FACTS:
This case involves a complaint for damages filed by David Tuazon against the Cerezo spouses, the owners of Country Bus Lines, and their bus driver. Tuazon alleged that the bus driver operated the bus in a negligent manner, causing damage to his tricycle and serious physical injuries to him. Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper, and although the summons issued against the Cerezo spouses was returned unserved, they participated in the proceedings before the trial court. They filed several pleadings, including a comment, motion for bill of particulars, and reply to the opposition. The trial court denied Tuazon's prayer for new summons but granted his motion to litigate as a pauper. The Cerezo spouses were subsequently declared in default for failing to file an answer. The trial court ruled in favor of Tuazon, but did not make a pronouncement on Foronda's liability due to the lack of service of summons on him. Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo's business benefited the family, so Attorney Cerezo was not held liable.
The Cerezo spouses filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. They claimed that an indispensable party was not served with summons and questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, stating that the Cerezo spouses' failure to file an answer was due to their own negligence. They also failed to offer a reasonable settlement. The Cerezo spouses then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, but it was denied due to procedural deficiencies. They filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, seeking the annulment of the trial court's decision, but it was also denied. Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, which is the present case.
ISSUES:
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Whether the lower court's findings of negligence against defendant-driver Danilo Foronda, whom the lower court did not summon, is null and void for want of due process.
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Whether defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but was not summoned by the lower court.
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Whether the petitioner waived her right to question the lower court's jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages.
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Whether or not the petitioner had other available remedies such as an appeal, motion for new trial, or petition for certiorari.
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Whether or not the petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
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Whether or not the petitioner can file a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction.
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Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment since there was no service of summons on Foronda and Tuazon did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.
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Whether Foronda is an indispensable party to the case.
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Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
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Whether or not Foronda is an indispensable party to the case.
RULING:
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The lower court's findings of negligence against defendant-driver Danilo Foronda cannot be declared null and void for want of due process.
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Defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda is not an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory.
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The petitioner waived her right to question the lower court's jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages.
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Yes, the petitioner had other available remedies such as an appeal, motion for new trial, or petition for certiorari. The petitioner could have availed of these remedies within the reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court.
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No, the petitioner cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment. A petition for relief from judgment should only be filed in exceptional cases, and there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented the petitioner from filing an appeal, motion for new trial, or petition for certiorari.
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No, the petitioner cannot file a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner had the opportunity to avail of a new trial or appeal, but she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief, which was denied with finality. Additionally, the defense of lack of jurisdiction fails as the petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
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The trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment. The basis of Tuazon's action is a quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not a delict under the Revised Penal Code. The same negligent act may give rise to civil liability arising from a delict or a quasi-delict, and the aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. The trial court found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as an employer. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case as Mrs. Cerezo's liability in an action for a quasi-delict is solidary, primary, and direct. Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
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Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. In this case, Mrs. Cerezo's liability is solidary, and each party is liable for the entire obligation. Jurisdiction over Foronda is not necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
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The trial court had jurisdiction over the case. The present action was for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda. Therefore, the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda was not necessary.
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Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. It is not necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence.
PRINCIPLES:
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Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived.
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Remedies available to a party declared in default include filing a motion to set aside the order of default before judgment.
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A party cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment if he or she had other available remedies and was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from filing such remedies. It is the party's own negligence that prevents the availment of the petition for relief. (Tuason v. Court of Appeals)
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An annulment of judgment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction can only be a valid ground if ordinary remedies such as new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. (Rule 47, Rules of Civil Procedure)
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A party who participated in the proceedings before the trial court and raised lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal may be barred by estoppel or laches from using lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity of the judgment. The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails if the party actively participated in the trial court proceedings.
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The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
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An employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while liability based on a delict is subsidiary.
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The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
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To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established.
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Any irregularity in the service of summons that might have vitiated the trial court's jurisdiction over the parties was deemed waived when the parties participated in the trial court proceedings.
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The plaintiff is not required to sue the driver and exhaust the driver's property first before seeking relief from the defendant who is primarily and directly liable. The plaintiff may opt to file a civil action for damages against the defendant who is primarily and directly liable for the civil negligence.