FACTS:

The petitioners in this case are appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the order issued in their favor by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The CA upheld Resolution No. 552, adopted by the City of Mandaluyong, which authorized the expropriation of a parcel of land owned by the petitioners. The City passed Resolution No. 552 to develop the land for low-cost housing for deserving city inhabitants. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, seeking the annulment of Resolution No. 552. The RTC initially dismissed the petition but later reconsidered and declared the resolution null and void. The City appealed the decision to the CA.

The City of Mandaluyong adopted Resolution No. 552 in 1997, which declared the construction of a truck staging area in a certain residential area. The Spouses Yusay, who were residents of the said area, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to nullify the resolution. They claimed that the resolution was invalid and violated their rights.

The RTC granted the petition and declared Resolution No. 552 null and void. It ruled that the resolution was hastily issued without proper consultation or public hearing. The City appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA reversed the RTC's decision and held that the resolution was valid. It stated that the RTC should have accorded the resolution the presumption of regularity and validity, and that the petitioners had been given ample opportunity to voice their protest. The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court (SC), posing the issues of whether the validity of Resolution No. 552 can be challenged before its implementation and whether a citizen must wait for the takeover of their property before going to court to nullify an unjust expropriation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether certiorari lies against the Sangguniang Panglungsod when it adopted Resolution No. 552

2. Whether a resolution is sufficient to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.

3. Whether the absence of an ordinance authorizing expropriation is equivalent to lack of cause of action.

4. Whether the adoption of Resolution No. 552 by the Sangguniang Panglungsod qualifies as an exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.

5. Whether the remedy of prohibition is available against the adoption of Resolution No. 552.

RULING:

1. The SC denied the petition and declared that certiorari and prohibition were not the proper remedies for the petitioners. It held that the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition.

2. The SC explained that certiorari can only be filed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The Sangguniang Panglungsod, which adopted Resolution No. 552, was a legislative and policy-making body and not part of the Judiciary. Therefore, certiorari did not lie against it.

3. The SC also noted that the Sangguniang Panglungsod did not abuse its discretion in adopting the resolution. It clarified that a resolution is a temporary expression of the lawmaking body's sentiment or opinion and does not confer any rights or have the same legal effect as an ordinance.

4. Based on these grounds, the SC upheld the CA's decision and declared that the RTC erred in granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

5. Certiorari does not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod because it is not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552. The Sangguniang Panglungsod is a legislative and policy-making body and the resolution merely expresses its sentiment or opinion, which is a constitutionally protected right.

6. The Sangguniang Panglungsod did not abuse its discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552 because a resolution is temporary in nature and does not confer rights. On the other hand, an ordinance is permanent in character and has the force and effect of law. Since Resolution No. 552 only expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, there was no abuse of discretion.

7. No, a resolution is not sufficient to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. A municipal ordinance is required for this purpose. The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous. An ordinance is a law, while a resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion. The present Local Government Code explicitly requires an ordinance for the exercise of eminent domain. The legislative intent is determined from the language of the statute, and in this case, there is no reason to depart from the requirement of an ordinance.

8. Yes, the absence of an ordinance authorizing expropriation is equivalent to lack of cause of action. The petitioner failed to present a certified true copy of an ordinance reiterating a previous resolution. Even if such an ordinance existed, it cannot cure the inherent defect of the complaint for expropriation, which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of the proper expropriation ordinance leads to a lack of cause of action.

9. The adoption of Resolution No. 552 by the Sangguniang Panglungsod does not constitute an exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It merely expresses the collective sentiment or opinion of the assembly.

10. The remedy of prohibition is not available against the adoption of Resolution No. 552. Prohibition can only be availed when a court, board, or officer has exercised power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, or has acted without authority. Moreover, the remedy of prohibition is not applicable to the expropriation of lands for public use, as long as just compensation is provided.

PRINCIPLES:

• Certiorari does not lie against a legislative and policy-making body when it adopts a resolution expressing its sentiment or opinion.

• A resolution is temporary in nature and does not confer rights, while an ordinance is permanent in character and has the force and effect of law.

• Under the Local Government Code, an expropriation proceeding must be initiated through an ordinance, not a resolution.

• The power of eminent domain by a local government unit requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) enactment of an ordinance; (2) exercise for public use, purpose, or welfare; (3) payment of just compensation; and (4) a valid and definite offer previously made to the property owner but not accepted.

• A resolution is different from an ordinance. An ordinance is a law, while a resolution is a declaration of sentiment or opinion.

• The present Local Government Code explicitly requires an ordinance for the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU.

• Legislative intent is determined from the language of a statute.

• The power of eminent domain involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people, thus demands a strict construction.

• In a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself is determined, regardless of the truth of the allegations.

• The absence of an ordinance authorizing expropriation is equivalent to lack of cause of action.

• Prohibition lies against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• "Arbitrary or despotic exercise of power" and "excess of jurisdiction" as grounds for availing the remedy of prohibition.

• Requirement of showing that other existing remedies are not speedy or adequate.

• In expropriation proceedings, the immediate possession of the land can be taken, as long as prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation are guaranteed.

• The nature of the power of eminent domain subordinates the interest of the affected landowner to the power of the State.

• Prohibition may become available when the landowners are not given just compensation or when there is no agreement on the amount of just compensation.

• The power of eminent domain can only be exercised through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court, until then, no expropriation proceeding exists.