FACTS:

Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three parcels of land in Balintawak, Caloocan City, which are occupied by 24 squatter families. In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315, expropriating 40 hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, including portions of the petitioner's land. The expropriated land was declared part of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), with the National Housing Authority (NHA) as the administrator. The implementation of P.D. 1315 was done in seven phases known as the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). Phases 1 to 6 were acquired and paid for, but BBP Phase 7, which includes the petitioner's land, was not acquired.

On September 11, 1979, Proclamation No. 1893 declared Metropolitan Manila as an Urban Land Reform Zone, later amended by Proclamation No. 1967 to identify 244 sites as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. On June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the NHA under its supervision. On February 7, 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body.

On September 24, 1981, the petitioner requested the HSRC to declare that his property is not covered by the Urban Land Reform Program, and on October 2, 1981, the HSRC Commissioner issued a certificate stating that the petitioner's property is outside the Urban Land Reform Zone. Upon receiving the certificate, the petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. The NHA requested a census of the families occupying the lots and held a dialogue with the squatters, but they did not attend. As a result, a recommendation was made to issue a demolition clearance. On January 21, 1982, the NHA granted clearance for the dismantling and removal of the illegal structures on the petitioner's property.

In 1986, the petitioner's property was listed as a priority project under the government's Community Self-Help Program, and the NHA approved funds for its acquisition. Negotiations between the petitioner and NHA took place, but no agreement was reached on the selling price. In 1990, the petitioner requested the revalidation of the demolition clearance and relocation of the squatters, which the NHA revalidated in 1991 and informed the Mayor of the availability of serviced home lots for the relocation of the families. However, Mayor Asistio stated that the city had no plans to develop or support the development of the private property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Annabelle Carangdang can be compelled to implement the directive/memorandum of relocation/resettlement without declaring P.D. 1315 as void and unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not P.D. 1315, at least up to the extent of petitioner's properties adversely affected, can be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

3. Whether the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.

4. Whether the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies.

5. Whether the petitioner has the privilege to assail the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315.

6. Whether the registered owner of land can bring an action to recover possession.

7. Whether the City of Pasay should make due compensation to the landowners.

8. Whether the landowners can opt for the right to be paid just compensation.

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court denies the petition.

2. First. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Prohibition is a preventive remedy that seeks to order the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an illegal act. In this case, petitioner does not pray for respondent Carangdang to be ordered to desist from relocating the squatters. Instead, what petitioner challenges is Carangdang's refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The proper remedy for this refusal is mandamus, not prohibition.

3. Second. The petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus either. Mandamus is a remedy used when a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty. However, in this case, Carangdang's refusal to implement the clearance is not unlawful neglect of duty. Respondent Carangdang claims that petitioner's land has already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315, which gives the NHA the authority to ignore the clearance. Since there is a legal question as to the validity of P.D. 1315, mandamus is not the appropriate remedy.

4. The petitioner failed to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus. There is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to the respondent to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property.

5. The petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager or bring the respondent's inaction to the attention of her superiors. Judicial action should not be invoked if there are still administrative remedies available.

6. The petitioner has no privilege to assail the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 as it is merely used as a means to break the respondent's hypocrisy and pretension. Furthermore, the petitioner's land is not in clear danger of expropriation, and there is reason to believe that taking petitioner's land will serve no social purpose. Additionally, the petitioner cannot blow hot and cold on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 as he did not question its constitutionality before and even negotiated with NHA for the price of his land.

7. The registered owner of land can bring an action to recover possession as possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land.

8. The City of Pasay is not required to restore possession of the land as it is no longer feasible due to its conversion into a road. The only relief available is for the city to make due compensation.

9. The landowners concerned cannot opt for the right to be paid just compensation as it is not an easy process and may take years, especially considering the government's budget difficulties.

PRINCIPLES:

• Prohibition is a preventive remedy that seeks to desist the defendant from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.

• Mandamus is a remedy used when a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty imposed by law.

• Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy when there is a legal question as to the validity of a law or regulation.

• Mandamus is a writ that commands a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do an act required to be done when there is a neglect of duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.

• Petitioner must show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.

• Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner.

• Petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action.

• A party cannot blow hot and cold on the constitutionality of a law and may be estopped from asserting its unconstitutionality.

• The remedy of restoration of possession may be available to an aggrieved landowner whose property was taken by the government without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and was devoted to public use.

• Possession is an attribute of ownership of land.

• The conversion of land into a road may render restoration of possession by the government inconvenient or unfeasible.

• Compensation should be made by the government when it occupies private land for public use.