FACTS:

On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig and his four-year-old son were walking when a gray car passed by and stopped. Rudy recognized the driver, Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr., who called him by his nickname. Petitioner opened the car door, drew a gun, and shot Rudy. Rudy ran away as petitioner drove off. Later, Rudy and his son went to the seashore and returned to the spot where he was shot. Rudy was brought to the Municipal Hall for interrogation and then to the hospital, where he was discharged the next day.

Petitioner was charged with frustrated murder but claimed innocence and presented evidence of his alibi. The RTC found petitioner guilty of attempted murder, but the CA modified the decision to guilt of less serious physical injuries.

During the incident, Rudy approached the car and when petitioner asked if he was a Barangay Captain, Rudy responded affirmatively. Petitioner then shot Rudy from inside the car, came out, and shot him again before speeding away. Rudy was taken to the nearest hospital and later transferred to another hospital for further treatment.

Petitioner defended himself through denial and alibi, but both the RTC and the CA found these defenses unconvincing. They considered the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and corroborating, establishing petitioner's identity as the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was the one who shot the victim.

2. Whether petitioner's defense of alibi would prosper.

3. Whether the failure to present evidence of ownership of the car used by the accused is material in the light of positive identification.

4. Whether the trial court and the appellate court committed an error in giving credence to the testimony of the sole eyewitness.

5. Whether the defense of alibi can prevail over the positive identification of the accused.

6. Whether the accused is guilty of attempted murder or less serious physical injuries.

7. Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.

8. Whether there was treachery in the commission of the crime of less serious physical injuries.

9. Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to the case.

10. Whether there is a factual basis for the award of moral damages.

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was the one who shot the victim. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the petitioner was the assailant based on the positive identification by the victim and the corroborating evidence such as the gunshot wound and the testimony of the doctor who treated the victim.

2. The defense of alibi raised by the petitioner did not prosper. The Court held that the positive identification by the victim prevails over the denial of the accused. The petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to corroborate his claim of being somewhere else at the time of the incident.

3. The ownership of the car used by the accused is immaterial in the light of positive identification.

4. The trial court and the appellate court did not commit an error in giving credence to the testimony of the sole eyewitness.

5. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.

6. The accused is guilty of less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder.

7. The aggravating circumstance of treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.

8. Treachery did not attend the commission of the crime of less serious physical injuries as the circumstances of the case did not show the deliberate and conscious adoption of means of execution that would ensure the commission of the crime without harm to the offender.

9. The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to the case as the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime of less serious physical injuries is less than one year.

10. There is no factual basis for the award of moral damages as the records do not support such an award.

PRINCIPLES:

• Positive identification by the victim carries more weight than the denial of the accused.

• The court gives more weight to the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of witnesses, as it has the opportunity to observe their demeanor.

• The defense of alibi must be supported by convincing evidence that the accused was somewhere else at the time of the crime.

• Credibility of witnesses is to be weighed and should not be based on numbers.

• Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would materially affect the result of the case.

• Alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim.

• In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that the accused was so far away that it was not possible for them to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

• The intent to kill is an essential element of attempted or frustrated murder and must be proven in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the assailant.

• When intent to kill is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only.

• Treachery requires the employment of means of execution that would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.

• Treachery in the commission of a crime requires the deliberate and conscious adoption of means of execution that would ensure the commission of the crime without risk to the offender.

• The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to offenses with a maximum term of imprisonment of less than one year.

• Moral damages may be awarded in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries, but there must be a factual basis for such an award.