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BRITANIA v. GEPTY

FACTS:

Blas Britania filed a case for judicial foreclosure of mortgage against Melba Panganiban. Britania claimed that they had a loan agreement wherein Panganiban borrowed P1,500,000.00 with interest of P100,000.00, secured by a 120-square meter property. Panganiban failed to comply with the agreement, so they executed a second agreement with a new payment scheme. Despite repeated demands, Panganiban continuously refused to pay her obligation. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75. Panganiban, in her answer, alleged that she borrowed from Britania for her buy-and-sell business and had been regularly paying her loans. She claimed that she issued a check to Britania with the understanding that he would not encash it as long as she continued paying her loans, but he encashed it even though it got dishonored. The trial court denied the complaint for foreclosure but granted Britania's monetary claims. Panganiban's personal properties were subsequently levied on.

Subsequently, an execution sale was conducted, and Britania won with a bid of P15,000.00 for the levied properties. Britania filed a motion to examine Panganiban, alleging that a property had been fraudulently transferred. Panganiban failed to appear at the hearing, prompting Britania to file a motion for Panganiban to be held in contempt of court. The trial court ordered Panganiban to comment on the motion. In her comment, Panganiban denied involvement in the fraud and stated that the property was not included in the trial court's decision. She did not oppose or comment on Britania's motion and cited a personal tragedy that prevented her active participation in the case.

Britania replied to Panganiban's comment reiterating his allegations. However, the trial court denied Britania's motion for contempt and motion to examine Panganiban, finding them without merit. Britania filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court denied it. Dissatisfied, Britania elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial court.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether Panganiban should be held in indirect contempt for her non-appearance during the scheduled hearing.

  2. Whether Britania has the right to examine Panganiban under Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

  3. Whether or not Britania can revive his claim on the property through examination of Panganiban under Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

  4. Whether or not Panganiban can be cited for indirect contempt of court for not appearing during the hearing on Britania's motion to examine her.

  5. Whether or not the order of the court a quo constituted a violation of the petitioner's right to be present and to oppose the motion.

  6. Whether or not the court a quo erred in not citing the private respondent in indirect contempt.

RULING:

  1. The Court of Appeals held that Panganiban's non-appearance during the scheduled hearing did not amount to a contumacious act that can be punished by contempt of court. The trial court properly deemed her to have waived her right to be heard on Britania's motion to examine her.

  2. The trial court correctly denied Britania's motion to examine Panganiban under Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The provision only applies when the judgment remains unsatisfied and there is a need to examine the judgment obligor's property and income. Since Panganiban did not own the property in question, it cannot be subject to examination to satisfy the judgment.

  3. The Court held that Britania cannot revive his claim on the property through examination of Panganiban under Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as it is not even applicable in this case.

  4. The Court held that Panganiban cannot be cited for indirect contempt of court for not appearing during the hearing of Britania's motion to examine her. The trial court itself, whose authority and dignity the contempt rules seek to protect, did not find Panganiban's non-appearance contemptuous. Without any ill intent found on Panganiban's part, the trial court cannot be compelled to hold her in indirect contempt of court.

  5. The Court held that the order of the court a quo did not constitute a violation of the petitioner's right to be present and to oppose the motion. The court merely reset the hearing date and directed the private respondent to file a comment on the petitioner's motions, which the private respondent had already complied with.

  6. The Court ruled that since there was no finding of any contemptuous act committed by the private respondent, the court a quo cannot be faulted for not citing the private respondent in indirect contempt.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The doctrine of immutability of judgment states that a final and executory judgment may no longer be modified or amended by any court, even if there are perceived errors of law or fact.

  • Litigation must come to an end, based on the principle of sound public policy.

  • The power to declare a person in contempt of court should be exercised judiciously and sparingly, with self-restraint and in the interest of justice.

  • There are two types of contempt of court: direct contempt and indirect contempt.

  • Indirect contempt is punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged.

  • Contempt proceedings should be liberally construed in favor of the accused.

  • An act can only be considered contemptuous if it is clearly contrary to or prohibited by the court's order.

  • The right to be present and to oppose a motion is not violated if the court merely resets the hearing date and directs the opposing party to file a comment.

  • For a court to cite a person in indirect contempt, there must be a finding of a contemptuous act committed by that person.