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AMALIA G. CARDONA v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Amalia G. Cardona was charged with violating Section 23(a) and (c) of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to Section 195 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code). She was accused of requiring voters to sign the back of their official ballots against their will, intentionally putting a distinguishing mark on the ballot. The complaint against Cardona was filed by a mayoral candidate who lost in the May 14, 2001 elections. During the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified that Cardona instructed them to sign the back of their ballots after voting. Cardona admitted allowing some voters to sign the dorsal portion of the ballots but claimed it was a mistake which she immediately rectified. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Cardona guilty and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of two to four years of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to one to two years of imprisonment. Unsatisfied, Cardona filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court, seeking her acquittal.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the participation of a private prosecutor during trial is a procedural issue that warrants the invalidation of the criminal proceedings.

  2. Whether the marks made on the ballot outside of those prescribed under Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 and Section 195 of the OEC automatically constitute an election offense.

  3. Whether intent is required for the conviction of a violation of Section 195 of the OEC.

  4. Whether Section 195 of the OEC is mala in se such that good faith and lack of criminal intent can be raised as valid defenses against its conviction.

  5. Is the placement of a distinguishing mark on a ballot considered an election offense?

  6. Did the accused deliberately place or cause a voter to place a distinguishing mark?

  7. What is the issue or issues in this case?

  8. What is the ruling of the Supreme Court on the issue or issues?

RULING:

  1. The criminal proceeding was regularly conducted and the private prosecutor's participation during trial is allowed under the Rules of Court. The participation of a private prosecutor is authorized by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or Regional State Prosecutor with the trial court's approval. The citation of Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure is incorrect.

  2. The marks made on the ballot outside of those prescribed under Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 and Section 195 of the OEC do not automatically constitute an election offense. Not all marks made on the ballot result in a declaration of invalidity. To constitute a distinguishing mark, it must be deliberate and show an intention to distinguish the ballot.

  3. Intent is required for the conviction of a violation of Section 195 of the OEC. The act of intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of a distinguishing mark is prohibited. The offense is not strict liability and requires criminal intent.

  4. Section 195 of the OEC is mala in se. An act prohibited by a special law does not automatically make it malum prohibitum. The inherent immorality or vileness of the act determines whether it is mala in se or mala prohibita. Good faith and lack of criminal intent can be raised as valid defenses against the conviction.

  5. The placement of a distinguishing mark on a ballot does not automatically constitute an election offense, unless a statute enumerates certain marks as illegal or distinguishing regardless of the question of intent. Unintentional marks made by the voter or by someone other than the voter do not invalidate the ballot.

  6. The accused is not guilty of deliberately placing or causing a voter to place a distinguishing mark. The accused's actions were not intended to identify the ballot after the vote has been cast. The accused had a mental black-out due to the belated voting and allowed voters to cast their votes later than the mandated time. The accused immediately closed the box upon realizing the mistake and rectified the situation. The absence of intent and the accused's good faith should exculpate her from criminal liability.

  7. The issue in this case is not provided in the text.

  8. The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant Amalia G. Cardona of the crime charged.

PRINCIPLES:

  • A distinguishing mark is one that is placed on a ballot with the intention of identifying the ballot after the vote has been cast.

  • Unintentional marks made by the voter or by someone other than the voter do not invalidate the ballot.

  • Intent is necessary to convict an accused of an election offense covered by a special law.

  • The burden of proof rests on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

No legal principles or doctrines are mentioned in the text.