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RENALYN A. MASBATE v. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO

FACTS:

Queenie was born out of wedlock on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James. Despite not being married, they had been living together. In April 2015, their relationship ended and Renalyn left for Manila, leaving Queenie in the care of Ricky James.

On November 7, 2015, Renalyn's parents took Queenie from the school where she was enrolled. Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody before the RTC alleging that Renalyn's parents refused to return Queenie and presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) signed by Renalyn that granted them parental rights and custody over Queenie.

During the hearing on December 3, 2015, Renalyn expressed her desire to have custody of Queenie. In an Order dated December 4, 2015, the RTC ruled that Queenie should be under Renalyn's custody based on the provision of the Family Code which disallows the separation of a child under seven years old from the mother.

Ricky James moved for reconsideration, alleging that the hearing did not comply with the procedural requirements for custody cases and that he was denied due process. The motion was denied in an Order dated January 7, 2016, with the RTC emphasizing that Renalyn has parental authority as the mother and that Ricky James failed to provide sufficient evidence showing Renalyn's unfitness for custody.

Ricky James appealed to the CA, arguing that a full-blown trial should have been conducted and that the best interests of the child were not considered. He also requested shared custody or visitation rights. The CA set aside the RTC Orders, remanded the case for custody determination, and upheld Renalyn's custody pending the final resolution. Ricky James was granted visitation rights of two days per week.

Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it. Ricky James filed a motion for clarification, which was granted by the CA, allowing him "limited and temporary custody" once a month for 24 hours, in addition to his visitation rights.

Petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the RTC's dismissal was correct and that the CA erred in remanding the case. Ricky James opposed the petition, claiming that it was filed out of time.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the petition for habeas corpus was filed within the reglementary period.

  2. Whether the ends of justice and substantial justice warrant overlooking the procedural lapse.

  3. Whether the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor.

  4. Whether the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner.

  5. Whether it is in the best interest of the minor to be in the custody of the petitioner.

  6. Whether the statement in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V concerning the choice of the child to live with either parent is applicable in custody disputes involving illegitimate children.

  7. Whether the exception to the tender-age presumption under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies in this case.

  8. Whether Article 213 of the Family Code applies in this case and necessitates the separation of the child from the mother

  9. Whether an illegitimate father can acquire custody rights over his child

  10. Whether the welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration in child custody cases?

  11. Whether the father is entitled to regain custody of his daughter?

  12. Whether the appellate court erred in granting temporary custody to the father for a limited period of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours once every month?

  13. Whether or not the mother's consent is necessary for the father to take his daughter out.

  14. Whether or not the father can be granted limited and temporary custody of his daughter.

RULING:

  1. The Court finds it proper to overlook the procedural lapse of filing the petition a day late in the interest of substantial justice.

  2. Rules on the perfection of appeals, particularly on the period of filing thereof, must yield to the loftier ends of substantial justice and equity. Cases should be determined on the merits and not on mere technicality or procedural nicety.

  3. Mothers, in the case of illegitimate children, are entitled to the sole parental authority and custody of their illegitimate children, unless there is an imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

  4. The tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless there are compelling reasons to order otherwise. Compelling reasons may include neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.

  5. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the mother has been neglecting the child and to establish whether the tender-age presumption should apply.

  6. The statement in Pablo-Gualberto invoking Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99 of the Rules of Court must be understood based on its proper context, which is the right of a child to choose which parent to live with. This choice is only available to children of married parents who have joint parental authority over their common children. Illegitimate children, on the other hand, are under the sole parental authority of the mother, unless she is proven to be unfit or unsuitable. Therefore, the statement in Pablo-Gualberto is not applicable in custody disputes involving illegitimate children.

  7. The exception to the tender-age presumption under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies in this case. It states that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

  8. Article 213 of the Family Code applies in this case, and compelling reasons must be found to separate the child from her mother. The court must determine if the child had been neglected and abandoned by the mother, rendering her unfit to exercise parental authority over the child. A trial is necessary to establish this.

  9. An illegitimate father can acquire custody rights over his child if the child's mother is found unfit or unsuitable. In default of the parents or a judicially appointed guardian, substitute parental authority may be exercised by the surviving grandparent, the oldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, or the child's actual custodian over twenty-one years of age. The best interest of the child is the overarching consideration in custody cases, and the court must consider the totality of the circumstances in awarding custody.

  10. Yes, the welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration in child custody cases. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child and should give due weight to the claim for custody based on human nature and equity. The Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code both emphasize that the welfare of the child should be the primary consideration in questions regarding the care and custody of the child.

  11. Yes, the father is entitled to regain custody of his daughter. Despite the sad reality that not all fathers have fulfilled their responsibilities towards their children, the father in this case has shown his willingness to be a responsible parent. Thus, he deserves the opportunity to prove that he is entitled to regain custody of his daughter.

  12. Yes, the appellate court erred in granting temporary custody to the father for a limited period of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours once every month. The appropriate provision for temporary visitation rights, not custody, is stated in Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. The temporary custodian should give notice of any plan to change the residence of the child or take the child out of their residence for more than three days. Temporary custody can only be determined after trial and the court renders its judgment awarding custody to the proper party.

  13. The mother's consent is necessary for the father to take his daughter out.

  14. The grant of limited and temporary custody for the father is deleted for lack of legal and factual basis.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Rules of procedure should not be applied in a rigid, technical sense, but should serve the purpose of securing substantial justice.

  • The welfare of children, as protected by the Constitution, should not be disregarded by the courts.

  • Mothers of illegitimate children are entitled to the sole parental authority and custody of their children, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness.

  • The tender-age presumption provides that no child under seven years old shall be separated from the mother unless there are compelling reasons to do so.

  • Compelling reasons may include neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.

  • The word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

  • Article 213 of the Family Code provides that in case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court, taking into account relevant considerations.

  • Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court allows the court to award the care, custody, and control of a child to the parent or another person deemed suitable for the child's best interest, and permits the child over ten years of age to choose which parent to live with.

  • The choice of a child under the first paragraph of Article 213 to live with either parent is only available in custody disputes between married parents who have joint parental authority.

  • Illegitimate children are under the sole parental authority of the mother unless she is proven to be unfit or unsuitable.

  • The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code provides an exception to the tender-age presumption, allowing a child under seven years of age to be separated from the mother if there are compelling reasons to do so.

  • Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we also ought not to recognize any distinction.

  • In custody cases, the best interest of the minor is paramount and refers to the totality of the circumstances that are most congenial to the survival, protection, and emotional development of the minor.

  • The preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family Code to exercise substitute parental authority does not automatically attach to the grandparents and is conditioned upon their fitness to care for the grandchild.

  • The welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration in child custody cases.

  • The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child and should give due weight to the claim for custody based on human nature and equity.

  • The Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code emphasize that the welfare of the child should be the primary consideration in questions regarding the care and custody of the child.

  • Temporary visitation rights, not custody, should be granted during the pendency of the case.

  • Temporary custody can only be determined after trial and the court renders its judgment awarding custody to the proper party.

  • The presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code is that the mother, as the natural guardian of a child below seven years old, is entitled to its custody, care, and education.

  • The father can only claim visitation rights over his child if he is able to substantiate his allegations of the mother's unfitness.

  • The mother's consent is necessary for the father to take his child out.