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OCA v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ

FACTS:

The administrative complaint filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) is against respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City. The complaint stems from the Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and malversation of public funds filed by the People of the Philippines against the respondent judge before the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan's First Division found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The court found that the respondent, then the City Mayor of Dapitan City, had conspired with Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Pepe Nortal to withdraw P1 million from the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF) and used this amount for his personal benefit. The Sandiganbayan imposed penalties on the respondent, including imprisonment, disqualification, and fines. The respondent filed motions for reconsideration and new trial, which were denied.

The OCA received a copy of the Sandiganbayan's decision and recommended that the case be considered a formal complaint against the respondent, that a copy be furnished to him for comment, and that he be suspended without pay and other benefits. The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. Nos. 209073-74.

In a minute resolution, the Supreme Court's Third Division re-docketed the OCA report as a formal complaint against the respondent, furnished him a copy of the report, required him to file a comment, and suspended him from office without pay and benefits. The respondent argued in his comment that the administrative complaint is premature because his Sandiganbayan convictions are not yet final, and that he had already gone on leave of absence and submitted his retirement application.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the disciplinary case against the respondent judge is premature due to the pending criminal convictions in the Sandiganbayan.

  2. Whether the Court has the power to institute disciplinary proceedings against judges and justices.

  3. Whether the Court has the power to preventively suspend an administratively charged judge.

  4. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the administrative complaint against the respondent despite his retirement and the pendency of his criminal convictions.

  5. Whether judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.

  6. Whether substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent administratively liable for acts committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City.

    • Whether the respondent, as City Mayor, approved and facilitated the withdrawal of the entire Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF) appropriation for the year 2001
    • Whether the respondent acted in bad faith by authorizing the withdrawal after losing in his reelection bid and ignoring objections from financial officers

  9. Whether the respondent actively worked for the approval of the P1 million cash advance from the CIF.

  10. Whether the respondent facilitated the withdrawal of the P1 million by Nortal.

  11. Whether the respondent received and used the withdrawn amount for his personal benefit.

  12. What penalty is appropriate for the respondent's transgressions.

  13. Whether or not the judge should be dismissed from the service and disbarred due to his criminal conviction.

  14. Whether or not the judge's conviction in the criminal case is sufficient ground for his dismissal from the service and disbarment.

RULING:

  1. The Court finds no merit in the respondent's claim of prematurity. The Court has the power to institute disciplinary proceedings independently of the status of criminal cases against judges and justices.

  2. The Supreme Court has the power to institute disciplinary proceedings against judges and justices as granted by Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This power allows the Court to oversee the administrative compliance of judges and court personnel and take administrative actions against them for violations.

  3. The Court has the power to preventively suspend an administratively charged judge pending investigation, especially when serious charges are involved or there exists a strong likelihood of guilt. This power is inherent in the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and personnel, serving as a measure to allow unhampered investigation and to protect the public from potential harm caused by the judge's continuance of office.

  4. The Court has jurisdiction to rule on the administrative complaint against the respondent despite his retirement and the pendency of his criminal convictions. The Court retains jurisdiction to either pronounce the respondent innocent or declare him guilty of the charges. Separation from office does not render a pending administrative charge moot and academic.

  5. Judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. This is recognized by the Rules which provide for the immediate forwarding of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment.

  6. Substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent administratively liable for acts committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City. The evidence on record supports the charges against the respondent, and it is sufficient to prove that the respondent committed the imputed acts violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of.

  7. The Court found that the respondent, as City Mayor, approved and facilitated the withdrawal of the entire CIF appropriation for the year 2001. The respondent's signature on the Disbursement Voucher, Request for Obligation Allotment, and PNB check established his authorization for the withdrawal. Moreover, it is unlikely that the withdrawal could have been made without the respondent's approval, as the CIF was an appropriation under the Mayor's Office. The Court also found that the respondent acted in bad faith by authorizing the withdrawal after losing in his reelection bid and disregarding objections from financial officers.

  8. The respondent actively worked for the approval of the P1 million cash advance from the CIF.

  9. The respondent facilitated the withdrawal of the P1 million by Nortal.

  10. The respondent received and used the withdrawn amount for his personal benefit.

  11. The appropriate penalty for the respondent's transgressions is dismissal from service.

  12. The Supreme Court found that the judge should be dismissed from the service and disbarred due to his criminal conviction. The Court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings involving members of the legal profession are prosecuted solely for the public welfare and to maintain the integrity of the courts. The nature and objectives of the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings are vastly different, and the judge cannot invoke his acquittal in the former as a defense in the latter. As an officer of the court, the judge is called to answer for his conduct and to uphold the standards of the legal profession.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts and personnel, empowering it to institute disciplinary proceedings against judges and justices.

  • The Court can preventively suspend an administratively charged judge pending investigation to ensure the unhampered process and public protection.

  • Disciplinary proceedings may be instituted motu proprio by the Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits or documents, or upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records.

  • Serious charges include bribery, dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, gross misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, willful failure to pay a just debt, borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a pending case, immorality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, partisan political activities, and alcoholism and/or vicious habits.

  • The Court retains jurisdiction over an administrative complaint even if the respondent has retired or ceased in office during the pendency of the case.

  • Separation from office does not render a pending administrative charge moot and academic.

  • Judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.

  • Substantial evidence is required to support conclusions in administrative proceedings. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It should be weighed and examined in a similar manner as other serious charges under Rule 140.

  • The approval and facilitation of the withdrawal of funds from an appropriation can indicate administrative liability on the part of a government official.

  • Approval and authorization signatures on relevant documents can establish responsibility for the withdrawal of funds.

  • Bad faith can be shown by authorizing irregular transactions and disregarding objections from financial officers.

  • Judges should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and their conduct should be above reproach.

  • The conduct of judges, official or otherwise, must always be beyond reproach and must be free from any suspicion.

  • A judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.

  • An administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.

  • A lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

  • Disciplinary proceedings involving lawyers are undertaken for the public welfare and to preserve the integrity of the courts.

  • The nature and objectives of criminal cases and disciplinary proceedings are distinct, and acquittal in the former does not absolve the lawyer from disciplinary liability.

  • Lawyers bear the responsibility to uphold the standards and integrity of the legal profession.