PUERTO DEL SOL PALAWAN v. KISSACK B. GABAEN

FACTS:

Puerto Del Sol Palawan, Inc. (PDSPI), the petitioner, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against public respondent Hon. Kissack B. Gabaen, in her capacity as Regional Hearing Officer of the Regional Hearing Office IV (RHO IV), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and private respondent Andrew Abis. PDSPI assails the Resolution dated April 3, 2013, and Resolution dated May 20, 2014, promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA). The case stemmed from a Complaint filed by Abis against PDSPI, which alleges that the company intruded upon ancestral lands belonging to the Cuyunen Tribe and developed the Puerto del Sol Resort. The NCIP RHO IV, through Gabaen, ruled in favor of Abis and ordered PDSPI to cease and desist from further intrusion. PDSPI filed a motion for reconsideration and a memorandum on appeal, but both were denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. PDSPI then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. PDSPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, PDSPI elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The central issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA was correct in invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to deny PDSPI's Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not PDSPI had an available remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration against the NCIP RHO IV's Order dismissing its Memorandum on Appeal.

  2. Whether or not the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying due course to PDSPI's Memorandum on Appeal should have been appealed before the NCIP En Banc.

  3. Whether or not the filing of a prior motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.

  4. Whether or not the issue raised by PDSPI is a purely legal one.

  5. Whether or not the NCIP RHO IV's Order violated the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure.

  6. Whether the Fresh Period Rule is applicable in the present case.

  7. Whether the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Regional Hearing Office IV (NCIP RHO IV) gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal.

RULING:

  1. The court ruled that PDSPI did not have an available remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration against the NCIP RHO IV's Order because the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure only allows one motion for reconsideration before the RHO.

  2. The court ruled that the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying due course to PDSPI's Memorandum on Appeal cannot be subject to an appeal before the NCIP En Banc because it is not a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case.

  3. The court ruled that the general rule that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before filing a petition for certiorari is subject to exceptions, such as when the order challenged is a patent nullity or when the issue raised is purely a question of law.

  4. The court ruled that the issue raised by PDSPI is a purely legal one.

  5. The court ruled that the NCIP RHO IV's Order violated the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure.

  6. The Court held that the Fresh Period Rule is applicable in the present case. While there are specific administrative rules of procedure that preclude the application of the Fresh Period Rule, such as Neypes v. Court of Appeals in relation to Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990, and Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, Series of 2004 in relation to Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, there is no similar provision in the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure. On the contrary, Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure explicitly adopts the Fresh Period Rule. Therefore, the Court found that NCIP RHO IV gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The general rule that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before filing a petition for certiorari is subject to exceptions, such as when the order challenged is a patent nullity or when the issue raised is purely a question of law.

  • The filing of a prior motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari if the order challenged is a patent nullity or if the issue raised is one purely of law.

  • The correct reglementary period for filing appeals before the NCIP En Banc is determined by the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Court.

  • The Neypes Rule, which allows parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration to file an appeal within fifteen days from its denial, may not strictly apply to administrative decisions unless specifically provided by the administrative rules of procedure.

  • The dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and procedural rules should not be applied in a rigid and technical sense. Procedural rules are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.

  • The right to appeal is merely statutory and not a natural right. However, the courts and administrative bodies are enjoined to respect the minimum period laid down by the applicable rules to allow an appeal.

  • All litigants must be afforded the fullest opportunity for the adjudication of their cases on the merits, to the extent allowed by the rules.