FACTS:

The petitioner, Romulo L. Neri, was the Director General of NEDA during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Criminal informations were filed against Benjamin Abalos and Neri for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the Philippine-ZTE NBN Project. Neri's case was docketed as SB-10-CRM-0099 and assigned to the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses. The prosecution moved for the consolidation of Neri's case with other cases related to the same project, citing the need for a more expeditious and cost-effective resolution. Neri opposed the consolidation, arguing that the cases involved different issues and facts, could violate his rights, and that his case was already at an advanced stage. The Sandiganbayan Fifth Division granted the consolidation in a resolution. Neri filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Neri then petitioned the Court, arguing that the consolidation order was void due to grave abuse of discretion. The Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan refused to accept Neri's case for consolidation, making the issue of consolidation moot. Nevertheless, the Court still addressed the constitutional law aspect of the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether consolidation of trial is proper in this case.

2. Whether the consolidation approved by the Fifth Division went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial.

3. Whether the criminal case for indirect bribery can be consolidated with the case for plunder.

4. Whether the consolidation of the cases would unduly expose the private respondent to unrelated testimonies and delay the resolution of the indirect bribery case.

5. Whether the consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would violate petitioner Neri's right to a speedy trial.

6. Whether the consolidation would unduly delay the resolution of the criminal case against petitioner Neri.

7. Whether consolidation of two criminal cases is proper

8. Whether consolidation of the cases would violate the accused's right to a speedy disposition of cases

RULING:

1. Consolidation of trial is proper in this case. The requisites for consolidation of trial are that the actions should arise from the same act, event, or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence. Furthermore, the court must have jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated, and a joint trial should not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

2. The consolidation approved by the Fifth Division did not go beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial. There is no evidence to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth Division approved was a fusion into one criminal proceeding where one case is unidentifiable from the other. The records indicate that the consolidation was approved for the purpose of promoting expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy.

3. The consolidation of the criminal case for indirect bribery with the case for plunder should be refused. The Court ruled that consolidation should be refused if it will unduly expose a party to unrelated testimonies, delay the resolution of the indirect bribery case, muddle the issues, and expose the party to the inconveniences of a lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case. Consolidation is also rendered inadvisable if the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial have already been heard in the earlier case.

4. Yes, the consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would violate petitioner Neri's right to a speedy trial.

5. Yes, the consolidation would unduly delay the resolution of the criminal case against petitioner Neri.

6. The court reversed and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan and ordered that the two criminal cases proceed independently and be resolved with dispatch. The court held that consolidation should only be ordered if it achieves the objects and purposes underlying the rule on consolidation, which include the swift dispensation of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties. However, consolidation should be denied if it subverts any of the aims of consolidation, such as delaying the resolution of one of the cases, exposing a party to lengthy litigation, and undermining the accused's right to a speedy disposition of cases. Ordering consolidation that would likely lead to these consequences constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

PRINCIPLES:

• Consolidation of trial is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, and attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants.

• Consolidation for trial is proper when the actions arise from the same act, event, or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence. It should not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

• Consolidation of trial may expedite trial or cause delays, but the right to a speedy resolution of cases cannot be sacrificed for the convenience and expense of the government.

• Consolidation of cases may be refused if it will unduly expose a party to unrelated testimonies and delay the resolution of a specific case.

• The consolidation of cases may be inadvisable if the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial have already been heard in the earlier case.

• Consolidation of cases may be justified to avoid unnecessary delay and duplication of evidence, but it must not violate the accused's right to a speedy trial.

• The number of witnesses and the relevancy of their testimonies are significant factors in determining whether consolidation would unduly delay the resolution of a case.

• The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Constitution and must be upheld, even if it means granting separate trials instead of a joint trial.

• The rights of an accused take precedence over minimizing the cost incidental to the resolution of controversies.

• Consolidation should be ordered to achieve the objects and purposes underlying the rule on consolidation.

• Consolidation should be denied if it subverts any of the aims of consolidation.

• Ordering consolidation that would likely delay the resolution of a case, expose a party to lengthy litigation, and undermine the accused's right to a speedy disposition of cases constitutes grave abuse of discretion.