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REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION v. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute between petitioner Reicon Realty Builders Corporation (Reicon) and respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) regarding a lease contract for a parcel of land and a building located in Quezon City. Reicon leased the property to Diamond, who subsequently sublet portions of it to Jollibee Foods Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises.

Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals, prompting Reicon to send a demand letter and terminate the lease contract. Diamond then filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga, and others before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.

Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on procedural grounds, including lack of jurisdiction over its person and lack of legal capacity to sue on the part of Diamond. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and Reicon appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari.

The CA dismissed Reicon's petition on the grounds of non-compliance with procedural requirements for service of the petition on Diamond. Reicon's motion for reconsideration was also denied.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether or not Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was properly served on Diamond.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules is sufficient ground for the dismissal of a certiorari petition.

  2. Whether jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was properly acquired by the Court of Appeals (CA).

  3. Whether or not Diamond submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (CA) by filing a special appearance

  4. Whether or not the CA acquired jurisdiction over Diamond's person

RULING:

  1. The Court ruled that the failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules is not sufficient ground for the dismissal of a certiorari petition. The service of the certiorari petition upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires.

  2. The Court held that jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, Diamond, was properly acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance. The alternative mode of voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over Diamond's person. Diamond's special appearance cannot be treated as a specific objection to the CA's jurisdiction over its person because it argued about the alleged error in the service of the certiorari petition, not the CA's service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the pleading.

  3. Diamond submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the CA by asking for an affirmative relief, i.e., the dismissal of Reicon's certiorari petition, without filing a proper jurisdictional objection.

  4. The CA had already acquired jurisdiction over Diamond's person.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules is not sufficient ground for the dismissal of a certiorari petition.

  • Jurisdiction over the person of a respondent may be acquired by the court through service of its order or resolution indicating the initial action on the petition, or by the respondent's voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

  • Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance.

  • Objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made.

  • Failure to make a proper jurisdictional objection constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

  • One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

  • Filing motions seeking affirmative relief is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.

  • The filing of a special appearance does not constitute an objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant if it is grounded on the service of the initiatory pleading.

  • The service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

  • The propriety of the trial court's service of summons and the CA's service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition are material to the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant's/respondents' person.