FACTS:

Medel Arnaldo Belen filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle Nezer Belen. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of his complaint, Belen filed an Omnibus Motion, containing allegations against Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman. Belen furnished copies of the motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of Justice, Manila. Suñega-Lagman learned about the motion and filed a criminal complaint for libel against Belen based on its contents. The libel complaint underwent preliminary investigation and a charge of libel was filed against Belen.

The complainant and his wife entered into a lease agreement with the respondent and his siblings in 1983. The defense raised by the respondent was that the lease period was only from 1993 to 1998. The complainant argued that the lease actually started in 1983. The issue of non-presentation of accounting for the first 5-year harvest was not raised in any of the witnesses' affidavits. The investigating fiscal dismissed the case, wrongly invoking the dismissal of a previous case and failing to schedule a clarificatory hearing. The investigating fiscal rendered a resolution on a matter not raised and deliberately concealed her biased reasoning.

The petitioner was charged with libel after filing an Omnibus Motion containing defamatory statements against Assistant City Prosecutor Suñega-Lagman. The trial court found the petitioner guilty of libel. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the statements were not absolutely privileged and that there was publication.

The petitioner seeks his acquittal of the crime of libel. He argues that in serving and filing an Omnibus Motion, he did not intend to expose it to third persons but only complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done. He asserts that the perusal of the motion by authorized representatives of the respondent and office staff did not constitute publication. The absence of publication negates malice according to the petitioner.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the element of publication is present in the case.

2. Whether or not the privileged communication rule is applicable.

3. Whether the communication made by the petitioner in his Omnibus Motion is absolutely privileged and therefore not actionable.

4. Whether the statements made by the petitioner in his Omnibus Motion are relevant and material to the subject matter of his cause.

5. Whether the petitioner's diatribes against the complainant in the motion for reconsideration are relevant grounds for disqualification.

6. Whether the petitioner's statements in the motion for reconsideration are libelous and damaging to the complainant's reputation.

7. Whether the defamatory statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are absolutely privileged communications.

8. Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the defamatory nature of the statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are admissible.

9. Whether the penalty of imprisonment or the imposition of a fine should be applied in cases of libel.

RULING:

1. The court ruled that the element of publication is present in the case. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. In this case, the defamatory statements in the Omnibus Motion were made known to persons other than the person defamed. Despite being in sealed envelopes, it was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor and furnished to other parties, making it reasonable to expect that persons other than the defamed person would be able to read the defamatory statements. Therefore, there was sufficient publication.

2. The court ruled that the privileged communication rule is not applicable in this case. The defamatory statements were published when a copy of the Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of the complainant in the criminal case, who is not an agent of the defamed person. As a result, the communication cannot be considered privileged.

3. The communication made by the petitioner in his Omnibus Motion is not absolutely privileged and is therefore actionable. While Philippine law does not explicitly state whether the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication extends to statements in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to trial, the court found persuasive the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas, which recognized the existence of such protection. However, in order for a communication to be absolutely privileged, it must be made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, and must be relevant to the issues. In this case, the statements made by the petitioner are not relevant to the subject matter of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his complaint and the disqualification of the investigating fiscal. Therefore, the communication is not absolutely privileged.

4. The statements made by the petitioner in his Omnibus Motion are not relevant and material to the subject matter of his cause. In determining whether a matter alleged in a pleading is privileged, it need not be material to the issue presented by the pleading, but it must be legitimately related to or pertinent to the subject of the controversy. The defamatory words and phrases used by the petitioner in his motion are not material or pertinent to his cause, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his complaint and the disqualification of the investigating fiscal. The statements do not meet the test of relevancy and therefore cannot be considered absolutely privileged.

5. The petitioner's diatribes against the complainant are not relevant grounds for disqualification. The trial court ruled that the diatribes were baseless, scurrilous attacks on the person of the complainant and had no relation to the subject matter of the petitioner's motion. The attacks damaged the integrity and reputation of the complainant and undermined the faith and confidence of litigants in the prosecutorial service. Thus, the court held that such diatribes are neither relevant grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid and justifiable reasons for disqualification.

6. The petitioner's statements in the motion for reconsideration were found to be libelous and damaging to the complainant's reputation. The trial court ruled that the statements crossed the line from legitimate criticisms to baseless attacks on the complainant's honor, reputation, mental, and moral character. The court also noted that the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a duty on lawyers to use language that is not abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper in their professional dealings. Therefore, the court held that the petitioner's statements were libelous and damaging to the complainant's reputation.

7. The defamatory statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are not absolutely privileged communications. They fail the test of relevancy as they are neither relevant grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid reasons for disqualification of a person.

8. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the defamatory nature of the statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are admissible as they are competent to testify on their own understanding of the questioned statements, and their testimonies are relevant to the court's determination of the defamatory character of such statements. The trial court also correctly determined the statements to be defamatory based on its own reading of the plain and ordinary meanings of the words and phrases used in the Omnibus Motion.

9. The penalty for the crime of libel is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from P200.00 to P6,000.00, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. In this case, the Court increased the fine imposed on the petitioner from Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Court also stated that if the accused is unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.

PRINCIPLES:

• Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written.

• A communication of a defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation.

• A defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by a person other than the offended party.

• The publication of a libel should not be presumed from the fact that immediate control thereof is parted with, unless there is a reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.

• The requirement of publication of defamatory matter is not satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person.

• A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if made in bad faith. This class of privileged communication includes allegations or statements made in pleadings or motions during judicial and administrative proceedings, as long as they are relevant to the issues.

• Pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged because they are part of public record open to scrutiny, they are presumed to contain lawful and legal allegations, and they can be supported by evidence in good faith. The privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice.

• The doctrine of absolutely privileged communication extends to statements made in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to trial. Such statements are protected, regardless of their defamatory tenor and the presence of malice, if they are relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause or subject of the inquiry.

• The degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary for a communication to be privileged is liberal. The court will consider the matter to be privileged as long as it is legitimately related to or pertinent to the subject of the controversy or becomes the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial. The words used in the communication should not be scrutinized with microscopic intensity, as it would defeat the protection of privileged communication.

• Pleadings should contain plain and concise statements of material facts and should not contain irrelevant or libelous matter.

• Lawyers should conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their professional colleagues and should use language that is not abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.

• The defense of absolutely privileged communication requires the relevancy of the statement, but it is not one of the elements of libel. The absence of an allegation of irrelevancy or impertinency in an information for libel does not violate the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

• The degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make an alleged defamatory matter privileged is inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety.

• An allegedly libelous publication must be interpreted in the plain and ordinary sense understood by the public.

• Opinion evidence or testimony is inadmissible as a witness can only testify to facts within their own personal knowledge.

• The preference for the imposition of fines rather than imprisonment in libel cases is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, taking into consideration the circumstances of each case and the interests of justice.

• The penalty for the crime of libel is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from P200.00 to P6,000.00, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.