to the Department of Justice for the third time, emphasizing that the tomato paste had already been consumed by the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison. Finally, Undersecretary of Justice approved the purchase order at a reduced price of P1,120.00 per case for 215 cases.

Respondent Eliseo Co filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that petitioner Sistoza and his staff conspired to give undue advantage to Elias General Merchandising despite their higher bid and lower quantity. The administrative proceedings were dismissed, but the criminal proceedings recommended the prosecution of petitioner Sistoza and his co-respondents.

The case involves petitioner Sistoza, who is accused of conspiring with other individuals to award the supply of tomato paste for the subsistence of prisoners to Elias General Merchandising despite its non-compliance with the original specifications and submission of a higher bid compared to another bidder, Filcrafts Industries, Inc. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the prosecution of Sistoza and his co-respondents for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019.

The OSP also claimed that Sistoza failed to disclose in his endorsements of the bidding to the Department of Justice that Elias General Merchandising's offer was higher than Filcrafts Industries, Inc.'s offer. After the Ombudsman authorized the filing of the appropriate Information against Sistoza, he filed a motion for reinvestigation and suspension of proceedings, which was granted for reinvestigation but denied for suspension. Sistoza argues that he only signed the purchase order after it had already been scrutinized by three office divisions of the Bureau of Corrections.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether petitioner's signature on the purchase order proves his active participation in the award of the supply of tomato paste to Elias General Merchandising.

  2. Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause to charge petitioner with violating Section 3, par. (e) of RA No. 3019.

  3. Whether there is probable cause to charge petitioner Sistoza for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019.

  4. Whether the acts charged against petitioner qualify as manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

  5. Whether the petitioner acted in good faith in relying on his subordinates' assurances regarding the legality of the bidding process.

  6. Whether the petitioner's actions can be considered gross inexcusable negligence punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

  7. Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the petitioner's involvement in a conspiracy to rig the bidding in favor of Elias General Merchandising.

  8. Whether the petitioner can be held criminally liable for his endorsements to the Department of Justice.

  9. Whether there is evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the petitioner.

  10. Whether the Court can direct the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the criminal case against the petitioner.

RULING:

  1. The Supreme Court held that petitioner's signature on the purchase order, without more, does not automatically prove his active participation in the award of the supply of tomato paste. Petitioner argued that he had no active participation in the award and his involvement was limited to signing the purchase order. The court noted that the purchase order had already passed the scrutiny of three office divisions of the Bureau of Corrections. Hence, the court ruled that petitioner's argument has merit and dismissed the allegation of his active participation in the award.

  2. The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to charge petitioner with violating Section 3, par. (e) of RA No. 3019. The court stated that the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause is generally not interfered with. However, the court recognized that there are exceptions to this rule, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the court found that the Ombudsman considered all essential facts in determining probable cause. Thus, the court concluded that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

  3. No, there is no probable cause to charge petitioner Sistoza for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019. The Office of the Ombudsman failed to establish the facts indicative of the modalities of committing a transgression of the statute.

  4. The acts charged against petitioner do not amount to manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, which should otherwise merit a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019. Petitioner relied upon supporting documents and certifications of regularity made by responsible public officers before affixing his signature on the purchase order. His act of relying upon a subordinate's certification and his knowledge of the second lowest bidder did not constitute recklessly imprudent reliance.

  5. Yes, the petitioner acted in good faith in relying on his subordinates' assurances regarding the legality of the bidding process.

  6. No, the petitioner's actions cannot be considered gross inexcusable negligence punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

  7. No, there is no sufficient evidence to prove the petitioner's involvement in a conspiracy to rig the bidding in favor of Elias General Merchandising.

  8. No, the petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for his endorsements to the Department of Justice.

  9. The Court held that there is no evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner, as Director of the Bureau of Corrections, is not expected to personally examine every single detail of the purchase order and investigate the motives of every public officer involved in the transaction. To require the petitioner to do so would be impractical given his numerous responsibilities. The Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion by disregarding essential facts that negate the presence of bad faith, partiality, and negligence on the part of the petitioner.

  10. The Court can direct the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the criminal case against the petitioner. The dismissal of a criminal case for lack of probable cause is justified to spare the accused from the expense, rigors, and embarrassment of trial. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from burdensome prosecution and unnecessary expenses. Thus, when there is insufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case or ascertain probable cause, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecution, particularly the Office of the Special Prosecutor for cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

  • The principle of non-interference with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion, which warrants the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

  • Grave abuse of discretion occurs when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner, involving passion or personal hostility, or when there is a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

  • The elements of the offense under Section 3, par. (e) of RA No. 3019, which defines corrupt practices of public officers, include the accused being a public officer, committing prohibited acts in relation to his or her official duties, causing undue injury to any party, giving unwarranted benefits or advantage, and acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough, as they must be evident or manifest and gross and inexcusable, respectively. Undue injury to a specified party must also result from any or all of these modalities.

  • Allegation does not amount to proof.

  • Facts must demonstrate evident bad faith, which connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose.

  • Gross inexcusable negligence refers to willful and intentional omission of care, manifested by breach of duty that is flagrant and devious.

  • The existence of probable cause requires a well-grounded and reasonable belief that the accused perpetrated acts in a criminal manner.

  • Reliance in good faith on supporting documents and certifications of regularity negates evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.

  • The reliance in good faith by a head of office on a subordinate, upon whom the primary responsibility rests, negates an imputation of conspiracy by gross inexcusable negligence to commit graft and corruption.

  • The act of the petitioner, although it may show errors in assessment, is imbued with good faith as the reliance on subordinates falls within parameters of tolerable judgment and permissible margins of error.

  • For conspiracy of silence and inaction to exist, there must be a patent and conscious criminal design, not merely inadvertence, under circumstances that would have pricked curiosity and prompted inquiries into the transaction because of obvious and definite defects in its execution and substance.

  • A signature on a document, even if required by law, is not enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among public officials and employees charged with defraudation.

  • The Ombudsman's authority to determine whether an accused should be subjected to trial must be tempered by the Court when the powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for persecution.

  • The dismissal of a criminal case for lack of probable cause spares the accused from the expense, rigors, and embarrassment of trial, and prevents needless waste of the courts' time and government resources.