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OPHELIA HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The petitioner, Ophelia Hernan, was an accounting clerk at the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City. She was promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal Clerk, where she served as cashier, disbursement, and collection officer. Her duties involved receiving cash and other collections from customers and clients for telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.

In December 1996, an auditor from the Commission on Audit (COA) discovered that deposit slips dated September 19, 1996, and November 29, 1996, did not bear the stamp of receipt by the LBP nor were they machine-validated. The auditor verified the reports and documents turned over by the petitioner and found that no deposits were made by her for the DOTC on September 19, 1996, and November 29, 1996.

Further investigation revealed that the only deposit made to the DOTC account on September 19, 1996, was from its Ifugao office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP. The LBP confirmed that they did not receive any deposit of P11,300.00 from the petitioner for the account of the DOTC on September 19, 1996. The COA demanded that the petitioner pay the missing amount, but she refused.

As a result, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against the petitioner, who was then charged before the RTC of Baguio City. The prosecution presented testimonies from COA auditors and LBP employees to establish its case, while the defense presented the lone testimony of the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that she personally deposited the exact amount in question at the LBP and retrieved the deposit slip, but it was discovered later that the amount was not remitted to the LBP account.

The trial on the merits ensued, and the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

The petitioner, Ophelia Hernan, filed a petition with the Supreme Court, raising several arguments against the Sandiganbayan's rulings. She claimed that her counsel never received the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration due to an erroneous notice sent to her counsel's previous office. The petitioner also argued that she was unable to obtain necessary evidence for her defense during the trial and requested for the case to be remanded for further reception of evidence. She sought to introduce an affidavit and deposit slips as additional evidence. The Court found that the petition was improper as certiorari was not the appropriate remedy. The Court also concluded that the entry of judgment was not premature despite the erroneous notice, as the petitioner failed to provide proper notice of the change in address.

In another case, the petitioner law firm was engaged by the respondent corporation to represent them in a civil case. The petitioner's counsel sent a letter to the respondent, informing them that the law firm would no longer represent them and subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The trial court granted the motion, but the respondent insisted that the petitioner had an obligation to continue representing them until they secure new counsel or until the termination of the civil case. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the withdrawal order, which was also denied by the trial court. Dissatisfied, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, challenging the withdrawal order and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the entry of judgment is premature due to petitioner's counsel not being properly notified of the resolution.

  2. Whether the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical.

  3. Did the Sandiganbayan act in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen the case?

  4. Did the petitioner overcome the presumption of law in the crime of malversation?

  5. Whether the penalties imposed on the petitioners should be adjusted in light of the enactment of RA No. 10951.

  6. Whether the application of RA No. 10951 should be retroactive and applicable to cases where the judgment of conviction has been rendered and the service of sentence has already begun.

  7. Whether or not the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari is properly filed.

  8. Whether or not the motion for reconsideration can be entertained by the Court of Appeals after the timely filing of a petition for review.

RULING:

  1. The entry of judgment is not premature. The Court held that in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of the party and their counsel to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them. Since petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in office address, the non-receipt of the resolution is attributable to both petitioner's and her counsel's negligence. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind litigants to give necessary assistance to their counsel and check the status of their case from time to time.

  2. The Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion to reopen the case is not capricious, despotic, and whimsical. The rules and jurisprudence provide specific requirements for the reopening of a case, and the absence of the first requirement that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the motion. The records show that the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration had already become final and executory and was recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the motion to reopen cannot be granted.

  3. The Sandiganbayan did not act in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen the case. The rulings sought to be refuted are legally sound and appropriately based on the evidence presented by the parties.

  4. The petitioner did not overcome the presumption of law in the crime of malversation. Even if someone else misappropriated the funds, the petitioner may still be held liable for malversation as she permitted, through her inexcusable negligence, another person to take the money.

  5. Yes, the penalties imposed on the petitioners should be adjusted in accordance with RA No. 10951. The penalty for qualified theft in this case should range from prision correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its minimum period, which is a lighter penalty than what was originally imposed by the Sandiganbayan.

  6. Yes, the application of RA No. 10951 should be retroactive and applicable to cases where the judgment of conviction has been rendered and the service of sentence has already begun. The accused should be entitled to the benefits of the new law, including serving a lesser sentence or release if they have already begun serving their previous sentence.

  7. The motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari is not properly filed as it was filed beyond the reglementary period.

  8. The Court of Appeals cannot entertain a motion for reconsideration after the timely filing of a petition for review.

PRINCIPLES:

  • In the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of court orders or resolutions upon parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record.

  • Litigants should give necessary assistance to their counsel and check the status of their case from time to time.

  • The requirements for the reopening of a case include: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

  • An appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters, except when it clearly overlooked certain facts or when the evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings.

  • In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.

  • A public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit but consents to the taking thereof by another person or through abandonment or negligence permits such taking.

  • Prohibited pleadings, such as motions for reconsideration, are not allowed when they are already a rehash of previous motions filed before the court. The court should be guided by the substance of the pleading, not the title or name given to it.

  • The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle that litigation must end and disputes must be finally settled.

  • The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that the judgment of courts and quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law, with exceptions for clerical errors, void judgments, and when circumstances transpire after finality that render execution unjust and inequitable.

  • Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. The winning party has the right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case through execution and satisfaction of the judgment.

  • A judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, unless circumstances transpire after finality that render execution unjust and inequitable. In such cases, the doctrine of immutability may be relaxed.

  • The court may direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of a new law imposing more lenient penalties favorable to the accused.

  • The provisions of a recent legislation, such as RA No. 10951, shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes have been reduced, taking into consideration the circumstances attending its commission.

  • The accused shall be entitled to the benefits of a new law that imposes a lesser penalty, even if it comes into effect after the judgment of conviction is rendered and the service of sentence has already begun.

  • A motion for extension of time to file a petition for review must be filed within the prescribed period and should be given consideration only under exceptional and meritorious circumstances.

  • The timely filing of a petition for review renders a motion for reconsideration of the decision or resolution sought to be reviewed moot and academic.