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ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. CA

FACTS:

The case involves Mrs. Imelda Marcos, Roberto Benedicto, and Hector Rivera who were charged for violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 34 of the Central Bank Act. The charge sheets alleged that the accused failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the prescribed period. Additional Informations were filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto for the same offense but involving different accounts. On the same day, two circulars were issued by the Central Bank, which amended the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Petitioners Benedicto and Rivera returned to the Philippines on the condition that they face criminal charges against them, including dollar-salting cases. They were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. They later moved to quash all the Informations filed against them, which was denied by the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Mrs. Marcos and petitioners separately filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petitions, except for the portion ordering the dismissal of one case. Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners filed an instant petition.

Petitioners were charged with violations of Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 3019. They argue that the filing of separate cases before different courts constitutes forum shopping and splitting of cases. The Court disagrees and finds that the offenses under the two laws are distinct and can be applied independently. Regarding the preliminary investigation, petitioners argue that it was invalid and violated their rights to due process. However, the Court states that preliminary investigation is not part of due process and can be waived. The admissions made by the petitioners in their petition lead the Court to conclude that they expressly waived their right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners were charged with violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, Republic Act No. 265, and other laws. They entered pleas and filed various motions and pleadings but did not demand a preliminary investigation. The trial court denied their motion to quash the informations. Petitioners argued that they were being prosecuted for acts punishable under repealed laws. They claimed that the repeal of these laws extinguished the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under them.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the petitioners have waived their right to question the irregularities in the preliminary investigation.

  2. Whether the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 extinguished the right to prosecute or punish offenses committed under the old laws.

  3. Whether the repeal of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 extinguished the criminal liability of the petitioners.

  4. Whether Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, is an ex post facto legislation.

  5. Whether the State's right to prosecute the petitioners for the dollar-salting offenses has already prescribed.

  6. Whether the offenses charged against the petitioners are already barred by prescription.

  7. Whether the petitioners are exempted from liability for violations of Circular No. 960.

  8. Whether the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts applies to the foreign currency accounts maintained by the petitioners.

  9. Whether the Compromise Agreement entered into by the petitioners grants them absolute immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution.

  10. Whether the Compromise Agreement covers the suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960.

  11. Whether the grant of absolute immunity under the Compromise Agreement extends to the criminal charges faced by the petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960.

  12. Whether any of the grounds provided in the Rules of Court, which petitioners relied on, apply in this case.

RULING:

  1. The petitioners have waived their right to question any irregularity in the preliminary investigation. By posting bail, entering their pleas, and filing various motions and pleadings without demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they have waived any irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.

  2. The repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 did not extinguish the right to prosecute or punish offenses committed under the old laws. The repealing circulars contained saving clauses that expressly provided that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the former circular. The saving clauses clearly manifested the intention to reserve the right to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960. Additionally, the new statute, Republic Act No. 7653, included a penal clause that expanded the scope of violations to include "other pertinent banking laws enforced or implemented by the Bangko Sentral." Therefore, violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board, which are proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of the repealed law, can still be prosecuted under the new law.

  3. The repeal of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of the petitioners for transgressions of Circular No. 960. The repeal and reenactment of the provision simultaneously "neutralizes" the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption. Therefore, the indictments against the petitioners cannot be quashed based on the repeal of Republic Act No. 265.

  4. Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 is not an ex post facto legislation. Penal laws operate prospectively and cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. Since there is no indication in Republic Act No. 7653 that the increased penalties were intended to operate retroactively, there is no ex post facto law in this case.

  5. The dollar-salting offenses for which the petitioners are charged have not yet prescribed. The computation of the prescriptive period should be based on the date of discovery of the offenses, which is after the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Since the offenses are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years, they prescribe in eight years. Therefore, as only a little more than four years had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991, the offenses have not yet prescribed.

  6. The Court held that the offenses charged against the petitioners were not barred by prescription. The eight-year prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the commission of the offenses, which happened after the EDSA Revolution of February 1986. The criminal actions were filed in 1991 and 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

  7. The Court ruled that the petitioners are not exempted from liability for violations of Circular No. 960. While Section 10(q) of the circular provides for an exemption for foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange Currency Deposit System, the petitioners failed to prove that they fall within the coverage of said exemption. The foreign currency accounts involved in the case were maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks.

  8. The Court held that the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts does not apply to the foreign currency accounts maintained by the petitioners. Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, and the petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim exemption based on Swiss banking laws.

  9. The Court ruled that the Compromise Agreement entered into by the petitioners does not grant them absolute immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution. While the validity of the agreement was upheld in a previous case, it only covers suits filed for violations of tax, tariff, and other revenue laws. The offenses charged against the petitioners in this case are not covered by the Compromise Agreement.

  10. The Compromise Agreement does not cover the suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960. The Agreement clearly lists and limits its applicability to the cases specifically mentioned therein. Scrutiny of the Agreement reveals that it does not include all cases filed by the government against the petitioners.

  11. The grant of absolute immunity under the Compromise Agreement does not extend to the criminal charges faced by the petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960. The immunity clause in the Agreement only applies to criminal investigations or prosecutions for acts or omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that may be alleged to have violated any laws, including Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in the Agreement. The interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which are the subject matter of the present case, are not "treated, mentioned, or included" in the Compromise Agreement.

  12. The Supreme Court dismissed the instant petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The charges against the deceased petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, were ordered dropped. It was also declared that any criminal and civil liability ex delicto attributable to him in the said cases were extinguished by reason of his death.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Waiver of right to question irregularities in the preliminary investigation.

  • Effect of repeal of penal law.

  • Exceptions to the rule of absolute repeal of a penal law.

  • Saving clause in repealing statutes to preserve the right to prosecute or punish offenses committed under old laws.

  • Expansion of penal clause in a new statute to include violations of laws, orders, instructions, rules, or regulations.

  • Repeal and reenactment of a provision simultaneously "neutralizes" the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption.

  • Penal laws operate prospectively and cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.

  • The computation of the prescriptive period for violations of special laws starts from the day of the commission of the violation or, if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

  • Prescription of offenses is counted from the discovery of the commission of the offenses, especially in cases where the offenses were not known during the time of their commission.

  • Exceptions to reporting requirements and exemptions from liability must be strictly construed and must be proven by the party invoking such exemptions.

  • Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws and such laws must be alleged and proved by the party invoking them.

  • Compromise agreements may only grant absolute immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution for offenses specifically covered by the agreement.

  • In construing contracts, the intent of the parties should be ascertained by looking at the words employed to project their intention.

  • When the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties.

  • A contract cannot be construed to include matters distinct from those with respect to which the parties intended to contract.

  • The grant of absolute immunity in a contract applies only to criminal investigations or prosecutions for acts or omissions committed prior to the specified date and relating to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in the agreement.

  • The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.