FACTS:

Gotesco Properties, Inc. (Gotesco) entered into a Credit Agreement with International Exchange Bank (IBank), executing a real estate mortgage as security for the loan. IBank foreclosed the mortgage and acquired the property when Gotesco defaulted. Gotesco filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages, but they eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement restructuring the loan. The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement. IBank later filed a Motion for Execution, alleging Gotesco's failure to comply with the terms. Initially denied, the motion was granted after a Motion for Reconsideration was filed. Gotesco filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was denied. They then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the trial court's grant of the Motion for Reconsideration. Gotesco argued that the trial court should not have granted the motion as the arguments were identical to those in the motion for execution and that the loan's demandability is at issue due to the Compromise Agreement.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the principle of stare decisis precludes the issuance of the Resolution granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

2. Whether or not the issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment is a court's ministerial duty, and if there are exceptions to this duty.

3. Whether the motion for execution is premature based on the duration of the ten-year term loan stated in the Compromise Agreement.

4. Whether the loan only becomes due and demandable after the ten-year term ends.

5. Whether the appellants had five years within which to pay their mortgage debt, despite the acceleration clause in the mortgage contract.

6. Whether the foreclosure of the mortgage was premature.

RULING:

1. The principle of stare decisis does not preclude the issuance of the Resolution granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration. An aggrieved party is permitted to question alleged errors in a judgment or final order, and if the court finds merit in the moving party's arguments, it is duty-bound to correct those errors. The principle of stare decisis applies only to final decisions of the Supreme Court, and not to lower courts or other divisions of the same court.

2. The issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment is generally a court's ministerial duty. However, there are exceptions to this duty. A writ of execution may be stayed or set aside when there are facts and circumstances that make execution impossible or unjust. It may also be quashed if it alters or varies the judgment, if it is defective in substance, improvidently issued, issued without authority, or issued against the wrong party. Additionally, payment or satisfaction of the judgment debt may also be a ground for quashing a writ of execution.

3. The motion for execution is not premature because the terms of the Compromise Agreement provide for the acceleration of the loan in case of default. The ten-year term loan mentioned in the Compromise Agreement does not prevent the immediate execution of the total sum due under the agreement, as stated in Section 4.03 of the agreement. The language of the agreement allows the creditor to move for immediate execution upon default by the debtor.

4. The loan does not need to wait for the ten-year term to end before becoming due and demandable. The Compromise Agreement contains an acceleration clause that allows the creditor to declare the entire obligation due and demandable if the debtor fails to pay any sum due under the agreement. This means that even if there is a fixed term for the loan, the creditor can invoke the acceleration clause and demand full payment if the debtor fails to comply with their payment obligations.

5. The appellants did not have five years to pay their mortgage debt. The entire provision of the mortgage contract must be taken into account, and it is clear that while the appellants were allowed to amortize their loan, they were under obligation to liquidate it within a period of not more than five years. The phrase "notwithstanding the foregoing" does not refer to the acceleration clause but to the stipulation that the loan had to be amortized within 5 years.

6. The foreclosure of the mortgage was not premature. The mortgage contract stated that failure to pay two successive monthly amortizations would render the entire loan due and payable. In this case, default had been committed for twelve months, justifying the foreclosure.

PRINCIPLES:

• Motions for reconsideration serve the purpose of allowing the court to correct errors in a judgment or final order that are unsupported by law or evidence.

• The principle of stare decisis applies only to final decisions of the Supreme Court, and not to lower courts or other divisions of the same court.

• The issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment is generally a court's ministerial duty, subject to certain exceptions.

• A writ of execution may be stayed or set aside when execution becomes impossible or unjust, or when there are defects in the substance or issuance of the writ.

• Payment or satisfaction of the judgment debt may also be a ground for quashing a writ of execution.

• Acceleration clauses in contracts are valid and produce legal effect. These clauses allow the creditor to accelerate the payment of the entire obligation if the debtor defaults on their payment obligations.

• Interpretation of contractual provisions requires considering the entire provision and not just isolated phrases.

• Acceleration clauses give creditors the choice to collect the entire demandable amount immediately.

• Default in payment according to the terms of the contract justifies the exercise of acceleration clauses and the subsequent foreclosure.