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SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

The petitioner, Silverina Consigna, and the co-accused, Jaime Rusillon, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The charges arose from a loan transaction where Consigna, using the three checks signed by Rusillon as security, obtained a loan from private complainant Emerlina F. Moleta. Consigna claimed that the loan was for the implementation of various projects in the municipality and that Rusillon was aware of it. On the other hand, Rusillon denied any participation in Consigna's acts and stated that he only signed the checks for specific purposes such as payroll, daily expenses, and construction. The Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty but acquitted Rusillon.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Sandiganbayan's decision, arguing that the court committed grave abuse of discretion. However, the petition mistakenly raised jurisdictional errors actually proper for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of raising errors of judgment proper for a petition for review under Rule 45. Nonetheless, the petition was timely filed.

The petitioner argued that the court committed reversible error in finding her guilty of estafa based on an information that did not specifically designate the provision allegedly violated. The petitioner also challenged her guilt under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes estafa committed by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. Lastly, the petitioner questioned her guilt under Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, which pertains to the offense of causing undue injury to any party, including the government, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

The court reviewed the arguments raised by the petitioner and rejected them. The court emphasized that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. The court cited People v. Dimaano to support this principle. Based on the above considerations, the court concluded that the petitioner's arguments were without merit and held that the petition must fail.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the court committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly violated.

  2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

  3. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.

  4. Whether the petitioner committed estafa by means of deceit;

  5. Whether the petitioner violated Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);

  6. Whether the court had jurisdiction over the case.

  7. Whether the use or abuse of office is an element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

  8. Whether the petitioner committed the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

  9. Whether or not the inclusion of an attorney's fees clause in the agreement is valid.

  10. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees is proper.

RULING:

  1. The court denied the petition.

  2. The court held that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. The court referred to People v. Dimaano and United States v. Lim San, which established the principle that the designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information is a conclusion of law made by the prosecutor, and what matters is whether the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged.

  3. The court concluded that false pretense and fraudulent acts attended the petitioner's transaction, as required for the crime of estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC. It emphasized that the element of deceit, consisting of false statement or fraudulent representation, must be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the commission of the fraud, and that the false statement or representation should be the cause or motive for the offended party to part with his money.

  4. The court held that the petitioner committed estafa by means of deceit. The elements of estafa by means of deceit were present in the case, namely: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.

  5. The court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. The essential elements of the offense were present: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he/she acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) his/her action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to any private party in the discharge of his/her functions.

  6. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The court ruled that the offense committed by the petitioner was directly related to her position as municipal treasurer, and therefore, the court had jurisdiction over the case.

  7. The use or abuse of office is not an element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. It is an aggravating circumstance that is material not from the allegations, but from the proof presented during trial.

  8. The petitioner committed the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 under the alternative mode of "causing undue injury" to the private party, Moleta, committed with evident bad faith.

  9. Yes, the inclusion of an attorney's fees clause in the agreement is valid. It is well-settled that stipulations on attorney's fees in contracts are valid and binding provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable. In this case, the inclusion of an attorney's fees clause in the agreement was not shown to be unfair or excessive, and therefore is valid.

  10. No, the award of attorney's fees is not proper. The award of attorney's fees is dependent on the existence of a law, contract, or stipulation authorizing the same. In this case, there is no legal basis for the award of attorney's fees as there was no showing of bad faith or unjustified refusal to comply with a valid obligation. The Court held that the award of attorney's fees should be deleted.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information, not by the title or designation of the offense alleged or the provision of law cited. (People v. Dimaano)

  • The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information is a conclusion of law made by the prosecutor. It is the acts alleged in the body of the information that matter for the defense. (United States v. Lim San)

  • In the prosecution for estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC, it is essential that the element of deceit, consisting of false statement or fraudulent representation, be made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, and that such false statement or representation is the cause or motive for the offended party to part with his money.

  • Estafa by means of deceit requires the presence of false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, reliance by the offended party, and resulting damage.

  • Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 requires the presence of a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions, manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence, and causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to any private party.

  • The offense committed must have a direct relationship with the accused's position as a public officer for the court to have jurisdiction over the case.

  • The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 as an element, but it may serve as an aggravating circumstance depending on the proof presented during trial.

  • There are two ways by which a public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in the performance of their functions: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.

  • "Evident bad faith" in the context of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will.

  • The last sentence of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 is not a restrictive requirement that limits the application or extent of its coverage. It includes officers and employees of offices or government corporations even if they are not charged with the grant of licenses or concessions.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 225015 : March 10, 2021

H.D. NELSON CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Petitioner, v. GLOBAL PROFIT ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondent.

  • Stipulations on attorney's fees in contracts are valid and binding provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable.

  • The award of attorney's fees is dependent on the existence of a law, contract, or stipulation authorizing the same.

  • The award of attorney's fees should have legal basis such as bad faith or unjustified refusal to comply with a valid obligation to be proper.