MARILOU S. LAUDE v. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE

FACTS:

This case involves the dispute over the ownership and possession of a parcel of land between Samantha and Jacob. Samantha claimed that she inherited the land from her parents and filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession. However, Jacob asserted that he acquired ownership of the land through a valid sale from Samantha's parents.

The trial court ruled in favor of Jacob, stating that he acquired ownership of the land. Samantha appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Jacob failed to comply with the three-day notice rule when filing his answer. Jacob argued that the rule only applies to actions involving forcible entry and illegal detainer and that Samantha was already aware of his possession of the land.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, ruling in favor of Jacob. Samantha then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the three-day notice rule should have been applied in her case.

The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and determine whether the three-day notice rule applies to disputes over ownership and possession of land.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the failure of the petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is justified.

  2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to a mandatory injunction for the transfer of respondent Pemberton.

  3. Whether the judge correctly denied the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules.

  4. Whether the filing of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of the petitioners' right to access to justice as recognized by international law and the 1987 Constitution.

  5. Whether the offended party has the legal personality to challenge the dismissal of a criminal case.

  6. Whether the Visiting Forces Agreement impairs the constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

  7. Whether the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power violates the Constitution, particularly the equal protection clause and the exclusive power of the Court to adopt rules of procedure.

  8. Whether the detention facility where the accused is being held is under the control, supervision, and jurisdiction of American military authorities.

  9. Whether a writ of mandatory injunction should be issued to compel the turnover of custody of the accused.

RULING:

  1. The court dismissed the petition. The failure of the petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. The court ruled that the three-day notice requirement is mandatory and is intended to avoid surprises to the adverse party and to give them time to study and respond to the motion. The court also held that the petitioners are not entitled to a mandatory injunction for the transfer of respondent Pemberton because they are not the real party in interest in the criminal case.

  2. The judge correctly denied the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice the accused's rights.

  3. The filing of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is not an assertion of the petitioners' right to access to justice as recognized by international law and the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners' interpretation of international law and their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule do not justify their actions.

  4. The offended party does not have the legal personality to challenge the dismissal of a criminal case. Only the People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, has the authority to prosecute criminal cases and appeal their dismissal. The offended party's right to prosecute is exclusive to the People.

  5. The issue of whether the Visiting Forces Agreement impairs the constitutional power of the Supreme Court is not the main issue of the case and therefore cannot be resolved in this petition. The proper venue to rule on the constitutionality of an official act is through any action cognizable by courts of justice, but the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

  6. The transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power does not violate the Constitution. The equal protection clause is not violated because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter the Philippines and all other accused. The Court also ruled that the power of the Court to adopt rules of procedure is not curtailed or violated in this case. The Constitution recognizes the generally accepted principles of international law, which include agreements that recognize immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction.

  7. The detention facility where the accused is being held is not under the control, supervision, and jurisdiction of American military authorities. The accused is confined in Camp Aguinaldo, which is the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

  8. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction to compel the turnover of custody of the accused is denied for lack of merit. The petitioners failed to provide any legal and factual basis for their claim, and the Court cannot consider the issuance of a writ without such basis.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The three-day notice requirement is mandatory and is intended to avoid surprises to the adverse party and to give them time to study and respond to the motion.

  • The general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, unless doing so will not cause prejudice to the other party or violate their due process rights.

  • The noncompliance of the Public Prosecutor's approval in a motion related to the place of confinement is fatal because it pertains to the criminal aspect of the case, which is exclusively lodged in the People of the Philippines.

  • The Philippines, as a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is obligated to comply with its obligations under the Covenant.

  • Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires States Parties to ensure that individuals have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate their rights. This may be through judicial and administrative mechanisms.

  • The obligation under Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a system of accessible and effective remedies, not for individuals to take matters into their own hands.

  • The enjoyment of rights recognized under the Covenant can be effectively assured through various means, such as the direct applicability of the Covenant, the application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of law, or the interpretive effect of the Covenant in the application of national law.

  • Failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of rights violations could give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant.

  • The obligation to provide an effective remedy includes reparation to individuals whose rights have been violated. Reparation may involve restitution, rehabilitation, measures of satisfaction, and bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to justice.

  • Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be used as an excuse to rectify procedural deficiencies that could have been easily complied with. Both petitioners and accused are entitled to the protection of their human rights.

  • The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is the real party in interest in a criminal case and has the exclusive right to prosecute criminal cases.

  • The offended party may only be allowed to pursue the criminal action on their own behalf in exceptional circumstances, such as a denial of due process.

  • The constitutionality of an official act may be subject to judicial review, but it must be properly raised and presented in the case, and its resolution must be necessary to a determination of the case. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

  • The equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of members of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter the Philippines and all other accused.

  • The power of the Court to adopt rules of procedure is not violated when there is an agreement recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction, as long as it is in line with the generally accepted principles of international law.

  • The detention facility where the accused is being held must be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, and the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities."

  • A writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial, the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

  • The right to change one's name is a personal right that may be granted as long as there is no fraudulent intent or no harm is done to the public interest.

  • There is no requirement for the petitioner to present substantial and compelling reasons for changing their name.