ELIZALDE S. CO v. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ

FACTS:

The case involves a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and acquitted respondent Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. (Muñoz) of three counts of libel.

The libel charges stemmed from statements made by Muñoz against petitioner Elizalde S. Co (Co) in interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz claimed that Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor to expedite the issuance of warrant of arrest against him, manipulated the results of a government bidding, and received money under the condition of sub-contracting a project to Muñoz. Co filed a complaint-affidavit and three criminal informations for libel were filed against Muñoz.

Muñoz defended himself by stating that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a matter of public duty, and that he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman. However, the Ombudsman dismissed the cases. The RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel, ordering imprisonment and awarding damages. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz on the ground of lack of actual malice.

Co, unable to appeal the criminal aspect of the libel suits, now seeks damages based on Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. He argues that Muñoz failed to overcome the presumption of malice and that Muñoz is not entitled to the defense of privileged communication. Muñoz, on the other hand, argues that Co is barred from filing a civil action due to the dismissal of the criminal action.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused's civil liability.

  2. Whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.

RULING:

  1. A private party may not appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused's civil liability. The extinction of the penal action extinguishes the civil action unless the reservation to institute a separate civil action is made.

  2. The respondent is not liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks despite his acquittal. If there is no libel due to the privileged character of the communication and actual malice is not proved, there should be no award of moral damages.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The extinction of the penal action extinguishes the civil action unless the reservation to institute a separate civil action is made. (Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court)

  • If there is no libel due to the privileged character of the communication and actual malice is not proved, there should be no award of moral damages. (De la Rosa, et al. v. Maristela)