FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Roble Peñas filed a petition against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to contest two resolutions - Resolution No. 18-0665 and Resolution No. 20-0121-33. Resolution No. 18-0665 found probable cause for his indictment for election overspending, while Resolution No. 20-0121-33 denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Digos City, Davao Del Sur for the 2010 National and Local Elections (NLE) under the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) and declared his total election campaign expenditures as P600,000.00 in his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE).

Petitioner was informed by the COMELEC's Campaign Finance Unit in 2014 that he exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law. He explained that he failed to specify the breakdown of his expenses in his SOCE and that certain expenses, such as printing sample ballots and lawyer's fees, should not have been included in the computation. He argued that these expenses were political party expenses and not his own personal expenditure.

Despite petitioner's explanation, the COMELEC filed a formal complaint against him for election overspending. Petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit, asserting that the expenses for printing sample ballots and payment for legal services were NPC political party expenses and should be excluded from his personal campaign expenditures.

The COMELEC En Banc, through Resolution No. 18-0665, found probable cause to hold petitioner for trial and ordered the filing of an information against him while Resolution No. 20-0121-33 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed the present petition, alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause to indict him for election overspending during the 2010 NLE.

The petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation to rectify the errors in his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). However, it was argued that the SOCE was considered even though it had not been duly executed, and there was an inordinate delay in resolving the complaint by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The petitioner admitted that the notarized SOCE he filed was defective because it was not supported by receipts and other documents as stated in the document itself. He claimed that the notarized document does not bind him due to its defects.

The petitioner also alleged that the COMELEC violated his right to a speedy disposition of his case because it took them more than ten years from the filing of his SOCE to indict him for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The COMELEC failed to observe the mandated timeframe for conducting preliminary investigations.

In response, the COMELEC argued that the petitioner failed to comply with procedural requirements and that he had other remedies available to him. They also contended that the delay in the proceedings was justifiable due to intervening elections and that the petitioner failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintained that the finding of probable cause against the petitioner was supported by evidence, particularly his own SOCE. They also stated that the petitioner's Affidavit of Correction/Explanation should not be given weight as it was self-serving and filed as an afterthought.

The COMELEC argued that the legal effect of the petitioner's Affidavit of Correction/Explanation should be determined in the criminal case proceedings, not during the preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period.

2. Whether the petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

3. Whether the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion.

4. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in recommending the filing of an Information against the petitioner.

5. Whether the inordinate and oppressive delay attending the conduct of preliminary investigation violated the petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases.

6. Whether the right to speedy disposition of cases can be invoked to question the inordinate delay in the course of preliminary investigations by the COMELEC.

7. Whether the COMELEC failed to observe its own prescribed period for resolving cases.

8. Whether the COMELEC established justifications for the delay in resolving the case.

9. Whether the delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violated the petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case.

10. Whether the petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated.

11. Whether the petitioner's failure to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case before the COMELEC is fatal.

RULING:

1. The petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period. However, considering the exceptional circumstances and the meritorious grounds presented by the petitioner, the Court deems it proper to relax the strict application of procedural rules and give due course to the petition.

2. The petitioner did not have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A full-blown trial would not afford the petitioner expeditious relief from the detrimental effect of a wrongful charge of an election offense, especially one that was filed despite inordinate delay. The original action of certiorari provides the petitioner with immediate relief from the COMELEC's arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction.

3. The COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion. It has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses. However, its actions were tainted with whimsical and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction, depriving the petitioner of the prompt disposition of the complaint against him. The COMELEC's findings were contradicted by early evidence, and its delay in resolving the matter further unjustly subjected the petitioner to a public trial.

4. Yes, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in recommending the filing of an Information against the petitioner. The Court found that there was inordinate and oppressive delay in conducting the preliminary investigation, which violated the petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases.

