This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated November 28, 1990, rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. 00-10-04282-88 which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 28, 1989, and declared the dismissal of petitioner Antonio M. Corral legal and valid.

Petitioner is a yardman of respondent Pepsi Cola with a monthly salary of P2,500.00. He began as an ordinary laborer in December 1982. His task was to clean the yard and route trucks of Pepsi Cola, arrange the company's products in the yard and in the trucks, load and unload the company's products from the yard to the route trucks and vice-versa, and perform such other manual tasks as he may be ordered to perform by his immediate superiors.

On June 8, 1988, the petitioner was arrested and forcibly taken by police officers to the Taguig Police Station where he was detained, over his protest, without being informed of the charge against him.

On June 10, 1988, an amended information for Qualified Theft was filed against him and others (Crim. Case No. 73619 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila) upon the complaint of respondent R.J. Manago, in behalf of respondent Pepsi Cola. During his detention and investigation at the Taguig Police Sta­tion, petitioner was not allowed counsel of his choice and he was released only after posting bail for his provisional liberty.

He was not allowed to return to his job at the Pepsi Cola plant.

On July 6, 1988, or one (1) month later, he re­ceived a memorandum from Pepsi Cola terminating his employment. On October 12, 1988, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital Region, and prayed for reinstatement with backwages, damages, and attor­ney's fees.

After the parties had filed their position papers, Labor Arbiter Isabel P. Ortiguerra rendered a decision in his favor on July 28, 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered the respondents are hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and are hereby ordered to reinstate complainants (sic) to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages to be computed from the time complainant was dismissed up to the time he is actually reinstated.

"The respondents are further ordered to pay complainant attor­ney's fees equivalent to 10% of the entire judgment award.

"The claim for moral and exemplary damages is hereby dismissed for lack of merit." (p. 54, Rollo.)

Pepsi Cola appealed to the NLRC on November 28, 1990. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

Expectedly, this petition for certiorari was filed by Corral, who alleges that he was dismissed without due process. His employer allegedly did not furnish him with written notice of the charges against him, but summarily discharged him on June 10, 1988, when he reported for work. He received a notice of dismissal on July 6, 1988 only, or almost one (1) month after he had been discharged.

Petitioner denied that he committed theft against Pepsi Cola. His only participation in the transaction of June 4, 1988 was that at 5:00 p.m. when he was about to leave the Pepsi Cola FTI Warehouse for his home, another yardman, Victor Abundo, and Ignacio Patal, a salesman, requested him to help them in loading 330 cases of Pepsi Cola products from route truck 228 assigned to salesman Patal and to deliver them to a customer who had ordered them. Patal promised to arrange for his services in acting as a truck helper, a practice allowed by the company.

After he had completed unloading 330 cases of Pepsi Cola products at the store of Patal's customer, whom he did not even know, he separated from Patal and Abundo, and headed home.

Four days later, or on June 8, 1988, he was ar­rested by Taguig policemen while performing his chores as a yardman at the Pepsi Cola FTI Warehouse. He was taken to the Taguig Police Station without being informed of the offense he supposedly had committed, until a series of intimidating questions on his alleged par­ticipation in the theft of Pepsi which occurred on June 4, 1988 were propounded to him by the police investiga­tors. They threatened to detain him unless he would admit his participation in the heist. He was included in an amended information as one of the accused in Crim. Case No. 73619 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasig. However, a month later or on July 8, 1992, the case was provisionally dismissed at the instance of the prosecution. Nevertheless, Pepsi Cola refused to take Corral back.

After a careful review of the record, we find merit in the petition for certiorari.

The record shows that Corral was dismissed from the service on July 6, 1988, the date he received a memorandum from Pepsi Cola accusing him of having "acted as accomplice to consummate a crime of theft perpetuated by Abundo of carting away 330 cases of PCD products amounting to P31,530.00 using company truck No. 228" (p. 29, Rollo). Prior thereto, he was neither informed why his services were being terminated, nor given a chance to defend himself. His summary dismissal violated the following procedure to be observed by employers desiring to dismiss employees:

"Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.

"x x x                         x x x                             x x x.

"Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allega­tions stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires." (Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.)

In Century Textile Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528, 535, the Court defined the essential elements of due process:

"The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these two requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the 1987 Constitution."

Pepsi Cola did not comply with the above guide­lines for the dismissal of its employee. The procedure prescribed by law is mandatory. Unless followed, the employee's right to due process of law is breached and vitiates management's decision to terminate the employ­ment (Rutty vs. NLRC, 182 SCRA 365).

This Court had stated in an earlier case that while it is the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee, the exercise of that prerogative must be made without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only the employee's position but also his means of livelihood. Basically, the right of an employer to dismiss an employee differs from, and should not be confused with, the manner in which that right is exercised. It must not be oppressive and abusive for a worker's right to his job is a property right (Remerco Garments Mfg. vs. Min. of Labor, et al., 135 SCRA 167).

The investigation and trial of the criminal charge against the petitioner could not take the place of the notice and hearing required under the Labor Code. In any event, since the criminal action was provisionally dismissed on July 8, 1992, at the instance of the prosecution, that circumstance bolsters the petitioner's claim of innocence or lack of lawful cause for the termination of his employment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission was rendered with grave abuse of discretion, hence, it should be SET ASIDE. The decision dated July 28, 1989 of Labor Arbi­ter Isabel P. Ortiguerra is hereby reinstated with modification of the award for backwages which shall not exceed three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.