FACTS:

The petitioner, Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA), filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88. CREBA is an organization of private corporations and individuals involved in land and housing development. The respondent in this case is the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who issued the administrative issuances subject of the petition.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued various administrative orders and memoranda that pertain to the conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses. These issuances cover all applications for land conversion and aim to regulate the reclassification of agricultural lands. In April 2008, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications through Memorandum No. 88.

CREBA contends that the enforcement of these administrative issuances has adversely affected housing projects, resulting in housing shortage, unemployment, and illegal squatting.

The petitioner challenges the validity of the Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01-02 (DAR AO No. 01-02), as amended, which expands the definition of agricultural lands to include lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. The petitioner argues that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction and violated Republic Act No. 6657 by issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02. The petitioner also contends that DAR AO No. 01-02 violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and the constitutional mandate on local autonomy. Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02 deprive them of their liberty and property without due process of law and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Finally, the petitioner argues that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional because it suspends the land use conversion without any basis.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioner has filed the petition in the proper court forum.

2. Whether exceptional and compelling circumstances are present to justify direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

3. Whether the petitioner has properly invoked a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

4. Whether the Secretary of Agrarian Reform exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88.

5. Whether the petitioner's proper remedy is a Petition for Declaratory Relief instead of a Petition for Certiorari.

6. Whether the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted within his authority in promulgating DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, which included lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands.

7. Whether the inclusion of such lands in the definition of agricultural lands unduly expands or enlarges the definition.

8. Whether reclassification of agricultural lands automatically allows the landowner to change its use without the need for conversion.

9. Whether the reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs or through Presidential Proclamations still requires the process of conversion.

10. Whether the reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs should be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure or the approval or clearance of DAR.

11. Whether DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, violates the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Constitution.

12. Whether DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. The petition must be dismissed because the petitioner failed to file the petition in the proper court forum. The petitioner should have initially filed the petition with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so constitutes a sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition.

2. The petition must also be dismissed because the petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to the Supreme Court. The petitioner did not fulfill the conditions set forth in a previous case, Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, which requires the petitioner to demonstrate exceptional and compelling circumstances for the Supreme Court to exercise its primary jurisdiction.

3. The petitioner failed to meet the requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued the assailed administrative issuances in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. The Secretary did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, therefore, a Petition for Certiorari is not the appropriate remedy in this case.

4. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. These actions were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions, not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. The Secretary did not make any adjudication of rights of the parties, so there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

5. The proper remedy for the petitioner is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, as this case essentially seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned administrative issuances. The Court only has appellate jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief and certiorari is not the proper avenue to challenge the constitutionality or legality of administrative issuances. The writ of certiorari is limited to determining the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

6. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted within his authority in promulgating DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, which included lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands. This authority is derived from the mandate given to the DAR under Executive Order No. 129-A to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation, as well as the authority to approve or disapprove the conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, also recognizes the DAR's authority to approve land conversion, including the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands lands not reclassified before 15 June 1988.

7. The inclusion of lands not reclassified before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition. It serves the purpose of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 by clarifying what lands can be subject to DAR's conversion authority. This interpretation is supported by jurisprudence, particularly the case of Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, which states that agricultural lands reclassified after 15 June 1988 can be subject to DAR's conversion authority.

8. Reclassification of agricultural lands alone does not automatically allow the landowner to change its use. The landowner must still undergo the process of conversion before using the land for other purposes.

9. The reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs or through Presidential Proclamations still requires the process of conversion before the land can be used for non-agricultural purposes.

10. The power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute and subject to the approval or clearance of DAR. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 recognizes the authority of DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses.

11. DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not violate the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Constitution. The administrative and criminal penalties provided in the order are in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435.

12. DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not unconstitutional as it was issued to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development and was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public.

PRINCIPLES:

• There is a hierarchy of courts which determines the venue of appeals and serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. Petitions against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against superior courts should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

• The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the desired redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.

• The Supreme Court has appellate, not original, jurisdiction over Petitions for Declaratory Relief, even if only questions of law are involved.

• The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board, or officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.

• Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right, or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter.

• Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised arbitrarily due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility.

• A Petition for Certiorari may only be invoked against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Quasi-judicial function refers to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

• Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, there must be a law that gives rise to specific rights and a controversy brought before them.

• The writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and is issued only at the discretion of the court.

• The DAR has the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion under the mandate given by Executive Order No. 129-A.

• Lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 can be included in the definition of agricultural lands for land use conversion.

• The DAR's conversion authority extends to lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, as clarified in Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform.

• Reclassification and conversion of lands are distinct concepts, with reclassification referring to the utilization of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes and conversion referring to the change in the use of a specific piece of agricultural land as approved by the DAR.

• A mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. Conversion is necessary before using the land for non-agricultural purposes.

• The authority to convert reclassified agricultural lands is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

• Reclassification of agricultural lands specifies how they shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses but does not automatically convert the land for other purposes.

• Even reclassification of agricultural lands through Presidential Proclamations requires conversion clearance from the DAR.

• Reclassification alone does not suffice, and conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.

• Agricultural lands reclassified to non-agricultural uses must undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for other purposes, regardless of whether the reclassification was done by LGUs or through Presidential Proclamations.

• Public agricultural lands reserved for public use or purpose do not require conversion and are outside the coverage of the CARP.

• The power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute and is subject to the approval or clearance of DAR.

• Administrative and criminal penalties for illegal or premature conversion of lands within DAR's jurisdiction are in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435.

• Memorandum No. 88 was issued to address the rice shortage and is made in pursuit of the general welfare of the public.