5. Yes, the inordinate and oppressive delay attending the conduct of preliminary investigation violated the petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court emphasized that the right to speedy disposition of cases extends not only to criminal cases but also to other adversarial proceedings before any judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative tribunals. The COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, is not exempt from the duty of observing the constitutional safeguard of the right to speedy disposition of cases.

6. The right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked to question the inordinate delay in the course of preliminary investigations by the COMELEC.

7. The COMELEC failed to observe its own prescribed period for resolving cases.

8. The COMELEC failed to establish justifications for the delay in resolving the case.

9. Yes, the delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violated the petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case. The Court held that the delay of six years in resolving the complaint prejudiced the petitioner, causing mental anguish, anxiety, damage to reputation, and impairing the defense. The Court also noted that the complexity of the issue did not justify the unreasonable delay and that the COMELEC failed to justify the length of time it took to conclude the preliminary investigation. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived his right to a speedy disposition of his case.

10. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated. The Court emphasized that the duty to promptly resolve the complaint lies with the governing agency and not with the respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be faulted for invoking his right to a speedy disposition only in the present petition.

11. The Court also ruled that the petitioner's failure to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case before the COMELEC is not fatal. Similar to the Rules of Procedure before the Ombudsman, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibit the filing of motions to dismiss. Thus, there is no legitimate avenue for the petitioner to invoke his right to a speedy disposition of his case before the COMELEC. Moreover, the Court held that the petitioner timely asserted his right to a speedy disposition by filing the present petition immediately after the COMELEC directed the filing of an information against him.

PRINCIPLES:

• The fresh-period rule is inapplicable to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64. The intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration is deductible from the provided reglementary period.

• Procedural rules should aid in the attainment of justice. A liberal construction of the Rules of Court is allowed in exceptional cases where a strict application of the rules would hinder the demands of substantial justice.

• Recourse to a petition for certiorari does not require the absence of a judicial remedy. It is the inadequacy of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.

• A petition for certiorari or prohibition may prosper despite the availability of other remedies in exceptional circumstances, such as when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate, when the interests of substantial justice require, or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

• The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses. However, its exercise of such power must not be whimsical or arbitrary, and it must ensure prompt disposition of complaints against individuals.

• The COMELEC has the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same. The finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the COMELEC. The Court generally does not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• To establish grave abuse of discretion, the act must be done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

• The guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution, which extends to all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies. No branch of government is exempt from the duty of observing the constitutional safeguard, and the right confirms immunity from arbitrary delay.

• In determining whether there has been inordinate delay, courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised. The complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence may justify a certain degree of delay.

• If there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to justify the delay and show that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

• The right to speedy disposition of cases can be invoked to question delays in preliminary investigations.

• The COMELEC is constitutionally committed to acting promptly on cases before it.

• The COMELEC's own rules of procedure prescribe specific periods for the conduct and resolution of preliminary investigations.

• The burden of justifying a delay in the resolution of a case is shifted to the COMELEC.

• The COMELEC must prove that it followed the prescribed procedure, that the complexity of the issues and volume of evidence made the delay inevitable, and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

• The right to a speedy disposition of a case includes the right to a prompt investigation or preliminary investigation.

• The length of delay is weighed against the interests of the accused, such as preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety, and limiting the impairment of the defense.

• Prejudice resulting from delay includes mental anguish, anxiety, damage to reputation, impairment of defense, and other injuries attendant to a criminal prosecution.

• The burden is on the prosecution or investigating agency to justify the length of time it took to conclude the investigation or preliminary investigation.

• Respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings do not have a duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case, and their failure to do so does not amount to acquiescence to the delay.

• The right to a speedy disposition of a case can be timely invoked through a motion to quash or any other appropriate legal action, even before arraignment.

• The duty to promptly resolve a complaint lies with the governing agency in a criminal prosecution or investigation.

• The petitioner is not duty bound to follow up on his or her own case; it is the governing agency that is tasked to promptly resolve it.

• The petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case can be asserted before entering a plea during arraignment.

• The filing of a motion to dismiss is not allowed under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.