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PACENCIO ABEJARON v. FELIX NABASA

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land in Silway, General Santos City, specifically a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. Petitioner Pacencio Abejaron claimed actual and lawful possession of the said portion, which he had occupied since 1945 and improved by building a family home, a small store, and planting trees. Respondent Felix Nabasa did not oppose or complain about these improvements, and in 1974, he obtained a title for the entire Lot 1, including Abejaron's portion. Abejaron's son filed a protest, but it was dismissed, prompting Abejaron to file an action for reconveyance with damages against Nabasa in 1982.

In another version of the facts, both Abejaron and Nabasa were already occupying their respective portions of the lot during a subdivision survey conducted in 1971. Abejaron claimed to have occupied the 118-square meter portion since before the survey, while Nabasa claimed that he had been residing on a 180-square meter public land in Silway since 1945. Abejaron's daughter obtained a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title for Lot 2, while Nabasa obtained a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title for his portion of Lot 1. Abejaron then filed an action for reconveyance with damages to regain his portion of Lot 1, and the trial court ruled in his favor, declaring his possession and occupancy in good faith.

In another version, Abejaron claimed ownership of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, while Nabasa obtained a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over the same land. Abejaron alleged that Nabasa fraudulently acquired the title over the disputed land, and he filed an action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled in favor of Abejaron, ordering Nabasa to reconvey the disputed portion. The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, declaring Nabasa as the owner of the land covered by the title. Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

Abejaron then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to find actual fraud by Nabasa, concluding that Abejaron forcibly transferred his house to the disputed land, and disregarding Abejaron's clear right over the property. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, stating that an action for reconveyance is the appropriate remedy when a property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name, and the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Although Abejaron did not claim ownership of the land, the court held that an action for reconveyance is still proper if the proponent has an equitable right to the property.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether an action for reconveyance is the proper remedy for the petitioner.

  2. Whether the petitioner has an equitable right to the disputed land.

  3. Whether the conditions specified in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied by the petitioner.

  4. Whether the amendment made by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act applies to the case.

  5. Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land.

  6. Whether or not petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to support his claim of possession and occupation since January 24, 1947.

  7. Whether the petitioner, who claims to have a preferential right to the disputed land but does not claim ownership, has the legal standing to file an action for reconveyance.

RULING:

  1. Yes, an action for reconveyance is the proper remedy for the petitioner. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance, and the action seeks to show that the person who obtained the registration of the property is not the real owner. However, it does not seek to set aside the registration decree but only to establish the fact of fraud.

  2. No, the petitioner does not have an equitable right to the disputed land. The petitioner admits that he believed the land was public in character and did not consider himself the owner. Thus, his claim for reconveyance is based on the deprivation of his right to file the necessary application for the land, not on ownership.

  3. The Court held that the conditions specified in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied by the petitioner. According to the Court, when the conditions as specified in Section 48(b) are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The lack of application for confirmation is a mere formality and does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.

  4. The Court ruled that the amendment made by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) applies to the case. The amendment provides that the provisions of Section 48(b) and (c) of the Public Land Act only apply to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain that have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. As petitioner Abejaron's possession and occupation began prior to June 12, 1945, the amendment is applicable.

  5. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the petitioner's claim for reconveyance. The Court found that the petitioner failed to establish that he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the disputed land for at least 30 years since January 24, 1947. The petitioner was unable to provide specific and incontrovertible proof of the portion of the land that he actually possessed and occupied as of January 24, 1947. The Court also noted that the land was surveyed and identified as separate lots only in the 1970s, making it difficult to determine the precise boundaries of the petitioner's claimed possession. Additionally, the petitioner's failure to declare the land for taxation purposes and the absence of well-nigh incontrovertible evidence further weakened his claim.

  6. No, the petitioner does not have legal standing to file an action for reconveyance. The Court held that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. Since the petitioner does not claim ownership of the disputed portion, and only has a "preferential right" to acquire ownership by virtue of his possession, he cannot maintain the present suit. The Court further ruled that persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State, and the real party in interest in such cases is the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, only the government may institute an action for reconveyance of ownership of a public land. As the petitioner failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the government, who has the specific power and function to institute such an action.

PRINCIPLES:

  • An action for reconveyance is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully registered in another's name, as long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.

  • Fraud is a ground for reconveyance, and the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

  • Possession of public lands, once occupation is proven under a claim of ownership, constitutes a grant from the state. The possessor is deemed to have already acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant from the government.

  • Possession of public land that meets the conditions specified in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is deemed equivalent to a government grant.

  • Lack of application for confirmation does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.

  • The amendment made by P.D. No. 1073 limits the application of Section 48(b) and (c) of the Public Land Act to lands in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945.

  • The requirement for possession and occupation under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942, is that it should have started on January 24, 1947, or earlier.

  • Findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive, unless not supported by evidence or strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise.

  • Evidence of possession and occupation must be well-nigh incontrovertible when claiming ownership of public land.

  • Tax declarations and receipts, while not conclusive evidence of ownership, can be strong evidence when accompanied by proof of actual possession or supported by other effective proof.

  • Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name.

  • Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State.

  • Only the government may institute an action for reconveyance of ownership of a public land.

  • The Solicitor General, on behalf of the government, has the specific power and function to institute actions for reversion of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution.