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EDEN ETINO v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioner Eden Etino was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. The complaint alleged that on November 5, 2001, in Maasin, Iloilo, petitioner shot and assaulted Jessierel Leyble, inflicting gunshot wounds on his body. During the trial, Leyble testified that he was walking with his companions when petitioner shot him from behind. Leyble's testimony was corroborated by a witness and supported by medical records presented by Dr. Rodney Jun Garcia. The defense presented alibi witnesses, alleging that petitioner was with them when the shooting happened. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals (CA), on appeal, affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, ordering petitioner to pay moral and temperate damages. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising various issues regarding the sufficiency of evidence and credibility of witnesses.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the crime committed is frustrated or attempted parricide/murder/homicide or only lesiones (physical injuries).

  2. Whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal.

  3. Whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused.

  4. Whether the petitioner had the intent to kill the victim based on the circumstances of the case.

  5. Whether the crime committed by the petitioner is frustrated or attempted homicide, or physical injuries only.

  6. Whether the identification of the petitioner as the victim's assailant is sufficient.

  7. Whether or not the victim's initial reluctance to file a complaint and his fear of reprisal affect his credibility as a witness.

RULING:

  1. The court must determine whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal and whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused in order to determine the crime committed.

  2. The prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died from his wound without timely medical assistance. Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds enters the realm of doubt, and the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

  3. There was no evidence on record that proved the accused had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. None of the prosecution's witnesses testified that the accused aimed and fired the shotgun to kill the victim. The accused only fired a single shot at close-range and did not hit any vital part of the victim's body.

  4. The Court held that based on the circumstances of the case, the petitioner did not have the intent to kill the victim. The fact that petitioner only fired one shot, which did not result in a fatal injury, and immediately fled the scene, does not suggest an intent to kill. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animos interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as the other elements of the crime. Therefore, the intent to kill was lacking in this case.

  5. The Court ruled that since the intent to kill was lacking, the crime committed by the petitioner is not frustrated or attempted homicide but serious physical injuries under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This is because the victim's period of incapacity and healing of his injuries was more than 30 days.

  6. The Court held that the identification of the petitioner as the victim's assailant was positive and conclusive. The victim personally reported the incident to the authorities and identified petitioner and his companions as the assailants. The victim and the prosecution witnesses consistently and positively identified petitioner as the assailant. The circumstances of the close-range attack, broad daylight incident, and the long-standing familiarity between the victim and petitioner also support the positive identification. Therefore, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by the petitioner fail.

  7. The victim's initial reluctance to file the complaint and his fear of reprisal do not affect his credibility as a witness. The Court considers the victim's temporary silence and fear of reprisal as valid reasons for his initial reluctance to come forward. Moreover, the victim's positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under oath deserve full faith and credence, in the absence of any showing of malice or improper motives.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Questions of fact cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition, but the court may probe questions of fact if the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.

  • A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present, frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution but the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, and attempted when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution.

  • When the accused intended to kill the victim but the victim did not die due to timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim's wounds were not fatal or mortal, the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill and the wounds sustained were not fatal, the crime may be serious, less serious, or slight physical injury.

  • Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful, and such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

  • Intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from homicide, and it must be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, including the means used by the offender, the nature and location of the victim's wounds, the conduct of the offender before, at the time, or immediately after the killing, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, and the motives of the accused. Intent to kill is only presumed if the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the offender.

  • Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animos interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as the other elements of the crime.

  • When the intent to kill is lacking but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not frustrated or attempted homicide but physical injuries.

  • Positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.

  • The failure to file a complaint to the proper authorities within a reasonable time does not impair the credibility of the complainant if the delay is satisfactorily explained.

  • The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case does not affect the credibility of a prosecution witness.

  • Fear of reprisal is a valid excuse for the temporary silence of a prosecution witness and does not affect his credibility.

  • In the absence of any showing that a witness was actuated by malice or other improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under a solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.