FACTS:

FACTS

Efren D. Almuete, Johnny Ila, and Joel Lloren were charged with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, also known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines." On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, Almuete's counsel informed the trial court that Almuete and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. Despite this, the court proceeded to promulgate its decision, finding the accused guilty and sentencing them to imprisonment.

Following the promulgation, Almuete and his co-accused filed motions for reconsideration and later a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition and ordered the re-promulgation of the decision in the presence of Ila and Lloren.

The People of the Philippines appealed the CA's decision to the Supreme Court, which reversed the acquittal and reinstated the trial court's decision. Almuete then filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied. In an attempt to seek clarification and a new promulgation, Almuete filed a Motion for Clarification and a Motion for Repromulgation, but these were also denied by the trial court.

Almuete then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA seeking relief from the trial court's denial of his motions, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. Now, Almuete raises several issues before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the denial of the Motion for Repromulgation is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.

2. Whether the promulgation of judgment is valid.

3. Whether petitioner's right to appeal has prescribed.

4. Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the petition for certiorari and reviewing the trial court's assessment of evidence and findings of fact.

5. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the respondent is a nullity.

6. Whether the trial court erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in Article 310 instead of Article 309.

7. Whether the trial court erred in the computation of the imposable penalty.

8. Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court on the accused is erroneous and beyond the range prescribed by law.

9. Whether the Court has the duty and inherent power to correct the penalty imposed on the accused to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.

10. Whether or not the imposition of the corrected duration of the penalty violates the accused's constitutional and legal rights.

11. Whether or not the modification of the penalty should also apply to the co-accused who failed to appeal.

RULING:

1. Yes, the denial of the Motion for Repromulgation is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93 which prohibits requiring convicts to appear before trial courts for the promulgation of judgments of conviction that have been affirmed or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The practice of requiring convicts to appear is considered an unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense. Thus, there was no error in the trial court's denial of the motion.

2. Yes, the promulgation of judgment is valid. The petitioner's absence during the promulgation does not invalidate it because the petitioner's presence was not necessary. The trial court had already notified the petitioner through the proper channels, and there was no justifiable reason for the petitioner's absence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in promulgating the judgment despite the petitioner's absence.

3. No, the petitioner's right to appeal has prescribed. The petitioner availed of the wrong remedy by filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal after the reversal of the acquittal by the Court of Appeals. The Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed, and the petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law which was to file an appeal by writ of error. Since the petitioner failed to exercise the proper remedy within the prescribed period, the right to appeal has already prescribed.

4. Yes, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the petition for certiorari and reviewing the trial court's assessment of evidence and findings of fact. The appellate court exceeded its authority and arrogated unto itself the power to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error.

5. Yes, the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the respondent is a nullity. The appellate court lacks statutory authority to entertain and resolve errors of judgment and can only entertain errors of jurisdiction. A void judgment has no legal effect and cannot impair or create rights.

6. Yes, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in Article 310 instead of Article 309. The circumstances enumerated in Article 310 were not present in the case, thus the proper penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article 309.

7. Yes, the trial court erred in the computation of the imposable penalty. The correct imposable maximum penalty should be anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

8. Yes, the penalty imposed by the trial court on the accused is erroneous and beyond the range prescribed by law.

9. Yes, the Court has the duty and inherent power to correct the penalty imposed on the accused to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.

10. The imposition of the corrected duration of the penalty does not violate the accused's constitutional and legal rights. It is a remedial and corrective measure that protects the accused against the risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of imprisonment. Therefore, the petition is denied and the penalties are affirmed.

11. Pursuant to Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the favorable modification of the penalty should also apply to the co-accused who failed to appeal.

PRINCIPLES:

• The denial of a Motion for Repromulgation in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.

• The promulgation of judgment does not require the presence of the convict if proper notification has been made.

• The prescription of the right to appeal when the proper remedy is not availed of within the prescribed period.

• An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, allowing the appellate court to reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned.

• The Court of Appeals has statutory authority to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

• A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, and it is non-existent in contemplation of the law.

• The penalty imposed by the trial court must be modified based on the applicable law and provisions.

• A final judgment may no longer be altered, amended, or modified, even if there is an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, except for certain recognized exceptions such as matters of life, liberty, honor, or property warranting the suspension of the rules and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings of fact. The existence of special or compelling circumstances, the merits of the case, a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and the absence of unjust prejudice to the other party are factors to be considered in deciding whether to suspend the rules. (citing People v. Barro)

• The court has the power to suspend its own rules or except a particular case from its operation when the purposes of justice require, especially when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the rules. The court should relax the rules in the interest of substantial justice, serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof. (citing People v. Barro)

• The penalty imposed by the trial court must be within the range prescribed by law, otherwise, it is erroneous and can be corrected by the Court.

• The Court has the duty and inherent power to correct the penalty imposed on the accused to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.

• An erroneous judgment that ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful penalties is necessarily void and can never become final and executory.

• Corrected duration of penalty does not violate the accused's constitutional and legal rights.

• Remedial and corrective measures protect the accused from the risk of another trial and review.

• Favorable modification of penalty should apply to co-accused who failed to appeal.