FACTS:

In the first case, Omar Villarba and other members of the Junior Order of Kalantiao were charged with violating the Anti-Hazing Act for hazing Wilson Dordas III. During the trial, Dordas testified that he was recruited by Villarba to join the fraternity and was subjected to various humiliating and dangerous activities, including physical assault, during the initiation rite. Villarba was identified as one of the perpetrators.

In the second case, Villarba appealed his conviction, arguing that the information charged against him was invalid and questioning the inconsistency in Dordas's statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, ruling that the initiation activities were considered hazing and that the amendment in the victim's name was merely formal and did not require rearraignment. Villarba filed a motion for reconsideration.

In the third case, Villarba filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court after his motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. He argues that his right to due process was violated because he was not rearraigned after the information was amended. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the amendment is not substantial and does not change Villarba's defense.

In the fourth case, Renato Olarte was charged with theft through estafa. During the trial, Olarte filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that the facts alleged constitute a different offense under the Bouncing Checks Law. The trial court initially denied the motion but later granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the original information. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, ruling that the prosecutor has the discretion to amend the information and the court's approval does not require notice and hearing. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the dismissal violated their right to due process.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the inclusion of the suffix 'III' to the name of Dordas in the Information constitutes a substantial amendment that requires a new arraignment.

2. Whether the inclusion of the suffix 'III' to the name of the accused in the Information is a substantial amendment that warrants a second arraignment.

3. Whether the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused requires a sufficient complaint or information.

4. Whether or not the Information is sufficient to apprise the accused of the offense charged.

5. Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the testimony of the victim credible.

6. Whether the lower courts erred in appreciating the victim's testimony as credible.

7. Whether the victim's testimony was self-serving and uncorroborated.

8. Whether the victim's testimony was inconsistent and unbelievable.

9. Whether or not the accused is guilty of homicide.

10. Whether or not the penalty imposed on the accused is proper.

RULING:

1. No, the inclusion of the suffix 'III' to the name of Dordas in the Information is not a substantial amendment that requires a new arraignment.

2. The inclusion of the suffix 'III' to the name of the accused in the Information is not a substantial amendment that warrants a second arraignment. It does not change the crime charged and the theory or defense of the petitioner. The amendment only states with precision something that was already included in the original Information. It is merely a formal amendment.

3. The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused requires a sufficient complaint or information. The complaint or information must set forth a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. Compliance with this rule is essential to satisfy the constitutional rights of the accused. Any deviation that prejudices the accused's substantial rights is fatal to the case.

4. The Supreme Court ruled that the Information is sufficient to apprise the accused of the offense charged. The lack of the phrase "prerequisite to admission" in the Information does not render it invalid. As long as the alleged facts in the Information reasonably inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation, the constitutional right to be informed of the offense charged is upheld. The use of derivatives, synonyms, and allegations of basic facts constituting the crime is sufficient to comply with the requirement of stating the acts or omissions that constitute the offense.

5. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not err in finding the testimony of the victim credible. The evaluation of witnesses' credibility is best left to the trial court, as it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial. Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to great weight and respect.

6. The lower courts did not err in appreciating the victim's testimony as credible. The victim was able to provide a detailed and categorical narration of his ordeal during the initiation. He identified the petitioner as one of the members who punched him in the abdomen. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the victim's testimony to be direct, straightforward, and credible. The rule is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court due to its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under examination. The findings of the trial court on witness credibility are binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless substantial facts were shown to have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.

7. The accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide based on the evidence presented.

8. The penalty imposed on the accused is affirmed, which is one (1) day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 12 years, as a maximum. The accused is also ordered to pay the costs of suit.

PRINCIPLES:

• Arraignment is the accused's first opportunity to know the precise charge pressed against them, and is a legal imperative to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process. It is necessary to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusations against them.

• Amendments to the complaint or information may be made without leave of court before the accused enters his plea. After plea and during trial, amendments may only be made with leave of court and when it does not cause prejudice to the rights of the accused.

• Formal amendments may be made even after arraignment without requiring a second plea, as long as it does not charge a new offense, alter the prosecution's theory, cause surprise, or adversely affect the accused's substantial rights.

• Substantial amendments refer to recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the court's jurisdiction. It is deemed substantial if it affects the defense and evidence of the accused.

• The test for determining whether an amendment is substantial is the effect of the amendment on the defense and evidence. If a defense and evidence under the original information would no longer be applicable after the amendment, it is deemed substantial.

• The inclusion of suffixes or other minor changes to the name of an accused in the Information does not constitute a substantial amendment that warrants a second arraignment if it does not change the crime charged and the theory or defense of the accused. It is merely a formal amendment.

• The accused has a constitutional right to be fully informed of the reason and basis for their indictment. The complaint or information must set forth a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.

• The allegations in the information are given more weight than a prosecutor's designation of the offense in the caption. The actual recital of facts stated in the information determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused. The wording of the information does not need to be a verbatim reproduction of the law in alleging the acts or omissions that constitute the offense.

• The information must state the acts or omissions that constitute the offense in ordinary and concise language, enabling a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The exact language of the statute is not necessary as long as the offense is described in intelligible terms with sufficient particularity.

• The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is satisfied as long as the crime, as described in the information, is reasonably adequate to apprise the accused of the offense charged. The use of derivatives, synonyms, and allegations of basic facts constituting the crime will suffice.

• The evaluation of witnesses' credibility is best left to the trial court, which has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to great weight and respect.

• The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, and its findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless substantial facts were shown to have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.

• The testimony of a single witness may suffice to attain conviction if it is deemed credible, and the prosecution has no obligation to present a certain number of witnesses. Testimonies are weighed, not numbered.

• The reluctance of fraternity members to speak about initiation rites in hazing cases is not unusual. Fraternities and sororities are secretive in nature, and the silence is only broken after someone has been injured severely.

• Guilt beyond reasonable doubt is the standard of proof in criminal cases.

• The penalty imposed must be in accordance with the law and supported by the evidence presented.