JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the former President of the Philippines, is the highest-ranking official prosecuted under RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659, known as the Plunder Law. On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed eight separate Informations before the Sandiganbayan against Estrada, which included charges of plunder (Crim. Case No. 26558), violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Crim. Cases Nos. 26559-26562), violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Crim. Case No. 26563), perjury (Crim. Case No. 26564), and illegal use of an alias (Crim. Case No. 26565). On 11 April 2001, Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion to remand the case to the Ombudsman for a preliminary investigation on certain charges and to reconsider/reinvestigate other offenses, claiming lack of probable cause. However, these motions did not address the alleged ambiguity of the charges or the purported vagueness of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the plunder charge, issuing a warrant for his arrest, and denied his motion for reconsideration on 25 June 2001. Subsequently, Estrada moved to quash the Information based on claims of unconstitutionality and multiple charges in one Information, which the Sandiganbayan denied on 9 July 2001. The central issues raised in his petition focus on the Plunder Law's alleged vagueness, its purported lowering of the evidence standard in proving predicate crimes, and whether the Plunder Law qualifies as a malum prohibitum.

ISSUES:

  1. Is the Plunder Law (RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659) unconstitutional for being vague?

  2. Does the Plunder Law require less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder, thus violating the due process rights of the accused?

  3. Is Plunder as defined in RA 7080 a malum prohibitum, and if so, is it within the power of Congress to so classify it?

RULING:

  1. The Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. The law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters that enable the accused to determine the nature of the violation. The terms "combination" and "series" are sufficiently clear in their popular meanings, and the term "pattern" is adequately defined within the context of the statute.

  2. The Plunder Law does not require less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and does not violate the due process rights of the accused. The prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

  3. Plunder is a malum in se crime, requiring proof of criminal intent (mens rea). The legislative declaration of plunder as a heinous offense implies that it is inherently wrong, thus requiring proof of criminal intent.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Presumption of constitutionality: Legislative measures are presumed to be constitutional unless proven otherwise beyond any tinge of doubt.

  • Comprehensible standards: A law is not vague if it provides some comprehensible guide or rule that informs those subject to it what conduct would render them liable.

  • "Void-for-vagueness" doctrine: A statute is void for vagueness if it lacks comprehensible standards that people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

  • Reasonable doubt: In criminal prosecutions, the State must prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, including each essential element of the crime charged.

  • Malum in se: Crimes that are inherently wrong require proof of criminal intent (mens rea).

  • Severability: Invalid provisions of a statute can be severed from the valid ones, preserving the constitutionality of the remaining parts.