MIGDONIO RACCA v. MARIA LOLITA A. ECHAGUE

FACTS:

Maria Lolita A. Echague (respondent) filed a Petition for the allowance of the will of Amparo Ferido Racca (Amparo) and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. Respondent claimed that Amparo executed a notarial will before her death, leaving an undivided portion of her estate to her grandnephew Migdon Chris Laurence Ferido. Petitioners Migdonio Racca (Migdonio) and Miam Grace Dianne Ferido Racca (Miam), who are Amparo's husband and daughter, respectively, were named as Amparo's known heirs. The trial court initially issued an Order setting the case for hearing, which was duly served to the parties. However, petitioners failed to appear during the scheduled hearing, leading the trial court to declare them in default. Petitioners filed a Motion to Lift Order of General Default, claiming that they did not receive proper notice of the hearing due to excusable negligence and citing other grounds to question the will. The trial court denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file an appeal before the Court. The main issues for resolution are whether the Order of General Default can be set aside and whether known heirs are still entitled to personal notice despite publication and posting of the notice of the hearing.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether petitioners were properly notified in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court.

  2. Whether petitioners, as known heirs of the testator, are entitled to notice under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 despite the publication of the notice of hearing.

  3. Whether an order of general default can be validly issued in a probate proceeding.

  4. Whether publication of the notice of hearing is sufficient to notify the interested parties in the probate proceedings.

  5. Whether personal notice to the designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees is required in addition to publication.

  6. Whether lack of personal notice to an interested person in a probate proceeding is fatal to the validity of the allowance of the will.

  7. Whether personal notice to individual heirs, legatees, and devisees is necessary in probate proceedings.

  8. Whether failure to personally notify the individual heirs, legatees, and devisees affects the jurisdiction of the court.

  9. Whether personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is mandatory in probate proceedings.

  10. Whether the petitioners were properly notified of the probate proceedings.

  11. Whether the notice sent to Migdonio complied with the procedural requirements under Section 4 of Rule 76.

RULING:

  1. The petition is meritorious. Petitioners were not properly notified in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court.

  2. Yes, petitioners, as known heirs of the testator, are entitled to notice under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 despite the publication of the notice of hearing.

  3. No, an order of general default cannot be validly issued in a probate proceeding.

  4. Publication of the notice of hearing is not sufficient to notify the interested parties in the probate proceedings. Personal notice to the designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees is required.

  5. Personal notice to the designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees is required in addition to publication.

  6. Under the 1939 case of Testate Estate of Murray, McMaster v. Henry Reissmann & Co., lack of personal notice to an interested person in a probate proceeding is not fatal to the validity of the allowance of the will. The publication of the notice of hearing in the manner prescribed by law is considered sufficient notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings. Therefore, interested persons are deemed constructively notified by the publication of the notice of hearing.

  7. Personal notice to individual heirs, legatees, and devisees is not necessary in probate proceedings. The court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice is only a matter of procedural convenience.

  8. Failure to personally notify the individual heirs, legatees, and devisees does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. It only constitutes a procedural error and does not constitute extrinsic fraud. The non-inclusion of their names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not deny them their day in court, as long as they are not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

  9. Yes, personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is mandatory in probate proceedings. The Court ruled that the trial court has a duty to strictly comply with the procedures laid in Section 4, which include the requirement to cause copies of the notice of the time and place of the hearing to be sent to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. The use of the word "shall" in the rule indicates that compliance with personal notice is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement renders the proceedings a violation of due process. The rule on personal notice was instituted in Section 4 to safeguard the right to due process of heirs, legatees, or devisees who may be affected by the proceeding. Personal notice serves as an additional form of notification that cannot be disregarded even if publication has been made.

  10. The court ruled that the petitioners were not properly notified of the probate proceedings. The court held that under Section 4 of Rule 76, each known heir whose residence is known should be individually served a copy of the notice of hearing. The fact that the petitioners lived in the same residence as Migdonio does not relieve the court of its obligation to serve personal notices to each known heir. The court held that the publication of the notice under Section 3 was not sufficient to comply with the requirements of Section 4.

  11. The court also ruled that the notice sent to Migdonio failed to comply with the procedural requirements under Section 4 of Rule 76. The court found that there was no evidence that the notice of hearing addressed to Migdonio was deposited in the post office at least 20 days before the hearing. Even if the notice was personally served, it was not served at least 10 days before the hearing, as required by Section 4. The court also considered the elderly age and lack of legal knowledge of Migdonio, and held that the two-day period between receiving the notice and the hearing was insufficient to allow him to seek legal advice and prepare his opposition to the petition.

PRINCIPLES:

  • A petition for review under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law is the appropriate remedy. (Rule 45, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)

  • An order of general default in a probate proceeding bars the party declared in default from participating in the proceedings and cannot even appeal the judgment rendered by the court. (Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Hon. Enriquez)

  • Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the issuance of an order of default, does not apply in probate proceedings. (Riera v. Palmaroli)

  • In probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will, specifically the testamentary capacity and compliance with formal requisites. (Articles 805 and 806, New Civil Code)

  • Notice to the designated and known heirs, devisees, and legatees under Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court is mandatory in probate proceedings.

  • Publication of the notice of hearing is not sufficient when the places of residence of the heirs, legatees, and devisees are known.

  • Personal service of the notice is equivalent to mailing.

  • Probate proceedings are in rem nature, and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested through the publication of the notice.

  • Proceedings in rem, such as probate proceedings, are notices to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and the orders and decrees issued therein. (Testate Estate of Murray, McMaster v. Henry Reissmann & Co.)

  • Lack of personal notice to an interested person in a probate proceeding does not invalidate the allowance of the will if there was publication of the notice of hearing in the manner prescribed by law. (Testate Estate of Murray, McMaster v. Henry Reissmann & Co.)

  • The effectivity of the 1940 Rules of Court introduced the requirement of personal notification to the known heirs, legatees, and devisees in addition to the publication of the notice of hearing. (Joson v. Nable)

  • Publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation is necessary for probate proceedings.

  • Personal notice to individual heirs, legatees, and devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not a jurisdictional requirement.

  • Failure to personally notify individual heirs, legatees, and devisees is a procedural error, but does not affect the validity of the probate proceedings.

  • Each known heir whose residence is known must be individually served a copy of the notice of hearing in probate proceedings, as mandated by Section 4 of Rule 76 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

  • Publication of the notice under Section 3 is not sufficient to comply with the requirements of Section 4.

  • Personal notice must either be deposited in the post office at least 20 days before the hearing or personally served at least 10 days before the hearing, as provided by Section 4 of Rule 76.

  • Negligence in attending a hearing may be excused if it is shown that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it.