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MARVIN MERCADO v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Marvin Mercado and his co-accused were charged with and convicted of violating the Anti-Carnapping Act. They were sentenced to a prison term of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Marvin Mercado filed a petition for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals should have certified the case to the Supreme Court because the penalty of 30 years imposed by the appellate court was already reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, stating that the provision relied upon by the petitioner was applicable only when the penalty imposed was at least reclusion perpetua. The appellate court's penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 30 years was in accordance with the law. The petitioner then questioned whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable to his case. The Supreme Court explained that reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty and cannot be divided into different periods. The range of 30 years falls within the penalty of reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code, but it only serves for the successive service of sentence and not as a penalty in itself. The crime committed by the petitioner was penalized under a special law, not the Revised Penal Code. Special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which are different from those in the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence or intimidation is 17 years and 4 months to 30 years, while killing or raping the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court erred in using the term reclusion temporal and setting the minimum penalty at 12 years and 1 day instead of following the penalties set by the Anti-Carnapping Act. The appellate court's ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals should have certified the case to the Supreme Court considering that the penalty imposed by the appellate court was already reclusion perpetua.

  2. Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable in this case.

RULING:

  1. The Court of Appeals was not required to certify the case to the Supreme Court. The provision of Section 13, Rule 124, relied upon by the petitioner, only applies when the penalty imposed is at least reclusion perpetua. In this case, the penalty imposed by the appellate court was in accordance with Section 14 of RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Section 13, Rule 124.

  2. The last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable in this case. While the thirty-year period falls within the range of reclusion perpetua, reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty that cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty-year period is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Article 70 of The Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the crime committed by the petitioner is one penalized under a special law, RA 6538, which has its own specific penalties that do not correspond to those in The Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the terms used under The Revised Penal Code, such as reclusion temporal, are not applicable to the penalty for carnapping under RA 6538.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The provision under Section 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure applies only when the penalty imposed is at least reclusion perpetua.

  • Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty that cannot be divided into different periods.

  • Special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which are not taken from or refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.