View full case

NATION PETROLEUM GAS v. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) decision and resolution which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss for alleged improper service of summons. The respondent, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, filed a complaint against the petitioner corporation and its directors/officers for civil damages arising from estafa. The respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was granted and the corresponding writ was issued. The court sheriff served the summons and other pertinent documents to the petitioner's liaison officer, Claudia Abante, and attempted to serve the other defendants at their given addresses but they refused to acknowledge receipt. The petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served, and that the individual petitioners were not personally served with the summons. The respondent argues that there was valid service of summons and that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official functions. Further pleadings were submitted by both parties to support their respective contentions.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari, holding that compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is an issue of both due process and jurisdiction. The purpose of summons is to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant of the action against him. In this case, the defendant corporation is a domestic corporation, and service of summons on a domestic corporation is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited, and exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers specifically mentioned in the rule is void, defective, and not binding to the corporation. The Supreme Court applied the ruling in a previous case, E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Development Corporation, which held that substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons is not sufficient for a domestic corporation.

The Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether there was valid service of summons on the defendant, petitioner corporation. The trial court had ruled in favor of the plaintiff, private respondent, finding that there was substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons. However, the Supreme Court disagreed and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court held that there was no valid service of summons as it was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The court emphasized strict compliance with the rule. The Supreme Court also distinguished this case from a previous case where substantial compliance was upheld, stating that the previous case was decided under the 1964 Rules of Court, while the present case falls under the new rule. The court further emphasized the importance of notice and service of summons in ensuring due process in administrative and judicial proceedings. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals (CA) that there was a valid and effective service of summons on the petitioner corporation through its liaison officer, who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary. The Supreme Court ruled that the corporate secretary, as one of the officers authorized to receive summons, constructively received the summons, and thus, there was a valid service of summons. The court applied the principle of estoppel, stating that the petitioner corporation, having instructed its liaison officer to receive the summons, cannot deny the jurisdiction of the trial court based on invalid service of summons. The court also gave weight to the sheriff's report, which supported the finding of valid service of summons, and invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty. The court ruled that the affidavit of the liaison officer, denying that she received instructions from the corporate secretary, was self-serving and not enough to overcome the presumption of regularity. The court rejected the argument that previous cases were not applicable because they were decided before the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that under both the former and present rules, the declaration of an officer of the court should carry more weight than a denial from a party.

The Supreme Court was tasked to examine the validity of certain statements made by the individual petitioners and Melinda Ang in relation to the service of summons and other pertinent papers to Abante, the defendants' Liaison Officer. Ang denied having spoken with any process server to give instructions to serve the summons and other papers to Abante, despite the Sheriff's Report indicating that the summons and papers were received by Abante upon Ang's telephone instruction. The Court noted that while Ang may not have talked to the sheriff or process server directly, it did not rule out the possibility that she had indeed spoken to Abante and instructed her to receive the documents on her behalf. Additionally, Abante disavowed any conversation with Ang or receiving telephone instructions from her, which the Court considered self-serving. The Court mentioned that evidence such as a telephone billing statement or an affidavit of a disinterested third person could have been presented to refute the disavowal.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the affidavit of Abante is sufficient evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity of service of summons.

  2. Whether the service of summons upon the individual petitioners was valid.

  3. What constitutes a reasonable time for personal service of summons on the defendant?

  4. What specific details must be included in the Return of Summons for substituted service to be valid?

  5. Who is considered a person of suitable age and discretion for the purpose of substituted service?

  6. Who is considered a competent person in charge for the purpose of substituted service?

  7. Whether the service of summons on the defendants was properly made through substituted service.

  8. Whether there were justifiable causes existing which prevented personal service upon all the individual defendants within a reasonable time.

  9. Whether the summons was properly served to the individual petitioners through substituted service.

  10. Whether the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance.

  11. Whether or not the individual petitioners, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, are deemed to have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction.

