FACTS:

The consolidated petitions assailed the constitutionality of the Philippine Pork Barrel System, leading the Supreme Court to scrutinize deeply the system’s key elements and historical evolution. Referred to as "Pork Barrel," this political term of American-English origin historically denoted targeted appropriations intended to benefit a legislator’s district, enhancing electoral prospects by politically satisfying constituents. In the Philippines, it evolved into mechanisms like lump-sum discretionary funds for congressional members and later executive lump sums.

Initially dating back to the 1922 Act 3044, the "Public Works Act," congressional involvement was evident in the post-enactment approval of fund expenditures. Over the decades, the utilization of the "Pork Barrel" structure saw numerous iterations through various administrations, adapting names and project scopes including the "Countrywide Development Fund" and the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF). This control extended not just to project identification but to the distribution and realignment of funds, thus allocating large sums for various public and infrastructure projects led by the discretion of individual members of Congress.

Under the Marcos administration, the concept of "Congressional Pork Barrel" expanded significantly despite being briefly shelved during Martial Law, illustrating the system's resilience and adaptability. The system continued through the Corazon Aquino administration, through forms like the “Mindanao Development Fund” and “Visayas Development Fund” leading to the broader "Countrywide Development Fund" included in the GAAs of the early 1990s, documented allocation expanding to P2.3 billion.

Successive administrations continued to use and modify this funding mechanism. During the Estrada administration, PDAF formally appeared in 2000, offering considerable flexibility regarding fund utilization and project specification, realignment, and executive oversight. This persisted into the Macapagal-Arroyo administration, emphasized through varying degrees of scrutiny and procedural adjustments, particularly towards ensuring compliance with executive-identified priorities.

The controversies surrounding these funds grew immensely, with instances of misappropriation and corruption becoming publicly magnified, particularly under the Aquino administration. High-profile investigations and exposés by whistle-blowers and the Commission on Audit (CoA) revealed systemic inefficiencies, misuse of funds, and widespread corruption involving the PDAF and various ghost projects managed by fake NGOs.

Triggered by these widespread corruption allegations and findings, petitions were lodged seeking to declare the system unconstitutional, leading to this landmark decision wherein the Supreme Court undertook to examine the functional, operational, and constitutional integrity of the Pork Barrel System.

ISSUES:

I. Procedural Issues

1. Whether the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy.

2. Whether the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review.

3. Whether petitioners have legal standing to sue.

4. Whether the principles of res judicata and stare decisis bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System."

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel"

Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws violate the principles of:

a. Separation of powers

b. Non-delegability of legislative power

c. Checks and balances

d. Accountability

e. Political dynasties

f. Local autonomy

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel"

Whether the following phrases are unconstitutional for constituting undue delegations of legislative power:

a. "And for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds.

b. "To finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund.

RULING:

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues

1. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy. The system persists in the form of the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds, and PD 1869 as amended by PD 1993 for the Presidential Social Fund.

2. Not a Matter of Policy The issues raised present legal questions, not policy matters, hence, within the Court's jurisdiction to resolve.

3. Legal Standing Petitioners have the requisite standing as taxpayers and citizens to question the validity of the "Pork Barrel System."

4. Non-Applicability of Res Judicata and Stare Decisis The Court concludes that the earlier cases (Philconsa and LAMP) do not bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System."

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel"

5. Separation of Powers The system violates the separation of powers principle as legislators are allowed to exercise post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget.

6. Non-Delegability of Legislative Power The system involves legislators exercising appropriation powers individually, violating the principle that such power should be exercised by Congress as a bicameral body.

7. Checks and Balances The system creates appropriations that are not subject to the President's item-veto power, violating checks and balances principles.

8. Accountability By giving legislators post-enactment roles, the system impairs the principle of public accountability.

9. Political Dynasties Although raised, this argument was not ruled upon due to lack of self-executing law defining political dynasties.

10. Local Autonomy The system undermines local autonomy as it allows national legislators to intervene in purely local matters.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel"

15. Validity of Appropriation Sections 8 of PD 910 and 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, are valid appropriations laws to the extent that they designate a determinate amount for a specific public purpose.

16. Undue Delegation The phrases "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (PD 910) and "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" (PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993) constitute undue delegation of legislative power due to lack of sufficient standard.

PRINCIPLES:

• Doctrine of Separation of Powers Legislative post-enactment participation in budget implementation violates this principle.

• Non-Delegability of Legislative Power Appropriation must be exercised by Congress, not individual legislators.

• Checks and Balances Lump-sum appropriations hinder the President's veto power, undermining checks and balances.

• Public Accountability Legislators’ roles in budget execution dilute congressional oversight.

• Local Autonomy National legislators encroaching on local matters violate the principles of local autonomy.

• Undue Delegation Adequate legislative guidelines must limit delegated rule-making authority; broad phrases allowing discretionary use of funds by the President are unconstitutional.