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RHODORA M. LEDESMA v. CA

FACTS:

In April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed against Dr. Rhodora Ledesma by Dr. Juan Torres Jr. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit, but an Information for libel was still filed against her. She then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to have the criminal case dismissed. The DOJ granted the petition and directed the trial court to defer the arraignment. However, the trial court set aside the order and scheduled arraignment without the consent of the trial prosecutor. The DOJ reversed the decision of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the informations. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, prompting the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The petitioner now seeks recourse with the Supreme Court.

In her argument, the petitioner claimed that the trial court relied solely on the "Crespo vs. Mogul" decision when denying the motion to withdraw the informations. She argued that the said case is not applicable and infringes on constitutional principles. The main issue in the petition was whether the respondent court committed any reversible error in affirming the trial court's denial of the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information.

This case highlights the distinction between dismissal of charges in a preliminary investigation and a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause for a warrant of arrest is the function of the judge, while the determination of whether the accused should be held for trial or released is the function of the prosecutor. The Court clarified that judges should not be burdened with preliminary examinations and investigations. The Court also cited previous cases that emphasized the public prosecutor's control and direction over the prosecution of criminal offenses.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the jurisdiction of the judge or the prosecutor.

  2. Whether the prosecutor has the authority to dismiss a case for lack of evidence.

  3. Whether the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases, including those that have already been filed in court.

  4. Whether the appeal to the Secretary of Justice is precluded by the ruling in Crespo.

  5. Whether the trial court is bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or dismiss the case.

  6. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the information based solely on its reliance on Crespo

  7. Whether the trial judge failed to conduct an independent assessment of the motion to dismiss

  8. Whether or not the communication made by the respondent is privileged.

  9. Whether or not the communication amounts to publication within the meaning of the law on defamation.

  10. Whether or not the filing of the civil and administrative complaints against the complainants was motivated by malice and ill-will.

RULING:

  1. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the function of the judge. Preliminary investigation proper, on the other hand, ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released and is the function of the prosecutor.

  2. The prosecutor has the authority to dismiss a case for insufficiency of evidence after conducting a reinvestigation, even if the judge did not investigate the case. The prosecutor's decision should normally prevail in a clash of views between the judge and the prosecutor.

  3. Yes, the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases, even those that have already been filed in court. This power of review is provided for in Section 37 of the Administrative Code and is part of the Secretary's authority of supervision and control over his subordinates. The Secretary may affirm, modify, or reverse resolutions of his subordinates based on his own discretion.

  4. No, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice is not precluded by the ruling in Crespo. The Crespo ruling simply recognizes that the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of higher authorities, including the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, and ultimately, the Secretary of Justice. The appeal to the Secretary of Justice can still be availed of even after the filing of an information in court. This is in accordance with Republic Act No. 5180, as amended, and the Department of Justice Circulars.

  5. No, the trial court is not ipso facto bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or dismiss the case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the trial court, it is not lost despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court should make its own evaluation of the merits of the case and determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice.

  6. Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the information based solely on its reliance on Crespo. The trial judge failed to make an independent and competent assessment of the issues presented in the motion to dismiss, as required by previous Supreme Court rulings.

  7. Yes, the trial judge failed to conduct an independent assessment of the motion to dismiss, and instead ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the Secretary of Justice's recommendation.

  8. Yes, the communication made by the respondent is privileged. The Supreme Court ruled that a communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or duty is privileged despite containing incriminatory or derogatory matter.

  9. No, the communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. The Supreme Court held that when a public officer sends a communication to another officer or body of officers in the discharge of their official duties, such communication does not amount to publication in libel. Since the letter was submitted only to the director of the hospital and not disseminated to third persons, there was no publicity.

  10. No, the filing of the civil and administrative complaints against the complainants was not motivated by malice and ill-will. The Supreme Court considered the follow-up letter sent by the respondent to the director of the PHCA as evidence of her righteous disposition in seeking relief and pursuing proper relief for the alleged injustice she experienced. Filing the civil and administrative complaints manifests her earnest desire for justice.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Preliminary investigation is distinguished as an executive preliminary inquiry for the determination of sufficient grounds for filing an information, and a judicial preliminary examination for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

  • The determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the jurisdiction of the judge, while the determination of a prima facie case for trial is within the authority of the prosecutor.

  • Prosecuting officers have the authority and duty to prosecute persons who, based on the evidence received, are shown to be guilty of a crime, and they also have the duty not to prosecute when the evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.

  • Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, who exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the prosecutors, and has the authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings.

  • The Secretary of Justice has the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, including the power to review their resolutions in criminal cases.

  • The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine holds that mistakes, abuses, or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.

  • The appeal to the Secretary of Justice is not foreclosed by the ruling in Crespo, as the Secretary has the power to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the filing of an information in court.

  • The power of review of the Secretary of Justice is recognized by the Administrative Code, Department of Justice Circulars, and Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

  • The Secretary of Justice has the power of supervision and control over the prosecuting arm of the government and may review the decisions of government prosecutors.

  • Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or dismiss the case.

  • Courts have the power of judicial review to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

  • The trial court should make its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the case and not solely rely on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

  • Any disposition of the case, such as its dismissal or continuation, rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.

  • Trial courts are tasked to conduct an independent and competent assessment of motions to dismiss, particularly those involving the determination of probable cause, instead of solely relying on the opinions or resolutions of other authorities.

  • In cases of libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.

  • Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown. However, a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.

  • The privileged nature of a communication overcomes the presumption of malice. In the absence of malice, there is no libel.

  • A communication made in good faith upon a subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or duty is privileged, even if it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter.

  • When a public officer sends a communication to another officer or body of officers in the discharge of their official duties, it does not amount to publication in libel.

  • Filing civil and administrative complaints can be considered as manifestations of earnest desire for justice and relief for alleged injustice.