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CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. ALLAN RAPANAN

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) wherein the appellate court held petitioner Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc. liable for quasi-delict resulting in the death of Camilo Tangonan and physical injuries of Rapanan, and ordered it to pay respondents damages and attorney's fees. The accident happened on October 31, 1998, when a motorcycle with three passengers, driven by Camilo Tangonan, figured in a mishap along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. Tangonan died from the accident, while Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma suffered injuries. Rapanan and Camilo's common law wife, Mary Gine Tangonan, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, alleging that the victims were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire from one of the electric posts owned by petitioner. They claimed that petitioner's negligence in failing to fix and change the live tension wire despite being informed of its danger caused the mishap. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint, but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision, holding that petitioner was liable for quasi-delict. The CA found that the cause of the mishap was the dangling wire, and although the victims were partly responsible for their injuries, petitioner's negligence in maintaining its facilities contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.

ISSUES:

  1. Was petitioner's negligence in maintenance of its facilities the proximate cause of the death of Camilo and the injuries of Rapanan?

  2. In the event that petitioner's negligence is found to be the proximate cause of the accident, should damages be awarded in favor of Camilo's heirs even if they were not impleaded?

  3. Whether the petitioner was negligent and if such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

  4. Whether the damages awarded to Camilo's legal heirs were proper.

  5. Whether or not Mary Gine, as a mere common law wife, has legal personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilo's death.

RULING:

  1. The Supreme Court finds that the second and third elements of a quasi-delict case are lacking, thus precluding the award of damages in favor of respondents. The court notes the testimonies and evidence presented by the petitioner, including the testimony of its employees and the police blotter report, which showed that the fallen electric wire was placed at the foot of the electric pole, away from the road. The court agrees with petitioner's contention that it cannot be accused of negligence as its crew cleared the roads of fallen electric poles and snapped wires to ensure the safety of motorists and pedestrians. The court concludes that it was the recklessness and imprudence of Camilo, not petitioner's negligence, that was the proximate cause of the mishap.

  2. The Court concluded that there was no negligence on the part of the petitioner that caused the accident. The testimonies and police blotter indicated that the electric wires were quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road, far enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing vehicles and pedestrians. If the victims were strangled by the wires, it could only mean that the motorcycle careened towards the shoulder or that the passengers were thrown off the motorcycle onto the shoulder. The police investigation concluded that the accident was caused by Camilo's overspeeding, as evidenced by the skid mark that lasted up to 30 meters. Therefore, the mishap was already in progress on the road and was not caused by the petitioner's electric wires.

  3. Even assuming that the petitioner was negligent, the appellate court erred in awarding damages to Camilo's legal heirs because they were not impleaded in the case. The damages should have only been awarded to those who were parties to the lawsuit.

  4. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The complaint for damages filed by Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court due to the lack of legal personality of Mary Gine to institute the action. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

  • Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict.

  • The elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

  • Negligence as the proximate cause of an accident must be proven.

  • In order to recover damages, the plaintiff's own negligence must not be the immediate and proximate cause of the injury.

  • Damages can only be awarded to those who are parties to the lawsuit.

  • Only legal heirs have the legal personality to institute an action for damages due to the death of a person.

  • A mere common law wife is not considered a legal heir and, therefore, does not possess the legal personality to file a complaint for damages in such cases.