  12. Whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.

RULING:

  1. The Supreme Court ruled that the affidavit of Abante is not sufficient evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity of service of summons. The Court emphasized that Abante's affidavit is self-serving in nature and lacks concrete evidence to contradict the sheriff's report. The Court stated that a simple telephone billing statement or an affidavit from a disinterested third person could have been presented to refute the sheriff's claim, but none were provided. The presumption of regularity of official duty and the certificate of service of the process server supported the validity of the service of summons.

  2. The Court held that the service of summons upon the individual petitioners was not valid. The Court cited Section 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for personal service of summons as the preferred mode of service. Substituted service is only allowed when there is impossibility of prompt personal service and when stringent requirements have been complied with. The Court found that the requirements for substituted service were not faithfully and fully complied with. Therefore, the service of summons on the individual petitioners was ineffective.

  3. "Reasonable time" for personal service of summons on the defendant is interpreted as at least one month from the issuance of summons.

  4. The Return of Summons for substituted service must include a clear narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally, including the date and time of attempts on personal service, inquiries made to locate the defendant, and any other acts done to serve the summons. The reasons for the failure of personal service must also be specified.

  5. A person of suitable age and discretion for substituted service is someone who has attained the age of legal capacity (18 years old) and has enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. They must be able to read and understand English and comprehend the need to deliver the summons to the defendant or notify the defendant of its receipt.

  6. A competent person in charge for substituted service at the defendant's office or regular place of business is someone who manages the office or business, such as the president or manager. They must have sufficient knowledge to understand the defendant's obligation in the summons and the consequences of inaction.

  7. The Court held that the service of summons through substituted service was not properly made. The proof of service or Officer’s Return did not contain the pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons. The Sheriff failed to provide a detailed explanation of the efforts exerted towards personal service and the reasons why personal service could not be made. Thus, the substituted service cannot be upheld.

  8. The Court ruled that the justifiable causes existing which prevented personal service upon all the individual defendants within a reasonable time were not sufficiently proven. While the respondent submitted statements from their counsel and representatives regarding the service of summons, there was no actual hearing conducted to verify the validity of the grounds for substituted service. The statements alone were not enough to prove that the individual defendants were evading service of summons. Therefore, the Court held that there were no justifiable causes to justify the substituted service.

  9. The Court held that the summons was not properly served to the individual petitioners through substituted service. The sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service without making genuine efforts to locate the individual petitioners. There were no actual efforts exerted and no positive steps undertaken to earnestly locate the individual petitioners, therefore there is no basis to say that they evaded personal service of summons and justifying substituted service upon them.

  10. Despite the improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The fact that they sought affirmative reliefs from the court indicates their submission to its jurisdiction.

  11. Yes, the individual petitioners, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, are deemed to have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction.

  12. No, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's denial of the Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The presumption of regularity of official duty applies to the certificate of service of the process server.

  • Substituted service of summons is only permitted when there is impossibility of prompt personal service and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with.

  • Sheriffs must discharge their duties with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the expeditious dispensation of justice.

  • Substituted service of summons is available when personal service is impossible within a reasonable period, which ideally includes at least three attempts on different dates.

  • The impossibility of personal service justifying substituted service should be clearly explained in the proof of service with a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions.

  • For substituted service at the defendant's residence, the person receiving the summons must have a relationship of confidence with the defendant and be able to comprehend the importance of delivering the summons or notifying the defendant.

  • For substituted service at the defendant's office or regular place of business, the person receiving the summons must be the one managing the office or business and have sufficient knowledge to understand the defendant's obligations and the consequences of inaction.

  • Service of summons through substituted service must be accompanied by a proof of service or Officer's Return containing the pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons.

  • A patent defect in the service of summons, which is apparent on the face of the return, does not necessarily constitute conclusive proof that the actual service has been improperly made.

  • The trial court has the duty to immediately ascertain whether a patent defect in the service of summons is real and determine whether prior attempts at personal service have been properly done before resorting to substituted service.

  • If the returns do not show compliance with the rules on substituted service, actual and correct service may still be proven by evidence extraneous to the returns.

  • For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.

  • The "reasonable time" within which to personally serve the summons is 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff.

  • The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance, but this applies to affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.

  • A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and afterwards repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

  • Seeking affirmative relief from the trial court constitutes voluntary submission to its jurisdiction.