Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in operating a restaurant.^[1]

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation of the property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, entered his appearance as counsel for Victoria Legarda. He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from February 6, 1985 within which to file an answer to the complaint. The motion was granted by the court which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to answer the complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., she was declared in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease contract and to pay the following: (a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of P278,764.37, and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period. Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., the lower court issued a writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the property subject of the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale which, on July 11, 1986, was duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She alleged therein that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings nor by the evidence submitted.

Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from dispossessing petitioner of the premises in question. Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment on the petition with a motion for the lifting of the temporary restrain­ing order. Victoria Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The petition was thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest if the parties desired to file their respective memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he was adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated comment as her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which Victoria Legarda claimed that Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false pretenses that he was agreeable to the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and that the latter would withdraw the complaint against her, thereby prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint anymore, the Court of Appeals^[2] said:

"On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract in question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the defendant's counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant. But counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for relief from the order declar­ing their client in default or from the judgment by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if it had proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned' (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, SCRA 1138)." (Underscoring supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Surprisingly, however, inspite of the Court of Appeals' tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal to this Court of the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his client.

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel for New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through the Coronel Law Office, a letter demanding that she vacate the property within three days from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not inform petitioner of this develop­ment until sometime in March, 1990. Due to petitioner's persist­ent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's secretary informed her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction from the property. Consequently, petitioner had no recourse but to oblige and vacate the property.^[3]

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel,^[4] filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 contending that the decisions of the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court and divested of her property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel."^[5]

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 And November 29, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certificate of sale dated June 27, 1985 of the property involved and the subse­quent final deed of sale covering the same. The Court further directed private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property in the name of said private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of the petitioner.

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held administatively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner. Said counsel having been inadvertently omitted in the service of copies of said decision,^[6] on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division to which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he received on February 12, 1992.^[7]

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from February 22, 1992 within which to file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of work "consisting of daily hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in equally urgent cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases against the Marcoses."^[8]

The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said motion for extension with warning that no further extension will be given. Atty. Coronel received a copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992,^[9] a day after the expiration of the 30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty (30) days within which to submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St. Luke's Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiomyopathy, diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain infarction, thrombotic."^[10]

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed one day late, coupled with the circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March 9, 1992. Hence, the second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not presume that their motions for exten­sion of time will always be granted by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court with a view to attaining substantial justice.^[11]

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in this Court. It was addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of this Court. That he failed to immediately heed the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for him to do so, reflects an unbe­coming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We cannot counte­nance such disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and orders.^[12]

Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be heard and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had been required to explain.^[13]

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel vio­lated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case against her not to mention the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the depriva­tion of petitioner's rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March 18, 1991:

"Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private respondent's counsel. x x x."

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. PCGG, et al.," the Court en banc, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was found guilty of inexcusable negli­gence in his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. The Court said:

"We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991 unsatisfactory. Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June 1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain silent about it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only on the last day of the period granted to, him under said Resolu­tion that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September 1991 to file the Reply. This was a self-imposed period and, therefore, he was expected to faithfully comply with it not only because of the re­spect due this Court, but also because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and good faith on the line. For reasons only known to him, he did not. Worse, de­spite his receipt on 27 November 1991 of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30 September 1991 motion, Atty. Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to compel compliance. When he finally did, he committed, allegedly through inad­vertence, the blunder of placing his Reply under a wrong caption.

"For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991 and meet his self-imposed deadline, Atty. Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he has unduly delayed the disposi­tion of the pending incidents in this case." (Underscor­ing supplied.)

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material prejudice.^[14] It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prose­cution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.^[15] Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which resulted in depriving petitioner of her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case:

"Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

"Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest."

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of peti­tioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition of the acts constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal record, another copy be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and copies thereof be circulated in all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, Davide Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Civil Case No. Q-43811.

^[2] Justice Alicia V. Sempio Diy, ponente. Justices Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Celso L. Magsino, concurring.

^[3] Petition, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 15-16.

^[4] Singson Valdez and Associates.

^[5] Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 17.

^[6] The instant petition having been filed by another counsel and not by Dean Coronel, he was not been served any court processes prior to the promulgation of the decision of March 18, 1991. Since the dispositive portion of said decision does not mention specifically the name of Dean Coronel, inadvertently, no copy thereof was served on him.

^[7] Rollo, p. 364.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Ibid, pp. 381 & 386.

^[10] Ibid, p. 385.

^[11] Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76549, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 252.

^[12] Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92862, July 4, 1991, 198 SCRA 806.

^[13] Santos v. CFI of Cebu, Branch VI, G.R. No. 58532, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 472, 486-487.

^[14] See: Gutierrez v. Zulueta, Adm. Case No. 2200, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA 607.

^[15] Cantiller v. Potenciano, Adm. Case No, 3195, December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 246.