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PEOPLE v. PETRUS YAU

FACTS:

This case involves the appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. The crime was committed on January 20, 2004, when the accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy, kidnapped the victim, Alastair Joseph Onglingswam. The victim was kept captive for twenty-two days and was subjected to maltreatment. The accused-appellants demanded a ransom of $600,000 and Php20,000 for each day of detention. The victim was eventually rescued by the Philippine National Police on February 11, 2004.

On February 11, 2004, the PACER group positioned themselves in search of a taxi allegedly involved in victimizing foreign nationals. They flagged down a taxi and approached the driver, later identified as Petrus Yau. Petrus was unable to produce a driver's license and car registration, so he was asked for his name. He identified himself as Petrus Yau, a British national. When shown a picture of the private complainant, Petrus stated that the man was being kept in his house. As a result, he was arrested for kidnapping. Petrus led the team to his house where the victim, Alastair Onglingswam, was found chained and handcuffed on the floor. Alastair positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver.

In their defense, Petrus and Susana denied the accusations. They claimed that the alleged kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set them up. Petrus asserted that he was at home sleeping at the time of the kidnapping, and on the day of the alleged rescue, he went to his wife's shop and was abducted by three men. He was handcuffed, blindfolded, and beaten until he became unconscious. When he regained consciousness, he was inside a room and was later transferred to another room. Petrus claimed that he lost personal properties during his detention. He also argued that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation due to his non-professional driver's license. Petrus and Susana both denied the accusation and requested their innocence to be substantiated.

Susana Sumogba Yau, the appellant in this case, denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time he served food to the victim, Alastair. She is legally married to Petrus Yau, but they have been separated since June 2003. On February 11, 2004, Susana called Petrus to pick up Php7,000.00 from her sari-sari store earnings and deposit it in her bank account. Four to five policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to the hospital where Petrus had supposedly been brought because of a vehicular accident. Susana, together with her two children and helpers, went with the police but instead of being taken to the hospital, they were brought to an office where Susana saw her almost dead husband in a small room. They were detained there for three days and were not provided with the assistance of a counsel. Susana stated that her husband's name is Petrus Yau, not John or Ong Kwai Ping, and that he is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They own three houses and lots registered in her name. Susana's personal belongings, including cash, bank cards, passport, and cellphone, were taken away by unknown persons.

This case involves the appeal of accused Petrus Gonzales and Myrna Gonzales from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The trial court found them to be the principal perpetrators of the crime based on the testimonies of witnesses and the evidence presented. The CA affirmed this decision but modified the penalty imposed on the Gonzaleses. In their appeal to the Supreme Court, Myrna Gonzales argued that the RTC and CA erred in various aspects.

ISSUES:

  1. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses

  2. Sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits

  3. Degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom

  4. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are sufficient to establish the guilt of Petrus Yau beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

  5. Whether Susana Yau can be held liable as an accomplice to the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

  6. Did the accused-appellants prove their defense of alibi and frame-up?

  7. Did the accused-appellants waive their objection to their warrantless arrests?

  8. Can the illegality of the warrantless arrest be a ground for setting aside a valid judgment?

  9. Did the trial court correctly impose the penalties for the main accused and the accomplice?

  10. Did the trial court correctly apportion the civil liabilities between the main accused and the accomplice?

  11. Whether the accused-appellants are liable to pay damages to the victim.

  12. How should the damages be apportioned between the principal and the accomplice?

RULING:

  1. The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court, being in a better position to decide such questions, had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under examination. Moreover, the trial court's factual findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect and have conclusive effect.

  2. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged and the identity of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The victim positively identified the accused-appellant as the driver of the taxi he boarded before he lost consciousness. The victim also recognized the accused-appellant's voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper. The testimony of witnesses who interacted with the accused-appellant during the kidnapping further supported his identity.

  3. The Court also finds that the prosecution presented credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that led to the reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant committed the crime charged. The combination of established facts and circumstances, such as the victim being rescued in the accused-appellant's house and the recovery of the taxi and personal items belonging to the accused-appellant, point to his guilt.

  4. Yes, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are sufficient to establish the guilt of Petrus Yau beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The court agrees with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. The elements of kidnapping for ransom were duly established, namely: (a) intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty, and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

  5. Yes, Susana Yau can be held liable as an accomplice to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The court found that Susana knew of Petrus' criminal design but kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. She stayed with Petrus inside the house where the victim was detained and provided food to the victim, which constituted material and moral aid to Petrus in the execution of the crime. Susana's act of giving food to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime but merely an expression of sympathy or support to her husband. The court applied the three elements required for a person to be considered an accomplice, as stated in Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) that there be a community of design; (2) that the person cooperates in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice.

  6. The accused-appellants failed to prove their defense of alibi and frame-up.

  7. The accused-appellants waived their objection to their warrantless arrests.

  8. The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot be a ground for setting aside a valid judgment.

  9. The trial court correctly imposed the penalties for the main accused and the accomplice.

  10. The trial court erred in apportioning the civil liabilities between the main accused and the accomplice.

  11. The accused-appellants are held liable to pay damages to the victim. The Court of Appeals decision ordering the accused-appellants to pay the victim moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 is affirmed. The award of actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00 is also maintained.

  12. The damages shall be apportioned as follows: Petrus Yau, the principal, is directed to pay two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of damages, which amounts to P382,088.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of P66,666.67. Susana Yau y Sumogba, the accomplice, is directed to pay one-third (1/3) of the total amount of damages, which amounts to P191,044.00. Specifically, Susana shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ?66,666.67, and exemplary damages in the amount of P33,333.33.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The credibility of witnesses is best addressed by the trial court as it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct.

  • The trial court's factual findings, especially on credibility, are given great respect and have conclusive effect.

  • In proving a crime, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt both the commission of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator.

  • Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if there is more than one circumstance proven, the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances leads to conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

  • Circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, can be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  • The elements of kidnapping for ransom are: (a) intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty, and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

  • A person may be considered an accomplice if there is a community of design, cooperation in the execution of the crime by supplying material or moral aid, and a relation between the acts of the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice.

  • In case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

  • Affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate, and testimonies given during trial carry more weight than affidavits. Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not justify the outright acquittal of an accused.

  • Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.

  • The defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.

  • Objections to the procedure followed in the acquisition of jurisdiction must be raised before the accused enters his plea.

  • The illegality of a warrantless arrest does not deprive the State of its right to prosecute when all other facts point to the guilt of the accused.

  • The prohibition on the death penalty under R.A. No. 9346 affects the penalty imposed for kidnapping for ransom.

  • Damages awarded should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to their respective degrees of liability and actual participation.

  • The liability of the accused-appellants to pay damages to the victim is affirmed.

  • The damages should be apportioned between the principal and the accomplice based on their degree of participation in the commission of the offense.