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DACUDAO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE GONZALES

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case were investors who claimed to have been defrauded by Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies. After their demands for the return of their investments were ignored, they filed charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr. and others. The Secretary of Justice then issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182, directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases against Delos Angeles, Jr. and others to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. The complaints of the petitioners were subsequently forwarded to the Special Panel of the DOJ. Dissatisfied with this, the petitioners filed a petition before the Court, alleging that DO No. 182 violated their rights to due process, equal protection of the laws, and speedy disposition of cases. They also challenged the constitutionality of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, exempting cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City from the coverage of DO No. 182. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, were valid. The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioners should have filed their case with lower courts and that their petition lacked merit.

The Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of observing the hierarchy of courts in filing petitions for extraordinary writs such as certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction. It is observed that there has been a growing tendency of litigants and lawyers to directly file with the highest tribunal, bypassing the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Courts. The Court clarifies that while it has original jurisdiction to issue these writs, this jurisdiction is not exclusive and may also be exercised by lower courts. The hierarchy of courts should be followed, with petitions against first-level courts filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter filed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should only be invoked when there are special and important reasons stated clearly in the petition. This policy is enforced to prevent overburdening the Court's docket and to allow it to concentrate on matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. Litigants are reminded that the Court is not the sole venue for seeking redress and that it is a court of last resort. The observance of the hierarchy of courts is explicitly mandated in Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition for these extraordinary writs should be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, and in the appropriate court depending on the nature of the case. The writ of certiorari may only be issued when a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient; the abuse must be grave.

In this case, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order. They claim that certiorari is the proper remedy as there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. In order for a special civil action for certiorari to succeed, the petitioners must show that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the Secretary of Justice acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned issuances.

  2. Whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) is a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

  3. Whether the petition filed by the petitioners is proper under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

  4. Whether the Secretary of Justice's assailed issuances excluded the petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were entitled.

  5. Whether the challenged issuances exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws.

  6. Whether the exemption of cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from consolidation violated the petitioners' right to equal protection of the law.

  7. Whether the Secretary of Justice was justified in excluding cases filed in Cagayan de Oro from the scope of Department Order No. 182.

  8. Whether the Department Order violated the petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases.

  9. Whether the Department Order was issued with retroactive effect.

  10. Whether the Department Order constituted obstruction of justice.

RULING:

  1. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Secretary of Justice acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The allegations in the petition were merely general and did not show any specific instances of such actions. Moreover, the impugned issuances were intended to ensure the efficiency and economy of the preliminary investigation process, which is a purely executive or administrative function. Therefore, the petitioners did not meet the requirement for a special civil action for certiorari to prosper.

  2. The DOJ is not a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Although it is the primary prosecution arm of the government, its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; instead, their purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to charge the accused. The DOJ also does not exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause. While there may be some decisions characterizing the power of the public prosecutor as quasi-judicial in nature, this is only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, exercises powers similar to those of a court of law. However, the limited similarity ends there. Unlike a quasi-judicial body, the decisions of the DOJ arising from a preliminary investigation do not have the same effect as judgments of a court of law.

  3. The petition filed by the petitioners is not proper under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the Secretary of Justice.

  4. The assailed issuances did not exclude the petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were entitled.

  5. The challenged issuances did not exceed the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws.

  6. The exemption of cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from consolidation did not violate the petitioners' right to equal protection of the law.

  7. Yes. The Secretary of Justice was justified in excluding cases filed in Cagayan de Oro from the scope of Department Order No. 182 as it was based on a valid classification. The Secretary of Justice had considered that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan de Oro and that there were a considerable number of complainants residing in the city.

  8. No. The Department Order did not violate the petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases. The right to speedy disposition is a flexible concept, and it is only violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In this case, the consolidation of cases was ordered to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them.

  9. No. The Department Order was not issued with retroactive effect and did not violate the prohibition against passing retroactive laws. Procedural laws, such as the Department Order, are generally applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any vested rights.

  10. No. The petitioners failed to establish that the Department Order constituted obstruction of justice. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is sanctioned by law, and the Secretary of Justice had broad discretion in the discharge of the Department of Justice's functions.

PRINCIPLES:

  • In a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on the petitioners to demonstrate the absence of jurisdiction or the presence of grave abuse of discretion.

  • The function of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in conducting a preliminary investigation is purely executive or administrative and does not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. A preliminary investigation is inquisitorial in nature and aims to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The decisions of the DOJ arising from a preliminary investigation do not have the same effect as judgments of a court of law.

  • Mandamus only applies when there is an unlawful neglect of duty or exclusion from a right or office, and when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

  • Administrative regulations have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until set aside by a competent court.

  • The equal protection clause of the Constitution requires equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification, and does not require the universal application of laws without distinction.

  • The Secretary of Justice has the authority to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders.

  • The right to the speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept and is violated only when there are vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays in the proceedings.

  • Procedural laws generally have retroactive effect and are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.

  • The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any vested rights.