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JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION v. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR.

FACTS:

The petitioner, Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, is a private parking operator authorized to operate and manage parking spaces in Baguio City. They are also authorized to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. On May 17, 2003, respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia, and an unidentified person removed the clamp attached to a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle owned by Edwin Ang, which was illegally parked. A similar incident occurred on May 7, 2003, where the clamp on a Nissan Cefiro car belonging to Jeffrey Walan was forcibly removed by respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and two unidentified persons. As a result, Jadewell filed two cases against the respondents for robbery, while respondent Benedicto Balajadia filed a case against Jadewell's president and employees for usurpation of authority and grave coercion. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to file a case of usurpation of authority against the petitioner, but no probable cause to charge the respondents with robbery. However, the prosecutor found that the respondents violated a city ordinance by removing the wheel clamps and not paying the prescribed fees. The prosecutor then filed the corresponding informations against the respondents for violation of the city ordinance. Two criminal informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, charging the respondents with forcibly dismantling and taking the immobilizing clamp attached to the Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle and the Nissan Cefiro car.

In another related case, Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation filed criminal complaints against the respondents for violations of a city ordinance. The complaints were filed on October 2, 2003, but the offenses were allegedly committed on May 7, 2003. The petitioner argued that the filing of the complaints with the City Prosecutor's Office interrupted the running of the two-month prescriptive period for the offenses charged, and therefore, the offenses have not prescribed. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the prescriptive period began on the alleged date of the commission of the crime and ended two months after, regardless of the filing of complaints with the City Prosecutor's Office. The respondent judge ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that the offenses had already prescribed. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the offenses have not prescribed as the filing of the complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of the offense charged against respondents.

  2. Whether Act No. 3326, as amended, applies to the offenses charged.

  3. Whether the violation of a city ordinance falls under the scope of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

  4. Whether the filing of an Information is required to toll the prescriptive period for violations of city ordinances.

  5. Whether or not the filing of the Complaint before the Office of the Prosecutor tolls the prescription period for violations of special laws and ordinances.

  6. Whether the prescription period for the offense charged by the petitioner has expired.

  7. Whether the filing of the Information in court is necessary to toll the prescription period.

RULING:

  1. The Petition is denied.

  2. Yes, the violation of a city ordinance falls under the scope of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 1(B)(3) of the Rules provides that criminal cases falling within the scope of the Rule include violations of municipal or city ordinances.

  3. No, the filing of an Information is not required to toll the prescriptive period for violations of city ordinances. Under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of a complaint or information tolls the prescriptive period. The case is deemed commenced on the date it is actually filed in court, regardless of whether a preliminary investigation is conducted. This interpretation is in line with Act No. 3326, which states that the period of prescription is suspended when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.

  4. The filing of the Complaint before the Office of the Prosecutor does not toll the prescription period for violations of special laws and ordinances. The prescription period commences to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the violation is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the Complaint or Information in court. The recent case of People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that the doctrine of Zaldivia v. Reyes, which held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor tolls the prescription period, is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned.

  5. The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the ruling of the trial court that the prescription period for the offense charged by the petitioner has expired. The Court also held that the filing of the Information in court is necessary to toll the prescription period.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The prescription period for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000 is two months.

  • The commencement of the prescription period is from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, or if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

  • The prescriptive period is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and will begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

  • Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances.

  • The filing of the Complaint before the Office of the Prosecutor does not toll the prescription period for violations of special laws and ordinances.

  • Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

  • The filing of the Information in court interrupts the prescription period.

  • The doctrine of Zaldivia v. Reyes, which held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor tolls the prescription period, is not applicable to violations of special laws.

  • A crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if the necessary judicial proceedings are intentionally or negligently delayed until it is too late.

  • The applicable rules should be interpreted based on their plain language and intent, without resorting to misreading or distortion.

  • To prevent the problem of intentional or negligent delay in the institution of necessary judicial proceedings, the rules can be reworded or amended.